plaintiff contends defense in New York

1963In Dowsey v. Village of Kensington ( 257 N. Y. 221, 228 ): “ The plaintiff contends that the rule itself is invalid and that its existence seriously affects the value of her property.

1960Proof of such a situation on trial may well render valid the defendant’s contention in this regard upon the principle stated in Dowsey v. Village of Kensington ( 257 N. Y. 221, 228 ) as follows: ‘£ The plaintiff contends that the rule itself is invalid and that its existence seriously affects the value of her property.

2016The evidentiary rulings which the plaintiff contends were in error were proper exercises of the Supreme Court’s broad discretion in making such rulings (see Newark v Pimentel, 117 AD3d 581 [2014]; Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398 [2012]; Montes v New York City Tr.

2016The evidentiary rulings which the plaintiff contends were in error were proper exercises of the Supreme Court’s broad discretion in making such rulings (see Newark v Pimentel, 117 AD3d 581 [2014]; Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398 [2012]; Montes v New York City Tr.

2016Auth., 46 AD3d 121 [2007]).

1966For this proposition, the plaintiff cites Hatch v. Baker ( 139 Misc. 717 ); Howard v. Kirkpatrick ( 263 App. Div. 776 ); and Sherling v. Gallatin Improvement Co. ( 237 App. Div. 535 ).

1966For this proposition, the plaintiff cites Hatch v. Baker ( 139 Misc. 717 ); Howard v. Kirkpatrick ( 263 App. Div. 776 ); and Sherling v. Gallatin Improvement Co. ( 237 App. Div. 535 ).

1966For this proposition, the plaintiff cites Hatch v. Baker ( 139 Misc. 717 ); Howard v. Kirkpatrick ( 263 App. Div. 776 ); and Sherling v. Gallatin Improvement Co. ( 237 App. Div. 535 ).

1945(See Stern v. Great Island Corp., 250 App. Div. 115 ; Pollard v. Trivia Building Corp., 291 N. Y. 19 .) It seems clear that were this such a statutory cause of action, the plaintiff’s right to recover would nob depend upon any negligence of the defendant but would rest upon a breach of statutory duty, to the injury of the plaintiff, and in such circumstances contributory negligence would not constitute a defense.

1945(See Stern v. Great Island Corp., 250 App. Div. 115 ; Pollard v. Trivia Building Corp., 291 N. Y. 19 .) It seems clear that were this such a statutory cause of action, the plaintiff’s right to recover would nob depend upon any negligence of the defendant but would rest upon a breach of statutory duty, to the injury of the plaintiff, and in such circumstances contributory negligence would not constitute a defense.

1935In discussing the decision of Judge Werner in Netograph Manufacturing Co. v. Scrugham ( 197 N. Y. 377 ), the attorney for the plaintiff contends that the privilege of immunity only applies to residents without the State and has no bearing on the question of a resident within the State in view of the language of the court at page 380, where the court states: “ It is in furtherance of that policy and the due administration of justice that suitors and witnesses from abroad are privileged from liability.” This argument may be reduced to an absurdity and the principle enunciated in Netograph Manufa

1935In discussing the decision of Judge Werner in Netograph Manufacturing Co. v. Scrugham ( 197 N. Y. 377 ), the attorney for the plaintiff contends that the privilege of immunity only applies to residents without the State and has no bearing on the question of a resident within the State in view of the language of the court at page 380, where the court states: “ It is in furtherance of that policy and the due administration of justice that suitors and witnesses from abroad are privileged from liability.” This argument may be reduced to an absurdity and the principle enunciated in Netograph Manufa

1931Law, § 58) provides that all statements purporting to be made by the insured shall be deemed representations and not warranties; that by accepting the policies plaintiff made the language of this provision her own; that the provision is, as stated in Archer v. Equitable Life Assurance Society ( 218 N. Y. 18, 25 ) “ metamorphosed ” into a representation; that a misrepresentation does not necessarily effect a forfeiture, which is not favored; that in order to make a misrepresentation available as a defense, it must be alleged not only that a material statement is untrue, but also that the plaint

1931Church v. Walsh, 244 N. Y. 280, 290 .) The plaintiff contends that the rule itself is invalid and that its existence seriously affects the value of her property.

1922In Kaufman v. Kaufman ( 177 App. Div. 162 ) the plaintiff was denied a judgment of annulment which he sought on the ground that the defendant had another husband living at the time of his marriage with her because he had persuaded and induced her to secure a foreign divorce and had furnished her the money to do so, and assured her that the divorce so obtained was valid.

1922On the other hand, the Pennsylvania judgment would prevent the plaintiff claiming any matrimonial rights against Kelsey upon the principle that “ ‘ where a party has invoked the jurisdiction of any court and submitted himself theretq, he cannot thereafter be heard to question such jurisdiction.’ ” (Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503 .) The plaintiff contends that this principle was also applicable to James Bell in his lifetime, and is binding upon the defendants who succeeded to his rights, because Bell was cognizant of the plaintiff’s original intention when she went to Pennsylvania to secur

1916Co., 192 N. Y. 97 .

1915(Vought v. Williams, 120 N. Y. 253, 257 ; B lanck v. Badlier, 153 id. 551, 556; Moot v. Business Men’s Investment Assn., 157 id. 201, 211; McPherson v. Schade, 149 id. 16; Heller v. Cohen, 154 id. 299, 306.) Counsel for the plaintiff contends that the rule of caveat emptor applies, and in that behalf he relies on the referee’s finding, “ That the projections of the bay windows and portico, the existence of which the defendant has assigned as an objection to the title tendered to him, * * * were patent and visible to one on inspecting the premises; and that the defendant, before entering into t

1912Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige, 139 , 23 Am.