parent challenge in California

2023(In re Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 10 .) Our high court held that, although the parent could not challenge that order through her appeal from the court’s order terminating her parental rights, because the juvenile court “had a continuing duty to inquire whether [the child] was an Indian child in all dependency proceedings, including a proceeding to terminate parental rights,” the parent could challenge “the juvenile court’s finding of ICWA’s inapplicability underlying” the order terminating parental rights.

2023(See § 224.2, subd. (a); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 6 (Isaiah W.) [“Because ICWA imposes on the juvenile court a continuing duty to inquire whether the child is an Indian child, we hold that the parent may challenge a finding of ICWA’s inapplicability in an appeal from the subsequent [termination of parental rights] order, even if she did not raise such challenge in an appeal from the initial [detention] order”].) 6 Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ (Id., sub

2015If the parent believes that the petition does not ‘adequately communicate’ the department’s concerns or is otherwise misleading, the onus is on the parent to challenge the petition at the pleading stage.” (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1038, fn. 8 .) 8 Code, § 6200 et seq.) defines domestic violence as “abuse perpetrated against” specified parties, including “[a] person with whom the [perpetrator] has had a child.” (Fam.

2002If the parent believes that the petition does not ‘adequately communicate’ the [Agency]’s concerns or is otherwise misleading, the onus is on the parent to challenge the petition at the pleading stage.” (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1038, fn. 8 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ], citing In re Fred J. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 168, 176-177 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) Accordingly, Mother has waived her right to contest the sufficiency of the petition by failing to do so below.

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

1991A parent may challenge a contemporaneous order if the challenge is not designed to overturn the order authorizing the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. (§ 395; 5 In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 244-249 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 453 ].) In Kristin W, supra, the petitioner challenged both the termination of reunification services and the sufficiency of the reunification plan.

1991A parent may challenge a contemporaneous order if the challenge is not designed to overturn the order authorizing the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. (§ 395; 5 In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 244-249 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 453 ].) In Kristin W, supra, the petitioner challenged both the termination of reunification services and the sufficiency of the reunification plan.

1991A parent may challenge a contemporaneous order if the challenge is not designed to overturn the order authorizing the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. (§ 395; 5 In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 244-249 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 453 ].) In Kristin W, supra, the petitioner challenged both the termination of reunification services and the sufficiency of the reunification plan.

1991A parent may challenge a contemporaneous order if the challenge is not designed to overturn the order authorizing the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. (§ 395; 5 In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 244-249 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 453 ].) In Kristin W, supra, the petitioner challenged both the termination of reunification services and the sufficiency of the reunification plan.

2023(See In re John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123 [“In general, a parent may not challenge the sufficiency of allegations in a dependency petition on appeal if he or she did not raise the issue in the dependency court”].) 16 resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence [that] . . . [¶] (1) There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health c

2014Allowing parties to challenge the facial sufficiency of a petition for the first time on appeal conflicts with the emphasis on expeditious processing of these cases so that children can achieve permanence and stability without unnecessary delay if reunification efforts fail. [Citation.] Enforcing the forfeiture rule requires parties to raise such issues in the juvenile court where they can be promptly remedied without undue prejudice to the interests of any of the parties involved.” (Ibid.; see also In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 83 [following David H.’s reasoning]; cf. In re

2016In analysis that directly contradicts Mother‟s statutory interpretation argument here, the court in Jasmine D. reasoned that the balancing test it endorsed was confirmed by the Legislature‟s decision to amend section 366.26 in 1998 to add the language requiring the court to find “ „a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child.‟ ” (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 , citing Stats. 1998, ch. 1054, § 36.6.) The court concluded that this language “makes it plain that a parent may not claim entitlement to the [parental relationship exception] sim

2016In analysis that directly contradicts Mother’s statutory interpretation argument here, the court in Jasmine D. reasoned that the balancing test it endorsed was confirmed by the Legislature’s decision to amend section 366.26 in 1998 to add the language requiring the court to find “ ‘a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child.’ ” (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 , citing Stats. 1998, ch. 1054, § 36.6, p. 8171.) The court concluded that this language “makes it plain that a parent may not claim entitlement to the [parental relationship excep

2015(In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 459 [" 'If the parent believes that the petition does not "adequately communicate" the [Agency]'s concerns or is otherwise misleading, the onus is on the parent to challenge the petition at the pleading stage.' "].) Had Mother timely objected to the petition or requested clarification on the jurisdictional allegations, the Agency could have filed an amended or supplemental petition, if appropriate.

2014If the parent believes that the petition does not “adequately communicate” the [Department’s] concerns or is otherwise misleading, the onus is on the parent to challenge the petition at the pleading stage.’ [Citation.]” (In re S. O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 459 [rejecting Alysha S. and explaining that cases following the general rule represent the “better view”].) More to the point, the allegations amended at the time of the adjudicatory hearing were focused on father’s conduct and his inability to properly provide care for A.C. after she had been turned out of mother’s home.

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2018(See, e.g., In re John M . (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117 , 1123, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 ; In re Christopher C . (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73 , 82, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 .) Here, Father is not challenging the sufficiency of the petition, but the court's failure to make the findings required by statute.

2014Allowing parties to challenge the facial sufficiency of a petition for the first time on appeal conflicts with the emphasis on expeditious processing of these cases so that children can achieve permanence and stability without unnecessary delay if reunification efforts fail. [Citation.] Enforcing the forfeiture rule requires parties to raise such issues in the juvenile court where they can be promptly remedied without undue prejudice to the interests of any of the parties involved.” (Ibid.; see also In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 83 [following David H.’s reasoning]; cf. In re

2016(In re A.R. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1153 ; In re Fred J. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 168, 177 .) When social workers draft petitions that do not state sufficient facts, the parent may challenge the legal sufficiency of the petition.

2002If the parent believes that the petition does not ‘adequately communicate’ the [Agency]’s concerns or is otherwise misleading, the onus is on the parent to challenge the petition at the pleading stage.” (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1038, fn. 8 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ], citing In re Fred J. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 168, 176-177 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) Accordingly, Mother has waived her right to contest the sufficiency of the petition by failing to do so below.

2002“A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights. [Citation.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ].) “Before the state can deprive a parent of this interest, it must provide the parent with a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.” (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 668 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 ], fn. omitted.) It has been held that denying a parent’s request for a contested review hearing violates due process.

2002“A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights. [Citation.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ].) “Before the state can deprive a parent of this interest, it must provide the parent with a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.” (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 668 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 ], fn. omitted.) It has been held that denying a parent’s request for a contested review hearing violates due process.

2015(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 ; In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 809 ; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 ; cf. In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1342 [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to adoption when “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child 12 would benefit from continuing the relationship.” However, “a parent may not claim entitlement to the exception provided by [now] subdivision [(c)(1)(B)] simply by demonstrating som

2013(In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 [whether standard of review deemed substantial evidence or abuse of discretion, broad deference to lower court required]; Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [abuse of discretion]; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.) [substantial evidence].) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to adoption when “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” However, a parent may not claim this exception “si

2014(In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 480 ; In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 ; In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 .) A reviewing court “construes the well-pleaded facts in favor of the petition and determines whether a basis for jurisdiction is stated. [Citations.] In the dependency scheme, the petition is examined for whether essential facts have been pleaded which establish ‘at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (In re James C., supra, at p. 480 .) This court has previously held that a parent may not challenge the sufficiency of

2001The Court of Appeal has held that in such cases, in order to protect the due process rights of parents, a parent may challenge the legal sufficiency of the petition by a “motion akin to a demurrer.” (In re Fred J., supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at p. 176 ; In re Nicholas B., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133 ; In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 494 ] .) 5 And, on occasion, parents have demurred successfully to dependency petitions.

2002“A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights. [Citation.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ].) “Before the state can deprive a parent of this interest, it must provide the parent with a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.” (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 668 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 ], fn. omitted.) It has been held that denying a parent’s request for a contested review hearing violates due process.

2002“A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights. [Citation.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ].) “Before the state can deprive a parent of this interest, it must provide the parent with a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.” (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 668 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 ], fn. omitted.) It has been held that denying a parent’s request for a contested review hearing violates due process.

2024(In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833 , 859.) However, “[f]riendly or affectionate visits are not enough.” (In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15 , 25; see id. at p. 27; accord, In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303 , 318 [“the beneficial relationship exception demands something more than the incidental benefit a child gains from any amount of positive contact with her natural parent”].) To avoid termination of parental rights, Mother was required to “do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that [they] find their visits ple

2015(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 ; In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 809 ; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 ; cf. In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1342 [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to adoption when “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child 12 would benefit from continuing the relationship.” However, “a parent may not claim entitlement to the exception provided by [now] subdivision [(c)(1)(B)] simply by demonstrating som

2021(In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 808 (Zachary G.).) [¶] A prima facie case is made if the allegations demonstrate that these two elements are supported by probable cause. [Citations.] It is not made, however, if the allegations would fail to sustain a favorable decision even if they were found to be true at a hearing. [Citations.] While the petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency [citations], the allegations must nonetheless describe specifically how the petition will advance the child’s best interests.” (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157 .) Whet

2015(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 ; In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 809 ; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 ; cf. In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1342 [applying abuse of discretion standard].) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to adoption when “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child 12 would benefit from continuing the relationship.” However, “a parent may not claim entitlement to the exception provided by [now] subdivision [(c)(1)(B)] simply by demonstrating som

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ]; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ]; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 ]; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ]; In re Cathina W (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-726 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ].) Recently, this court extended the reasoning from those decisions to the juvenile court’s failure to advise a parent under rule 5.590(a) of her right to appeal fr

2016(In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 ].) In In re K.C., the California Supreme Court ruled a father did not have standing to challenge the juvenile court’s denial of placement with the child’s grandparents because he challenged only the denial of relative placement, not termination of his parental rights.

2016(In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 ].) In In re K.C., the California Supreme Court ruled a father did not have standing to challenge the juvenile court’s denial of placement with the child’s grandparents because he challenged only the denial of relative placement, not termination of his parental rights.

2015The termination of parental rights implicates a fundamental liberty interest (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 306 ), and therefore “significant due process safeguards have been built into the dependency scheme (id. at p. 307), including a right to court-appointed counsel for a parent who cannot afford to retain counsel . . . .” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 904 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 174 P.3d 180 ].) “All parties who are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent counsel.” (§ 317.5, subd. (a); see rule 5.660(d); In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th

2015The termination of parental rights implicates a fundamental liberty interest (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 306 ), and therefore “significant due process safeguards have been built into the dependency scheme (id. at p. 307), including a right to court-appointed counsel for a parent who cannot afford to retain counsel . . . .” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 904 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 174 P.3d 180 ].) “All parties who are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent counsel.” (§ 317.5, subd. (a); see rule 5.660(d); In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th

2015The termination of parental rights implicates a fundamental liberty interest (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 306 ), and therefore “significant due process safeguards have been built into the dependency scheme (id. at p. 307), including a right to court-appointed counsel for a parent who cannot afford to retain counsel . . . .” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 904 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 174 P.3d 180 ].) “All parties who are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent counsel.” (§ 317.5, subd. (a); see rule 5.660(d); In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th

2015The termination of parental rights implicates a fundamental liberty interest (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 306 ), and therefore “significant due process safeguards have been built into the dependency scheme (id. at p. 307), including a right to court-appointed counsel for a parent who cannot afford to retain counsel . . . .” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 904 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 174 P.3d 180 ].) “All parties who are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent counsel.” (§ 317.5, subd. (a); see rule 5.660(d); In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th

2014(In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 480 ; In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 ; In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 .) A reviewing court “construes the well-pleaded facts in favor of the petition and determines whether a basis for jurisdiction is stated. [Citations.] In the dependency scheme, the petition is examined for whether essential facts have been pleaded which establish ‘at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (In re James C., supra, at p. 480 .) This court has previously held that a parent may not challenge the sufficiency of

2001The Court of Appeal has held that in such cases, in order to protect the due process rights of parents, a parent may challenge the legal sufficiency of the petition by a “motion akin to a demurrer.” (In re Fred J., supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at p. 176 ; In re Nicholas B., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133 ; In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 494 ] .) 5 And, on occasion, parents have demurred successfully to dependency petitions.

2013(In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 166 ; In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1640 .) Here, father did not raise his objection to the juvenile court’s dispositional below.

2012(In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 166 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 424 ] (N.M.); In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1640 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 ].) DCFS argues mother should have challenged the petition’s sufficiency in writing, and immediately .after the court amended the petition’s language.