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14 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Koehlergreen2 sentences2020Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. [T]o prevail [on a stand-alone claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness], the PCRA petitioner must show exactly how appellate counsel was ineffective, by offering additional evidence or controlling authority, missed by direct appeal counsel, that would have changed the appeal outcome; or by specifically alleging the winning claim or distinct legal theory that appellate counsel failed to recognize; and then by showing how the appeal, as pursued, was incompetent by comparison[.] - 12 - Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 142 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). 2018See Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121 , 142 n.19 (Pa. 2012) (“A claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness is distinct from the instant stand-alone claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness grounded in the manner in which appellate counsel litigated a claim on appeal.”). | 6 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Johnson, C., Aplt.green1 sentence2025See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 335 A.3d 685 , 719-720 (Pa. 2025) (viewing stand-alone claim of constitutional violation as having been waived, only reviewable as a derivative ineffectiveness of counsel allegation). | 1 | 1 |
Texas v. Brownred1 sentence2024See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39; Horton, 496 U.S. at 133– 34. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Staton, A., Aplt.green1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Wells, 2829 Philadelphia 1981, unpublished memorandum, at *12 (Pa. Super. June 22, 1984) (direct appeal); Commonwealth v. Wells, 1639 Philadelphia 1992, unpublished memorandum at *3-*6 (Pa. Super. filed March 16, 1993) (appeal from denial of Appellant’s first PCRA petition). -5- Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen1 sentence2020Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418, 420-21 (Pa.Super.2016). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Morgangreen1 sentence2018See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 610 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 1992) (police officer read Miranda rights to non-custodial suspect and suspect thereafter requested counsel, which was not honored; “it is error for a court to consider a confession presumptively coerced merely because a request for a lawyer is not honored where, as here, the suspect was not in custody at the time.”) (emphasis in original) - 15 - J-S02040-18 ineffectiveness, as a stand-alone claim regarding that attorney’s failure to argue the correct legal theory to this Court on direct appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Paddygreen2 sentences2012Paddy, 15 A.3d at 443 ; see also id. at 476, (C.J. 2012Paddy, 15 A.3d at 443 ; see also id. at 476, (C.J. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Livelygreen2 sentences2008While it is worth noting that the relevant authority would seem contrary to such a claim, see Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464 , 610 A.2d 7, 10 (1992) (holding that prior inconsistent statements may be used as substantive evidence when, e.g., given under oath at formal legal proceeding or reduced to writing signed and adopted by witness), we are precluded from rendering meaningful appellate review of the lack of a limiting instruction at appellant’s trial due to his failure to develop a stand-alone claim on this basis. 14 . 2008While it is worth noting that the relevant authority would seem contrary to such a claim, see Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464 , 610 A.2d 7, 10 (1992) (holding that prior inconsistent statements may be used as substantive evidence when, e.g., given under oath at formal legal proceeding or reduced to writing signed and adopted by witness), we are precluded from rendering meaningful appellate review of the lack of a limiting instruction at appellant’s trial due to his failure to develop a stand-alone claim on this basis. 14 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Horton v. California
green
1 sentence2024See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39; Horton, 496 U.S. at 133– 34. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Sherwood
green
1 sentence2023Subsequently, relationship evidence appears to have been given a life of its own as a stand-alone exception, perhaps unintentionally so, in Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483 (Pa. 2009). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Beard v. Kindler
green
2 sentences2011Significantly, since Steele was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued unanimous decisions in two federal habeas corpus cases involving state prisoners, including Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 612 , 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009), a Pennsylvania capital case, which should significantly diminish the incentive for counsel to try to sow inconsistencies and confusion in state court procedural rulings, in an effort to lay the groundwork for a later federal habeas claim that state court procedural defaults should not be honored. 2011Significantly, since Steele was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued unanimous decisions in two federal habeas corpus cases involving state prisoners, including Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 612 , 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009), a Pennsylvania capital case, which should significantly diminish the incentive for counsel to try to sow inconsistencies and confusion in state court procedural rulings, in an effort to lay the groundwork for a later federal habeas claim that state court procedural defaults should not be honored. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 15 . 2008Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 15 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.