observed violation in New York

2024The record establishes, and defendant does not dispute, that the police were entitled to stop his vehicle based on an observed violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see People v Ricks , 145 AD3d 1610 , 1610-1611 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1000 [2017]; see generally People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]; People v Binion , 100 AD3d 1514 , 1515 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 911 [2013]).

2024The record establishes, and defendant does not dispute, that the police were entitled to stop his vehicle based on an observed violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see People v Ricks , 145 AD3d 1610 , 1610-1611 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1000 [2017]; see generally People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]; People v Binion , 100 AD3d 1514 , 1515 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 911 [2013]).

2024The record establishes, and defendant does not dispute, that the police were entitled to stop his vehicle based on an observed violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see People v Ricks , 145 AD3d 1610 , 1610-1611 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1000 [2017]; see generally People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]; People v Binion , 100 AD3d 1514 , 1515 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 911 [2013]).

2024The record establishes, and defendant does not dispute, that the police were entitled to stop his vehicle based on an observed violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see People v Ricks , 145 AD3d 1610 , 1610-1611 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1000 [2017]; see generally People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]; People v Binion , 100 AD3d 1514 , 1515 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 911 [2013]).

2024The record establishes, and defendant does not dispute, that the police were entitled to stop his vehicle based on an observed violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see People v Ricks , 145 AD3d 1610 , 1610-1611 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1000 [2017]; see generally People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]; People v Binion , 100 AD3d 1514 , 1515 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 911 [2013]).

2024The record establishes, and defendant does not dispute, that the police were entitled to stop his vehicle based on an observed violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see People v Ricks , 145 AD3d 1610 , 1610-1611 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1000 [2017]; see generally People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]; People v Binion , 100 AD3d 1514 , 1515 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 911 [2013]).

2013Further, he rejected defense counsels’ challenge to the temporal proximity of the showup procedure, citing People v Wells ( 221 AD2d 281 [1st Dept 1995], Iv denied 87 NY2d 978 [1996] [a two-hour time lapse between the robbery and showup does not compel a conclusion of invalidity]).

2013Further, he rejected defense counsels’ challenge to the temporal proximity of the showup procedure, citing People v Wells ( 221 AD2d 281 [1st Dept 1995], Iv denied 87 NY2d 978 [1996] [a two-hour time lapse between the robbery and showup does not compel a conclusion of invalidity]).

2008Thus, Watt and Casey together imply that an accusatory instrument that fails “reasonably” (People v Watt, 81 NY2d at 774 ) to serve its functions of providing fair notice and double jeopardy protection by specifying the time frame for the offense contains a jurisdictional defect; and, thus, a defendant does not have to raise the issue of the defect in the trial court in order to preserve it as a matter of law (see People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]; cf. People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 [2004], supra [with respect to facts establishing commission of offense, “(a)n information is jurisdic

2008In People v Casey ( 95 NY2d 354 [2000], supra), the Court observed that the requirement that an information “factually describe the elements of the crime and the particular acts of the defendant constituting its commission,” thus “giv[ing] an accused fair notice and prevent[ing] double jeopardy,” was not only constitutional in dimension, but also “not waivable” (id. at 363 [citations omitted]) — and, therefore, by implication, jurisdictional.

2008Thus, Watt and Casey together imply that an accusatory instrument that fails “reasonably” (People v Watt, 81 NY2d at 774 ) to serve its functions of providing fair notice and double jeopardy protection by specifying the time frame for the offense contains a jurisdictional defect; and, thus, a defendant does not have to raise the issue of the defect in the trial court in order to preserve it as a matter of law (see People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]; cf. People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 [2004], supra [with respect to facts establishing commission of offense, “(a)n information is jurisdic

2000(Garcia, supra, at 341 .) It also observed that factors “ ‘directly’ flowing from and relating to defendant’s personal conduct while committing the crime qualify [as mitigating circumstances].” (Id., at 342 [citations omitted].) In rejecting the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s age, prior criminal history and drug abuse problem constituted such circumstances, the Court observed that such factors “generally * * * do not pertain to defendant’s direct manner in the commission of the crime.” (Id.) In determining whether prior sexual victimization as a child, which was not involved in Gar

2000(Garcia, supra, at 341 .) It also observed that factors “ ‘directly’ flowing from and relating to defendant’s personal conduct while committing the crime qualify [as mitigating circumstances].” (Id., at 342 [citations omitted].) In rejecting the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s age, prior criminal history and drug abuse problem constituted such circumstances, the Court observed that such factors “generally * * * do not pertain to defendant’s direct manner in the commission of the crime.” (Id.) In determining whether prior sexual victimization as a child, which was not involved in Gar

1999In so doing, the court observed that the rule requires “clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependant relationship between the client and the attorney which often includes an attempt by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice” (citing Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d 505, 506-507 ).

1992That reason for the rule has been adopted by the Court of Appeals in People v McGrath ( 46 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 440 US 972 ) where the court observed that the rule has never been viewed as a "personal remedial right of a party aggrieved”, and again in People v Drain ( 73 NY2d 107, 110 ), where the court said that it consistently has "refused to suppress relevant evidence if little or no deterrent benefit could be anticipated from the exclusion”.

1992That reason for the rule has been adopted by the Court of Appeals in People v McGrath ( 46 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 440 US 972 ) where the court observed that the rule has never been viewed as a "personal remedial right of a party aggrieved”, and again in People v Drain ( 73 NY2d 107, 110 ), where the court said that it consistently has "refused to suppress relevant evidence if little or no deterrent benefit could be anticipated from the exclusion”.

1992The majority reads People v McGrath (supra) and People v Drain (supra) to suspend the exclusionary rule 'and allow the use of illegally seized evidence in civil proceedings only when exclusion would invite perjury.

1992That reason for the rule has been adopted by the Court of Appeals in People v McGrath ( 46 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 440 US 972 ) where the court observed that the rule has never been viewed as a "personal remedial right of a party aggrieved”, and again in People v Drain ( 73 NY2d 107, 110 ), where the court said that it consistently has "refused to suppress relevant evidence if little or no deterrent benefit could be anticipated from the exclusion”.

1992The majority reads People v McGrath (supra) and People v Drain (supra) to suspend the exclusionary rule 'and allow the use of illegally seized evidence in civil proceedings only when exclusion would invite perjury.

1976In Matter of Koner v Procaccino ( 45 AD2d 551, 554 , affd 39 NY2d 258 ) this court observed that the factors set forth in Matter of Rosenbloom v State Tax Comm. ( 44 AD2d 69 , mot for lv to app den 34 NY2d 518 ) could not be the exclusive test of determining a profession.

1976In Matter of Koner v Procaccino ( 45 AD2d 551, 554 , affd 39 NY2d 258 ) this court observed that the factors set forth in Matter of Rosenbloom v State Tax Comm. ( 44 AD2d 69 , mot for lv to app den 34 NY2d 518 ) could not be the exclusive test of determining a profession.

1976In Matter of Koner v Procaccino ( 45 AD2d 551, 554 , affd 39 NY2d 258 ) this court observed that the factors set forth in Matter of Rosenbloom v State Tax Comm. ( 44 AD2d 69 , mot for lv to app den 34 NY2d 518 ) could not be the exclusive test of determining a profession.

1906This rule and its history were discussed in Marsh v. McNair, 99 N. Y. 174 , where the court observed that the rule was an exception to the general rule of evidence forbidding the contradiction or explanation of written instruments by parol evidence and that it had long been established in the law of this State; that it grew up in the equity courts from the efforts of equity judges to prevent forfeitures, to relieve against frauds and to enforce the equitable maxim, “ Once a mortgage always a mortgage ”.

1894(Raymond v. Richmond, 88 N. Y. 671 .) We think the trial court observed the rule laid down in O’ Connell v. The People ( 87 N. Y. 377 ), and, as was said in that case, “ the court could not be required to repeat it (a portion of his charge) or answer again to different portions as analyzed by counsel.” (5) Appellants criticise the testimony of Osterhout and refer to their own, and urge upon this Court to hold that the jury have found contrary to the testimony given by themselves.

1894(Raymond v. Richmond, 88 N. Y. 671 .) We think the trial court observed the rule laid down in O’ Connell v. The People ( 87 N. Y. 377 ), and, as was said in that case, “ the court could not be required to repeat it (a portion of his charge) or answer again to different portions as analyzed by counsel.” (5) Appellants criticise the testimony of Osterhout and refer to their own, and urge upon this Court to hold that the jury have found contrary to the testimony given by themselves.