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14 California opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Concord Communities v. City of Concordgreen2 sentences2026(CALCRIM No. 571; see ibid. [defining danger as imminent if “the danger actually existed or the defendant believed it existed” and requiring that “[t]he danger must seem immediate and present” (italics added)].) The jury’s question suggests that at least some jurors may have harbored just such a misunderstanding. 2026(CALCRIM No. 571; see ibid. [defining danger as imminent if “the danger actually existed or the defendant believed it existed” and requiring that “[t]he danger must seem immediate and present” (italics added)].) The jury’s question suggests that at least some jurors may have harbored just such a misunderstanding. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Valligreen2 sentences2018(Compare, e.g., People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786 , 798, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 ( Valli ) [ Britt reflects that " Kellett is not necessarily a simple 'different time/different place' limitation"] with People v. Marlow , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 143-144, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825 , 96 P.3d 126 [ Kellett held inapplicable to murders argued to be related by common motive but carried out at different times in different locations].) Here, Linville's offenses were committed at different times in different places. 2018(Compare, e.g., People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786 , 798, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 ( Valli ) [ Britt reflects that " Kellett is not necessarily a simple 'different time/different place' limitation"] with People v. Marlow , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 143-144, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825 , 96 P.3d 126 [ Kellett held inapplicable to murders argued to be related by common motive but carried out at different times in different locations].) Here, Linville's offenses were committed at different times in different places. | 1 | 2 |
Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLCgreen1 sentence2025(See Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (E.D.Cal. 2013) 980 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1208 [right to an accounting is derivative; it must be based on other claims].) “Generally, an underlying fiduciary relationship, such as a partnership, will support an accounting, but the action does not lie merely because the books and records are complex. [Citations.] Some underlying misconduct on the part of the defendant must be shown to invoke the right to this equitable remedy.” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1137 .) Under these principles, McCullagh established both t | 1 | 1 |
Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. BOLI OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIESgreen1 sentence2023(See id. at pp. 176-186; but see Willis v. Winters (2011) 350 Or. 299, 309, fn. 6 [cautioning against an overly broad reading of Emerald Steel; the decision “should not be construed as announcing a stand-alone rule that any state law that can be viewed as ‘affirmatively authorizing’ what federal law prohibits is preempted”].) In the years since Emerald Steel, 24 23-103 federal district court in Colorado has held, in the context of a contract dispute, that “Colorado’s marijuana laws are preempted by” the CSA as well. 125 Three dissenting justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court have similarly con | 1 | 1 |
Goldstein v. Bursteingreen1 sentence2014(See Goldstein v. Burstein (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [a claim for an accounting brought after voluntary dissolution of the partnership].) In addition, because a partner’s right to an accounting derives from the Uniform Partnership Act, a claim for an accounting brought by a partner can be a stand- alone claim. | 1 | 1 |
Janis v. California State Lottery Commissiongreen1 sentence2014(Cf. Janis v. California State Lottery (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 824, 833 [holding cause of action for an accounting was derivative and must be based on other claims in a case where accounting is brought by third-party, non-partner].) Furthermore, an accounting is an equitable remedy to be decided by the court, not the jury; the court’s factual determinations are subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. | 1 | 1 |
MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklingreen1 sentence2009Ultimately, KPMG and Sidley simply omit the necessary central core of the standard: the plaintiffs allegations must rely on or depend on “ ‘the terms of the written agreement’ ” (MS Dealer, supra, 177 F.3d at p. 947), not simply on the fact that an agreement exists. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Willis v. Wintersgreen1 sentence2023(See id. at pp. 176-186; but see Willis v. Winters (2011) 350 Or. 299, 309, fn. 6 [cautioning against an overly broad reading of Emerald Steel; the decision “should not be construed as announcing a stand-alone rule that any state law that can be viewed as ‘affirmatively authorizing’ what federal law prohibits is preempted”].) In the years since Emerald Steel, 24 23-103 federal district court in Colorado has held, in the context of a contract dispute, that “Colorado’s marijuana laws are preempted by” the CSA as well. 125 Three dissenting justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court have similarly con | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Marlow
green
2 sentences2018(Compare, e.g., People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786 , 798, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 ( Valli ) [ Britt reflects that " Kellett is not necessarily a simple 'different time/different place' limitation"] with People v. Marlow , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 143-144, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825 , 96 P.3d 126 [ Kellett held inapplicable to murders argued to be related by common motive but carried out at different times in different locations].) Here, Linville's offenses were committed at different times in different places. 2018(Compare, e.g., People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786 , 798, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 ( Valli ) [ Britt reflects that " Kellett is not necessarily a simple 'different time/different place' limitation"] with People v. Marlow , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 143-144, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825 , 96 P.3d 126 [ Kellett held inapplicable to murders argued to be related by common motive but carried out at different times in different locations].) Here, Linville's offenses were committed at different times in different places. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack
green
1 sentence2025(See Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (E.D.Cal. 2013) 980 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1208 [right to an accounting is derivative; it must be based on other claims].) “Generally, an underlying fiduciary relationship, such as a partnership, will support an accounting, but the action does not lie merely because the books and records are complex. [Citations.] Some underlying misconduct on the part of the defendant must be shown to invoke the right to this equitable remedy.” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1137 .) Under these principles, McCullagh established both t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Feist v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Cal. 2016) 218 F.Supp.3d 1112, 1114 .) Section 1681n, subdivision (a), provides a cause of action for a consumer whose rights are violated: “Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of-- [¶] (1)(A) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 . . . .” Subdivision (a)(3) further allows a successful consumer to recover costs and reasonable attorney fees. 1 A “consumer report” i | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Goldman v. KPMG, LLP
green
1 sentence2024(Goldman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 231 .) In this context, “ ‘presum[ing] the existence of’ an agreement is not a stand-alone principle, but merely an elaboration of the underlying principle, stated in all the cases: actual reliance on the terms of the agreement to impose liability on the nonsignatory.” (Ibid.; see also Mattson Technology, Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1149 , 1156 [“Nor is it sufficient that . . . the controversy would not have occurred but for the existence of the contract, provided the contract is not the basis for the claims against the nonsignat | 1 | 2024–2024 |
ALLIANCE TITLE COMPANY, INC. v. Boucher
green
1 sentence2024Rather, the plaintiff actually relied on the terms of his employment contract in suing the nonsignatory successor employer, including by asserting claims for breach of and interference with the employment contract.4 ( Boucher, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 265–266, 272–273.) 4 In Boucher, the plaintiff’s original employer transferred all of its operations and assets to another subsidiary of the same parent company, which tried to give the plaintiff a less generous compensation package. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence2022A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436 .) “[T]he question is not what the ‘best lawyers would have done,’ nor ‘even what most good lawyers would have done,’ but simply whether ‘some reasonable lawyer’ could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted in the case at bar. [Citation.] A defendant must show that his attorney’s performance fell below this objective standard of reasonableness by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Jones (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 216, 235 , ci | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Lucas
green
1 sentence2022A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436 .) “[T]he question is not what the ‘best lawyers would have done,’ nor ‘even what most good lawyers would have done,’ but simply whether ‘some reasonable lawyer’ could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted in the case at bar. [Citation.] A defendant must show that his attorney’s performance fell below this objective standard of reasonableness by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Jones (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 216, 235 , ci | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Mincey
green
1 sentence2022A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436 .) “[T]he question is not what the ‘best lawyers would have done,’ nor ‘even what most good lawyers would have done,’ but simply whether ‘some reasonable lawyer’ could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted in the case at bar. [Citation.] A defendant must show that his attorney’s performance fell below this objective standard of reasonableness by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Jones (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 216, 235 , ci | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
green
1 sentence2022(Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 984 .) In short, because we have affirmed the trial court’s sustaining of defendants’ demurrer to all of the claims alleged in the operative complaint, Clark cannot seek injunctive relief as a stand-alone claim against defendants. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015Kirby, supra, Cal.4th 1244 did not require the denial of attorney fees for claims ‘intertwined” with meal or rest period claims, as the case dealt with a stand-alone claim under Labor Code section 226.7. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation
green
1 sentence2013We are satisfied the jury understood this form 16 La Costa appears to argue use of CACI No. VF-300 was entirely improper because it is to be used "solely" for claims of breach of contract, and "does not [cover] a stand- alone claim for breach of the implied covenant . . . ." La Costa cites nothing to support that claim, and it is contrary to the user comments that CACI No. VF-300 "is intended for use in most contract disputes." Because the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is merely an additional clause implied in law "as a supplement to the express contractual covenants" (Racine & Laram | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Digerati Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC
green
1 sentence2013We are satisfied the jury understood this form 16 La Costa appears to argue use of CACI No. VF-300 was entirely improper because it is to be used "solely" for claims of breach of contract, and "does not [cover] a stand- alone claim for breach of the implied covenant . . . ." La Costa cites nothing to support that claim, and it is contrary to the user comments that CACI No. VF-300 "is intended for use in most contract disputes." Because the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is merely an additional clause implied in law "as a supplement to the express contractual covenants" (Racine & Laram | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.