observed violation (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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observed violation in Ohio

12 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Whren v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1996 · cited in 3 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2000–2003
2 sentences

2003See, also, Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 . {¶ 16} R.C. 4503.21 requires operators of motor vehicles to “display in plain view on the front and rear of the motor vehicle the distinctive number and registration mark * * * furnished by the director of public safety.” R.C. 4503.22 provides that the distinctive number shall appear on a “license plate.” Together, these provisions require the license plates issued for a vehicle to be displayed on the front and rear of the vehicle, and in both instances, “in plain view.” {¶ 17} Defendant argues that the

2003See, also, Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 . {¶ 16} R.C. 4503.21 requires operators of motor vehicles to “display in plain view on the front and rear of the motor vehicle the distinctive number and registration mark * * * furnished by the director of public safety.” R.C. 4503.22 provides that the distinctive number shall appear on a “license plate.” Together, these provisions require the license plates issued for a vehicle to be displayed on the front and rear of the vehicle, and in both instances, “in plain view.” {¶ 17} Defendant argues that the

13
United States v. Patrick Arthur Castro, United States of America v. Herbert Thomas Cottergreen
ca9 · 1989 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025In Sims, this Court observed that the test is: “whether a joint trial is so manifestly prejudicial that the trial judge is required to exercise his or her discretion in only one way —by severing the trial. * * * A defendant must show clear, manifest or undue prejudice and violation of a substantive right resulting from failure to sever.” Sims, ¶38 quoting State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71 (1990), quoting United States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 1989).

11
Berish v. Berishgreen
ohio · 1982 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Decree, Decision, & Entry at 7.) {¶ 22} Upon review, the trial court observed the instruction of Berish , that "[i]t is the equitableness of the result reached that must stand the test of fairness on review." Berish at 320, 432 N.E.2d 183 .

2017And while there was ample evidence in this case to suggest that the marriage was irretrievably on the path to ending before the final hearing, fixing an exact date for de facto termination is (as the Berish court noted) "extremely difficult." Id.

11
McKimm v. Ohio Elections Commissiongreen
ohio · 2000 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006The court observed that the requirement of actual malice is intended to provide "essential `breathing space' for the criticism that is inevitable in free debate and crucial to our democratic system." Id. at 147.

2006However, the court also stressed that: {¶ 89} "[o]n the other hand, the actual-malice standard is not an impenetrable shield for the benefit of those who engage in false speech about public figures. `[F]alse speech, even political speech, does not merit constitutional protection if the speaker knows of the falsehood or recklessly disregards the truth. `* * * `[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected. * * * Hence the knowingly false statement and

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
City of Dayton v. Erickson green
ohio · 1996
2 sentences

2003Defendant argues, however, that because Officer Oldham saw the front license plate on the vehicle’s dashboard when he approached it after the stop, the officer had no legitimate basis to continue defendant’s detention, thus, requiring suppression of the crack cocaine that was later discovered on defendant’s person. *155 {¶ 15} Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 , confirmed that an observed violation of the motor vehicle code is a sufficient justification to stop and detain a motorist, such that no independent reasonable and articulable suspicion of other criminal acti

2003Defendant argues, however, that because Officer Oldham saw the front license plate on the vehicle’s dashboard when he approached it after the stop, the officer had no legitimate basis to continue defendant’s detention, thus, requiring suppression of the crack cocaine that was later discovered on defendant’s person. *155 {¶ 15} Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 , confirmed that an observed violation of the motor vehicle code is a sufficient justification to stop and detain a motorist, such that no independent reasonable and articulable suspicion of other criminal acti

32000–2003
State v. Torres green
ohio · 1981
1 sentence

2025A defendant must provide “the trial court with sufficient information so that it [can] weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the defendant's right to a fair trial.” State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340 (1981), syllabus; accord Ford at ¶ 106.

12025–2025
State v. Schiebel green
ohio · 1990
1 sentence

2025In Sims, this Court observed that the test is: “whether a joint trial is so manifestly prejudicial that the trial judge is required to exercise his or her discretion in only one way —by severing the trial. * * * A defendant must show clear, manifest or undue prejudice and violation of a substantive right resulting from failure to sever.” Sims, ¶38 quoting State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71 (1990), quoting United States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 1989).

12025–2025
Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan green
scotus · 2016
2 sentences

2023Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan Bd. of Trustees, 577 U.S. 136, 144-145 , 136 S.Ct. 651 , 193 L.Ed.2d 556 (2016).

2023Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan Bd. of Trustees, 577 U.S. 136, 144-145 , 136 S.Ct. 651 , 193 L.Ed.2d 556 (2016).

12023–2023
State v. Adams green
ohioctapp · 1982
2 sentences

2017Id., citing State v. Adams, 3 Ohio App. 3d 50 , 443 N.E.2d 1047 (10th Dist.1982); State v. James, 12th Dist.

2017Id., citing State v. Adams, 3 Ohio App. 3d 50 , 443 N.E.2d 1047 (10th Dist.1982); State v. James, 12th Dist.

12017–2017
State ex rel. Gross v. Industrial Commission green
ohio · 2007
2 sentences

2016Subsequently, the Industrial Commission terminated the employee’s TTD benefits on the basis of voluntary abandonment of employment, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to reinstate those benefits. {¶ 47} In affirming, this court observed that the doctrine of voluntary abandonment “has never been applied to preinjury conduct or conduct contemporaneous with the injury.” Gross II, 115 Ohio St.3d 249 , 2007-Ohio-4916 , 874 N.E.2d 1162, at ¶ 19 .

2016Subsequently, the Industrial Commission terminated the employee’s TTD benefits on the basis of voluntary abandonment of employment, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to reinstate those benefits. {¶ 47} In affirming, this court observed that the doctrine of voluntary abandonment “has never been applied to preinjury conduct or conduct contemporaneous with the injury.” Gross II, 115 Ohio St.3d 249 , 2007-Ohio-4916 , 874 N.E.2d 1162, at ¶ 19 .

12016–2016
Holda v. Blankfield, Unpublished Decision (2-24-2005) neutral
ohioctapp · 2005
1 sentence

2011The test of the existence of medical negligence is not hindsight, but one of foresight, considering all of the then known facts and with the state of medical knowledge at the time the physician acted.” {¶ 53} In Holda v. Blankfield, Cuyahoga App. No. 84350, 2005-Ohio-766 , this court observed that such instruction is a correct statement of the law.

12011–2011
Ericksen v. Edmonds School District No. 15 green
wash · 1942
2 sentences

2007The court observed that the clause was accompanied by an additional contractual stipulation that if “such hindrances or delays are occasioned by any act or omission on the part of the owner himself, additional time for the completion of the work will be allowed, provided always that the contractor shall have given notice in writing.” Id. at 410 , 125 P.2d 275 .

2007The court observed that the clause was accompanied by an additional contractual stipulation that if “such hindrances or delays are occasioned by any act or omission on the part of the owner himself, additional time for the completion of the work will be allowed, provided always that the contractor shall have given notice in writing.” Id. at 410 , 125 P.2d 275 .

12007–2007
Terry v. Ohio green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

2003Defendant argues, however, that because Officer Oldham saw the front license plate on the vehicle’s dashboard when he approached it after the stop, the officer had no legitimate basis to continue defendant’s detention, thus, requiring suppression of the crack cocaine that was later discovered on defendant’s person. *155 {¶ 15} Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 , confirmed that an observed violation of the motor vehicle code is a sufficient justification to stop and detain a motorist, such that no independent reasonable and articulable suspicion of other criminal acti

2003Defendant argues, however, that because Officer Oldham saw the front license plate on the vehicle’s dashboard when he approached it after the stop, the officer had no legitimate basis to continue defendant’s detention, thus, requiring suppression of the crack cocaine that was later discovered on defendant’s person. *155 {¶ 15} Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 , confirmed that an observed violation of the motor vehicle code is a sufficient justification to stop and detain a motorist, such that no independent reasonable and articulable suspicion of other criminal acti

12003–2003
State v. Purcell green
ohioctapp · 1995
1 sentence

1999Similarly, in State v. Purcell (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 501 , the First District Court of Appeals held that the defense counsel's decision to withdraw a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute deficient performance as the defense was not supported by expert testimony.

11999–1999

Where else courts name it

PA 53 (1980–2026) TX 35 (1943–2023) CA 34 (1959–2025) IL 22 (1898–2023) MD 17 (1980–2025) NJ 16 (1964–2022) OH 12 (1999–2025) NY 11 (1894–2024) WA 10 (1902–2026) IN 10 (1994–2019) WI 10 (1928–2023) FL 9 (1956–2008) MI 8 (1999–2026) KS 7 (1964–2026) IA 7 (1988–2015) LA 7 (1995–2013) GA 5 (1980–2001) WY 5 (1989–2025) AZ 5 (1990–2019) MA 5 (1983–2026) VA 4 (1959–2008) NM 4 (1986–2023) TN 4 (1995–2011) MO 3 (1953–2004) CO 3 (1994–2019) DE 3 (1954–2024) DC 3 (1981–2013) WV 3 (2012–2017) UT 3 (1994–2024) MT 3 (2005–2009) SD 3 (2007–2019) AK 3 (1978–1994) RI 2 (1968–1981) ND 2 (1986–1998) NH 2 (1987–2016) NC 2 (1998–2016) OR 2 (2007–2013) OK 2 (1999–2002)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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