slander claim (New York) · Go Syfert
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slander claim in New York

12 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1981–2022 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
Stein v. Tragergreen
nysupct · 1962 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022Attending school does not count as a "trade, business or profession," so as to bring this case within the realm of slander per se ( see Stein v Trager , 36 Misc 2d 227, 229 [Sup Ct, Erie County 1962]; Cain v Esthetique , 182 F Supp 3d 54, 73 [SD NY 2016], affd 733 Fed Appx 8 [2d Cir 2018], cert denied __ US __, 139 S Ct 1199 [2019]; TC v Valley Cent.

2022Attending school does not count as a "trade, business or profession," so as to bring this case within the realm of slander per se ( see Stein v Trager , 36 Misc 2d 227, 229 [Sup Ct, Erie County 1962]; Cain v Esthetique , 182 F Supp 3d 54, 73 [SD NY 2016], affd 733 Fed Appx 8 [2d Cir 2018], cert denied __ US __, 139 S Ct 1199 [2019]; TC v Valley Cent.

22
Lerwick v. Kelseygreen
nyappdiv · 2005 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013It is well settled that “[w]here relief may be afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 , 143 [1985]; see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 118-119 [1984]; Morrison v Woolley, 45 AD3d 953, 954 [2007]; Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 932 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 711 [2006]).

2013It is well settled that “[w]here relief may be afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 , 143 [1985]; see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 118-119 [1984]; Morrison v Woolley, 45 AD3d 953, 954 [2007]; Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 932 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 711 [2006]).

22
Morrison v. Woolleygreen
nyappdiv · 2007 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013It is well settled that “[w]here relief may be afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 , 143 [1985]; see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 118-119 [1984]; Morrison v Woolley, 45 AD3d 953, 954 [2007]; Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 932 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 711 [2006]).

2013It is well settled that “[w]here relief may be afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 , 143 [1985]; see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 118-119 [1984]; Morrison v Woolley, 45 AD3d 953, 954 [2007]; Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 932 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 711 [2006]).

22
Curiano v. Suozzigreen
ny · 1984 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013It is well settled that “[w]here relief may be afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 , 143 [1985]; see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 118-119 [1984]; Morrison v Woolley, 45 AD3d 953, 954 [2007]; Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 932 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 711 [2006]).

2013It is well settled that “[w]here relief may be afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 , 143 [1985]; see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 118-119 [1984]; Morrison v Woolley, 45 AD3d 953, 954 [2007]; Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 932 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 711 [2006]).

22
Vardi v. Mutual Life Insurancegreen
nyappdiv · 1988 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Co. of N.Y., 136 AD2d 453, 456 [1988]).

11
Liberman v. Gelsteingreen
ny · 1992 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007As a general rule, slander is not actionable absent a showing of special harm (Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 434 [1992]), unless the defamatory statement constitutes slander per se (id. at 435).

11
Avant Graphics Ltd. v. United Reprographics, Inc.green
nyappdiv · 1998 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Because the offending words are not set forth in the complaint, the slander claim is dismissed with leave to replead, if plaintiff be so advised (Avant Graphics v United Reprographics, 252 AD2d 462, 463 [1st Dept 1998]).

11
K. I. v. New York City Board of Educationgreen
nyappdiv · 1998 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Negligent Hiring and Retention A cause of action for negligent hiring or retention requires allegations that the employer “knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity to commit injury,” or the employer failed to investigate a prospective employee notwithstanding knowledge of “facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate that prospective employee” (T.W.v City of New York, 286 AD2d 243, 245 [1st Dept 2001]; see, as to elements, K.I. v New York City Bd. of Educ., 256 AD2d 189 [1st Dept 1998], and Yeboah v Snapple, Inc., 286 AD2d 204 [1st Dept 2001]; see also, addres

11
Yeboah v. Snapple, Inc.green
nyappdiv · 2001 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Negligent Hiring and Retention A cause of action for negligent hiring or retention requires allegations that the employer “knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity to commit injury,” or the employer failed to investigate a prospective employee notwithstanding knowledge of “facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate that prospective employee” (T.W.v City of New York, 286 AD2d 243, 245 [1st Dept 2001]; see, as to elements, K.I. v New York City Bd. of Educ., 256 AD2d 189 [1st Dept 1998], and Yeboah v Snapple, Inc., 286 AD2d 204 [1st Dept 2001]; see also, addres

11
T. W. v. City of New Yorkgreen
nyappdiv · 2001 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Negligent Hiring and Retention A cause of action for negligent hiring or retention requires allegations that the employer “knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity to commit injury,” or the employer failed to investigate a prospective employee notwithstanding knowledge of “facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate that prospective employee” (T.W.v City of New York, 286 AD2d 243, 245 [1st Dept 2001]; see, as to elements, K.I. v New York City Bd. of Educ., 256 AD2d 189 [1st Dept 1998], and Yeboah v Snapple, Inc., 286 AD2d 204 [1st Dept 2001]; see also, addres

11
Detone v. Bullit Courier Service, Inc.green
nyappdiv · 1988 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Negligent Hiring and Retention A cause of action for negligent hiring or retention requires allegations that the employer “knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity to commit injury,” or the employer failed to investigate a prospective employee notwithstanding knowledge of “facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate that prospective employee” (T.W.v City of New York, 286 AD2d 243, 245 [1st Dept 2001]; see, as to elements, K.I. v New York City Bd. of Educ., 256 AD2d 189 [1st Dept 1998], and Yeboah v Snapple, Inc., 286 AD2d 204 [1st Dept 2001]; see also, addres

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (17)

CaseCitedYears
Cain v. Atelier Esthetique Inst. of Esthetics, Inc. neutral
scotus · 2019
2 sentences

2022Attending school does not count as a "trade, business or profession," so as to bring this case within the realm of slander per se ( see Stein v Trager , 36 Misc 2d 227, 229 [Sup Ct, Erie County 1962]; Cain v Esthetique , 182 F Supp 3d 54, 73 [SD NY 2016], affd 733 Fed Appx 8 [2d Cir 2018], cert denied __ US __, 139 S Ct 1199 [2019]; TC v Valley Cent.

2022Attending school does not count as a "trade, business or profession," so as to bring this case within the realm of slander per se ( see Stein v Trager , 36 Misc 2d 227, 229 [Sup Ct, Erie County 1962]; Cain v Esthetique , 182 F Supp 3d 54, 73 [SD NY 2016], affd 733 Fed Appx 8 [2d Cir 2018], cert denied __ US __, 139 S Ct 1199 [2019]; TC v Valley Cent.

22022–2022
Lerwick v. Kelsey green
ny · 2006
2 sentences

2013It is well settled that “[w]here relief may be afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 , 143 [1985]; see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 118-119 [1984]; Morrison v Woolley, 45 AD3d 953, 954 [2007]; Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 932 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 711 [2006]).

2013It is well settled that “[w]here relief may be afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 , 143 [1985]; see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 118-119 [1984]; Morrison v Woolley, 45 AD3d 953, 954 [2007]; Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 932 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 711 [2006]).

22013–2013
Van-Go Transport Co., Inc. v. New York City Bd. of Educ. green
nyed · 1997
1 sentence

2011Analyzing compelled self-publication as an exception to the general rule that publication of the libel by the defendant to a third party is a necessary element of liability for defamation, the Van-Go court would impose liability only “if the defendant knew or could have foreseen that the plaintiff would be compelled to repeat the defamatory statement” ( 971 F Supp at 102 , quoting J.

12011–2011
Mandelblatt v. Perelman green
nysd · 1988
1 sentence

2011Crew Group, Inc. v Griffin, 1990 WL 193918 , 1990 US Dist LEXIS 15835 [SD NY 1990]; Weldy v Piedmont Airlines, 1989 WL 158342 [WD NY 1989], revd 985 F2d 57 [2d Cir 1993] [on the grounds that the District Court improperly dismissed the slander claim (the dismissed defamation claim was not appealed)]; Mandelblatt v Perelman, 683 F Supp 379 [SD NY 1988]; Elmore v Shell Oil Co., 733 F Supp 544 [ED NY 1988]; cf. Tischmann v ITT/Sheraton Corp., 882 F Supp 1358 [SD NY 1995]).

12011–2011
Tischmann v. ITT/Sheraton Corp. green
nysd · 1995
1 sentence

2011Crew Group, Inc. v Griffin, 1990 WL 193918 , 1990 US Dist LEXIS 15835 [SD NY 1990]; Weldy v Piedmont Airlines, 1989 WL 158342 [WD NY 1989], revd 985 F2d 57 [2d Cir 1993] [on the grounds that the District Court improperly dismissed the slander claim (the dismissed defamation claim was not appealed)]; Mandelblatt v Perelman, 683 F Supp 379 [SD NY 1988]; Elmore v Shell Oil Co., 733 F Supp 544 [ED NY 1988]; cf. Tischmann v ITT/Sheraton Corp., 882 F Supp 1358 [SD NY 1995]).

12011–2011
Elmore v. Shell Oil Co. green
nyed · 1988
1 sentence

2011Crew Group, Inc. v Griffin, 1990 WL 193918 , 1990 US Dist LEXIS 15835 [SD NY 1990]; Weldy v Piedmont Airlines, 1989 WL 158342 [WD NY 1989], revd 985 F2d 57 [2d Cir 1993] [on the grounds that the District Court improperly dismissed the slander claim (the dismissed defamation claim was not appealed)]; Mandelblatt v Perelman, 683 F Supp 379 [SD NY 1988]; Elmore v Shell Oil Co., 733 F Supp 544 [ED NY 1988]; cf. Tischmann v ITT/Sheraton Corp., 882 F Supp 1358 [SD NY 1995]).

12011–2011
Abbott v. Herzfeld & Rubin, P. C. neutral
ny · 1994
1 sentence

2003The balance of plaintiffs request is not supported by a proposed amended pleading nor by evidentiary supporting material (Abbott v Herzfeld & Rubin, 202 AD2d 351 [1st Dept 1994], lv dismissed and denied 83 NY2d 995 [1994]). .

12003–2003
Abbott v. Herzfeld & Rubin, P. C. green
nyappdiv · 1994
1 sentence

2003The balance of plaintiffs request is not supported by a proposed amended pleading nor by evidentiary supporting material (Abbott v Herzfeld & Rubin, 202 AD2d 351 [1st Dept 1994], lv dismissed and denied 83 NY2d 995 [1994]). .

12003–2003
McIntyre v. Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. green
nyappdiv · 1998
1 sentence

2000All the same, the purpose of punitive damages on a slander claim should be to punish the slander itself, since there must be a reasonable relationship between punitive damages and actual damages (see, e.g., McIntyre v.Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, 256 AD2d 269, 270-271 , appeal dismissed 93 NY2d 919 , lv denied 94 NY2d 753 ).

12000–2000
Miss American Petite, Inc. v. Fox Broadcasting Co. green
nyappdiv · 1999
1 sentence

2000Here, it is clear that the punitive damages award was intended to punish not merely the act of slander that was the gravamen of the counterclaim, but a broad range of malicious behavior, including numerous verbal statements that were plainly “ ‘loose, figurative or hyperbolic’ ” non-actionable expressions of opinion (Miss American Petite v Fox Broadcasting Co., 262 AD2d 33, 34 ).

12000–2000
King v. Tanner green
nysupct · 1989
2 sentences

1989That court further held that common-law standards of proof for defamation are applicable, and DNA test results are, in and of themselves, sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy in circumstances as these, where Ms. T. was married to another at the time of conception (King v Tanner, supra, at 1005 ).

1989Delaney, Supreme Court Justice, held that the results of a DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) test which indicate a probability of paternity of 99.993% are sufficient as a matter of law to warrant summary judgment dismissing the slander claim (King v Tanner, 142 Misc 2d 1004 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 1989]).

11989–1989
Kennedy v. Butler, Inc. green
ny · 1927
1 sentence

1986For purposes of a slander claim, however, it is clear that a false and malicious utterance by one employee to another can be actionable (see, Ostrowe v Lee, 256 NY 36 ; Kennedy v James Butler, Inc., 245 NY 204 ; Pirre v Printing Devs., 468 F Supp 1028, 1041 , affd 614 F2d 1290; PJI 3:23 [1986 Cum Supp]).

11986–1986
Ostrowe v. Lee green
ny · 1931
1 sentence

1986For purposes of a slander claim, however, it is clear that a false and malicious utterance by one employee to another can be actionable (see, Ostrowe v Lee, 256 NY 36 ; Kennedy v James Butler, Inc., 245 NY 204 ; Pirre v Printing Devs., 468 F Supp 1028, 1041 , affd 614 F2d 1290; PJI 3:23 [1986 Cum Supp]).

11986–1986
Pirre v. Printing Developments, Inc. green
nysd · 1979
1 sentence

1986For purposes of a slander claim, however, it is clear that a false and malicious utterance by one employee to another can be actionable (see, Ostrowe v Lee, 256 NY 36 ; Kennedy v James Butler, Inc., 245 NY 204 ; Pirre v Printing Devs., 468 F Supp 1028, 1041 , affd 614 F2d 1290; PJI 3:23 [1986 Cum Supp]).

11986–1986
Town of Cheektowaga v. City of Buffalo neutral
nyappdiv · 1979
1 sentence

1981It is doubtful that they have a cause of action for such conduct in any event (see Matter of Town of Cheektowaga v City of Buffalo, 67 AD2d 812 ; Rottkamp v Young, 21 AD2d 373, affd 15 NY2d 831 ), but until they exhaust the procedures for administrative review, they have not been deprived of the use of their land and redress must be limited to the slander claim.

11981–1981
Rottkamp v. Young green
ny · 1965
1 sentence

1981It is doubtful that they have a cause of action for such conduct in any event (see Matter of Town of Cheektowaga v City of Buffalo, 67 AD2d 812 ; Rottkamp v Young, 21 AD2d 373, affd 15 NY2d 831 ), but until they exhaust the procedures for administrative review, they have not been deprived of the use of their land and redress must be limited to the slander claim.

11981–1981
Rottkamp v. Young green
nyappdiv · 1964
1 sentence

1981It is doubtful that they have a cause of action for such conduct in any event (see Matter of Town of Cheektowaga v City of Buffalo, 67 AD2d 812 ; Rottkamp v Young, 21 AD2d 373, affd 15 NY2d 831 ), but until they exhaust the procedures for administrative review, they have not been deprived of the use of their land and redress must be limited to the slander claim.

11981–1981

Where else courts name it

TX 13 (1989–2019) NY 12 (1981–2022) CA 10 (1999–2026) MS 6 (2007–2024) GA 5 (1979–2023) NC 4 (2005–2017) OH 3 (2002–2020) CT 3 (1999–2018) MA 3 (2000–2002) MO 3 (1996–2006) AL 3 (1893–2026) NE 2 (2005–2025) MI 2 (1984–2016) CO 2 (1979–1983) RI 2 (2002–2026) PA 2 (1986–2009) DC 2 (1990–2013) UT 2 (1992–2000) ME 2 (1991–1995) WV 2 (1998–2020) FL 2 (2005–2005)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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