observed privilege in Maryland

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

1993In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 , 111 S.Ct. 56 , 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.)

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

1993In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 , 111 S.Ct. 56 , 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.)

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

1993In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 , 111 S.Ct. 56 , 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.)

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

1993In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 , 111 S.Ct. 56 , 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.)

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

1993In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 , 111 S.Ct. 56 , 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.)

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

1993In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 , 111 S.Ct. 56 , 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.)

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

1993In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 , 111 S.Ct. 56 , 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.)

2025The Court observed that a violation of the right to a public trial is classified as a structural error not because such a violation “renders a trial fundamentally unfair in every case[,]” but rather, “because of the ‘difficulty of assessing the effect of the error.’” Id. (quoting Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4). 42 Applying that test, the Court observed that Weaver offered no evidence (or even legal argument) to establish a reasonable probability that, had his trial counsel objected to the partial closure of the courtroom, the result of his trial would have been different.

2025The Court observed that a violation of the right to a public trial is classified as a structural error not because such a violation “renders a trial fundamentally unfair in every case[,]” but rather, “because of the ‘difficulty of assessing the effect of the error.’” Id. (quoting Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4). 42 Applying that test, the Court observed that Weaver offered no evidence (or even legal argument) to establish a reasonable probability that, had his trial counsel objected to the partial closure of the courtroom, the result of his trial would have been different.

2021The Court further stated that, if the State opts to produce a single direct witness and corroborating circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial evidence must be “of such a nature so as to be of equal weight to that of at least a second 3 witness, thus foreclosing any reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 616-17 .

2021In defining the two-witness rule’s parameters, the Court observed that the rule had “been relaxed so as to allow a conviction of perjury to stand if there are two witnesses, or one witness corroborated by circumstances proved by independent testimony.” Id.

2018The criticism rests on the practical consideration that, while back-seat driving is generally an annoyance, and sometimes a danger, it is almost never a physical fact." 244 Md. at 139 , 223 A.2d 141 (internal citations omitted).

2018The criticism rests on the practical consideration that, while back-seat driving is generally an annoyance, and sometimes a danger, it is almost never a physical fact." 244 Md. at 139 , 223 A.2d 141 (internal citations omitted).

2012Id. at 369 , 761 A.2d 885 .

2012Id. at 369 , 761 A.2d 885 .

2011The court observed that the instruction was very similar to the instruction held to be plainly erroneous in Himple v. State, 101 Md.App. 579 , 647 A.2d 1240 (1994).

2011The court observed that the instruction was very similar to the instruction held to be plainly erroneous in Himple v. State, 101 Md.App. 579 , 647 A.2d 1240 (1994).

2010Keying on the italicized part of the Rule, the Court observed that the requirement is that “instructions be given in respect to the applicable law in a case” and “does not apply to factual matters or inferences of fact.” Id. at 684 , 741 A.2d at 1122 .

2010In examining the scope of the common law legislative privilege as applied to local legislators, this Court opined: *339 In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 403 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1178 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the Court observed that the privilege had its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th and 17th century England and that “such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders.” See also Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Baker v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 894 F.2d 679 (4t

2002The Court observed that the rule of Miranda is to be “enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated ... [that is, in situations that] exert[] upon a detained person pressure that sufficiently impair[s] his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.” 468 U.S. at 437 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 .

2002The Court observed that the rule of Miranda is to be “enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated ... [that is, in situations that] exert[] upon a detained person pressure that sufficiently impair[s] his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.” 468 U.S. at 437 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 .

2001Turning then to the demand futility issue, the court observed that the rule emanating from earlier cases was that “where officers and directors are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they cannot be considered proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation,” but concluded that those cases “cannot be taken to mean that any board approval of a challenged transaction automatically con *610 notes ‘hostile interest’ and ‘guilty participation’ by directors, or some other form of sterilizing influence upon them.” Id. at 814 .

2001Were that so, the court stated, “the demand requirements of our law would be meaningless.” Id.

1998Id.

1995Maxima, 100 Md.App. at 454 , 641 A.2d 977 .

1995Maxima, 100 Md.App. at 454 , 641 A.2d 977 .

1994Relying largely on certain pronouncements in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Court observed that the defense of sovereign or public official immunity involves an immunity from suit—a right to avoid trial— not merely a defense to liability, and that “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 , quoted at 311 Md. 456 , 535 A.2d 923 .

1994Relying largely on certain pronouncements in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Court observed that the defense of sovereign or public official immunity involves an immunity from suit—a right to avoid trial— not merely a defense to liability, and that “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 , quoted at 311 Md. 456 , 535 A.2d 923 .

1994Relying largely on certain pronouncements in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Court observed that the defense of sovereign or public official immunity involves an immunity from suit—a right to avoid trial— not merely a defense to liability, and that “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 , quoted at 311 Md. 456 , 535 A.2d 923 .

1994Thus, it held that, like a claim of double jeopardy, the erroneous rejection of sovereign immunity “would effectively escape review if the sovereign were forced to stand trial on that claim and await final judgment before obtaining appellate review.” Id. at 456-57 , 535 A.2d 923 .

1994Relying largely on certain pronouncements in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Court observed that the defense of sovereign or public official immunity involves an immunity from suit—a right to avoid trial— not merely a defense to liability, and that “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 , quoted at 311 Md. 456 , 535 A.2d 923 .

1994Relying largely on certain pronouncements in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Court observed that the defense of sovereign or public official immunity involves an immunity from suit—a right to avoid trial— not merely a defense to liability, and that “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 , quoted at 311 Md. 456 , 535 A.2d 923 .

1989Thus, the court stated that in 1983 “what doctors knew or should have known about the risk of AIDS in blood transfusion therapy was virtually nothing.” 663 F.Supp. at 1054 .

1982In Howard v. Jessup, 519 P.2d 913 (Okla. 1973), the Court observed that the principle of self-protection and self-interest operates with at least equal force in cases of declarations against penal interests as in those involving pecuniary or proprietary interests.

1982Id. at 917 , citing 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 620 at 674 (1967).

1981In Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241 (1977), the Court observed in defense of retaining the requirement of corroboration (p. 246): "We see as much need today, perhaps more so in view of the escalating prosecutorial trend freely to utilize accomplices as State witnesses, to retain the requirement that a person accused of crime not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” Howard Turner may well have been guilty of robbing and killing Vernon Hoshall, but the problem is that he was convicted solely by the words of his accomplice John Morris without any corroboration thereof.

1981In Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241 (1977), the Court observed in defense of retaining the requirement of corroboration (p. 246): "We see as much need today, perhaps more so in view of the escalating prosecutorial trend freely to utilize accomplices as State witnesses, to retain the requirement that a person accused of crime not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." Howard Turner may well have been guilty of robbing and killing Vernon Hoshall, but the problem is that he was convicted solely by the words of his accomplice John Morris without any corroboration thereof.

1980The Court observed that the doctrine "portended the enactment of legislation guaranteeing *474 detainees the right to prompt presentment in Baltimore City and Montgomery County." [1] Id. at 319 .

1980The Court observed that the doctrine "portended the enactment of legislation guaranteeing detainees the right to prompt presentment in Baltimore City and Montgomery County.” 1 Id. at 319 .