plaintiff contends rule in Massachusetts

2008The plaintiff contends that the standard of review should be “substantial evidence,” that is, evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Levy v. Acting Governor, supra at 745 , quoting G.

2002See Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 426 Mass. 268, 280 (1997); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 785 , cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 850 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 61 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).

2002See Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 426 Mass. 268, 280 (1997); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 785 , cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 850 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 61 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).

2002See Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 426 Mass. 268, 280 (1997); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 785 , cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 850 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 61 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).

2002See Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 426 Mass. 268, 280 (1997); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 785 , cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 850 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 61 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).

2002See Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 426 Mass. 268, 280 (1997); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 785 , cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 850 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 61 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).

2002See Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 426 Mass. 268, 280 (1997); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 785 , cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 850 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 61 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).

1960The plaintiff contends that the rule of law applicable in the instant case is that-propounded in Yorra v. Lynch, 226 Mass. 153 , (see also Green v. Carigianis, 217 Mass. 1 ), which requires the owner of a building in possession or control of a part of it to exercise reasonable care to keep the part under his control in such condition that others will not be injured in their persons and damaged in their property, and that such duty extends not only to a tenant (the tenant’s son in Yorra v. Lynch, supra), but also to others in similar circumstances, including adjoining land owners and members of

1960The plaintiff contends that the rule of law applicable in the instant case is that-propounded in Yorra v. Lynch, 226 Mass. 153 , (see also Green v. Carigianis, 217 Mass. 1 ), which requires the owner of a building in possession or control of a part of it to exercise reasonable care to keep the part under his control in such condition that others will not be injured in their persons and damaged in their property, and that such duty extends not only to a tenant (the tenant’s son in Yorra v. Lynch, supra), but also to others in similar circumstances, including adjoining land owners and members of

1960The plaintiff contends that the rule of law applicable in the instant case is that-propounded in Yorra v. Lynch, 226 Mass. 153 , (see also Green v. Carigianis, 217 Mass. 1 ), which requires the owner of a building in possession or control of a part of it to exercise reasonable care to keep the part under his control in such condition that others will not be injured in their persons and damaged in their property, and that such duty extends not only to a tenant (the tenant’s son in Yorra v. Lynch, supra), but also to others in similar circumstances, including adjoining land owners and members of

1960Grasselli Dyestuff Corp. v. John Campbell & Co., 259 Mass. 103, 108 .

1939In the case just cited, the court said, at page 357, that it was not willing to go further than the doctrine stated in Davey v. Greenfield & Turner’s Falls Street Railway, 177 Mass. 106 , that, when there has been an invitation on the part of the carrier by stopping for the reception of a passenger, any person actually taking hold of the car and beginning to enter it is a passenger.

1939The plaintiff contends that the rule adopted in determining when a person becomes a passenger on a street car, see Duchemin v. Boston Elevated Railway, 186 Mass. 353 , should apply in the case at bar.

1935The plaintiff contends that the exception to the general rule, stated in Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387 , at page 390, governs the class of action to which the instant action is referable.

1934It is, however, contended by the plaintiff that the clause in question was intended to make certain the right of the seller to treat the failure to pay for an instalment of ice on its due date as a repudiation of the whole contract by the buyer, and that “it had absolutely no bearing on the question of passing of title,” citing National Machine & Tool Co. v. Standard Shoe Machinery Co. 181 Mass. 275 .

1921The plaintiff contends that the principle established in Blood v. Kane, 130 N. Y. 514, 518 , Matter of Mullon, 145 N. Y. 98 , Cooper v. Cooper, L.

1921The plaintiff contends that the principle established in Blood v. Kane, 130 N. Y. 514, 518 , Matter of Mullon, 145 N. Y. 98 , Cooper v. Cooper, L.

1915It was said by Mr. Justice Sheldon, speaking for the court, in Whitney v. Cheshire Railroad, 210 Mass. 263 , at page 268, with ample citation of authorities, “The rule has been laid down that where a demand is necessary to fix the legal rights of a party and give a complete cause of action, the demand ordinarily must be made within the time limited for bringing an action at law.” The plaintiff contends that this rule is confined in its operation to cases where an executory contract calls for the performance of some act upon demand. n But while many instances where it has been invoked are of th