parent challenge in Texas

2022See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 , 361–62 (Tex. 2003); Fletcher v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2021See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 , 361– 62 (Tex. 2003); Fletcher v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2021The court then reasoned that this right, combined with this Court’s holding in In re M.S. that the statutory right to appointed counsel in involuntary-termination suits “embodies the right to effective counsel,” 115 S.W.3d 534 , 544 (Tex. 2003), means that section 107.013 “provides a basis for the parent to challenge a judgment in a[n] [involuntary-termination suit] based on the ineffective assistance of retained counsel.” E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d at 261 .

2020“Thus, a parent may challenge an order of termination on the ground that court-appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance.” In re Z.C., No. 12-15-00279-CV, 2016 WL 1730740 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op. & order) (citing M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 544–45; In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. 2009)).

2020“Thus, a parent may challenge an order of termination on the ground that court-appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance.” In re Z.C., No. 12-15-00279-CV, 2016 WL 1730740 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op. & order) (citing M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 544–45; In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. 2009)).

2019“Thus, a parent may challenge an order of termination on the ground that court-appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance.” Id. (citing M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 544–45; In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. 2009)). 3 We note that the Texas Supreme Court has held that due process demands that we review the evidence supporting findings under Grounds D and E when they are challenged on appeal—even if the appellate court finds the evidence to support one of the other statutory grounds for termination—because termination of parental rights under these grounds “may have implications for . . . pa

2022See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 , 361–62 (Tex. 2003); Fletcher v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2010See Fletcher v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet); In re B.K.D., 131 S.W.3d 10, 16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (holding that because the jury found four grounds for termination under section 161.001(1) and the father challenged only three of those grounds, we were not required to address his argument that the evidence was insufficient on the three challenged grounds); see also In re S.A.G., No. 02- 09-00125-CV, 2010 WL 1006301 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (overruling a parent‘s is

2025See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611 , 615–17 (Tex. 2007) (explaining that parent must raise an issue on appeal challenging trial court’s Department’s appointment when the findings show it was appointed under Family Code section 153.131, as a challenge based on those findings is not subsumed by a parent’s claim that terminating the parent-child relationship is not in the child’s best interest); In re H.S., 2023 WL 4013305 , at *10; In re L.M., 2023 WL 2418912 , at *4 n.22.

2023See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611 , 615–17 (Tex. 2007) (explaining that parent must raise an issue on appeal challenging trial court’s appointment of the Department when the findings show it was appointed under Family Code section 153.131 as a challenge based on those findings is not subsumed by a parent’s claim that terminating the parent-child relationship is not in the child’s best interest); In re L.M., 2023 WL 2418912 , at *4 n.22.

2021When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we cannot “ignore undisputed evidence contrary to the finding” but must otherwise view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, which means we must “assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding,” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624 , 630–31 (Tex. 2018), and 6 “disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible,” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).

2003In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 280 ( Tex. 2002).

2024See In re Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 615 .

2021See id. (noting that a parent’s mental state may be considered in determine whether a child is endangered particularly if that mental state results in the parent engaging in conduct that jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of the child); see also In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re A.M.C., 2 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.) (upholding a jury’s determination of endangerment where the evidence showed mother’s suicidal thoughts, suicide attempts, and neglect); In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ)

2021See id. (noting that a parent’s mental state may be considered in determine whether a child is endangered particularly if that mental state results in the parent engaging in conduct that jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of the child); see also In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re A.M.C., 2 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.) (upholding a jury’s determination of endangerment where the evidence showed mother’s suicidal thoughts, suicide attempts, and neglect); In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ)

2021See id. (noting that a parent’s mental state may be considered in determine whether a child is endangered particularly if that mental state results in the parent engaging in conduct that jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of the child); see also In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re A.M.C., 2 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.) (upholding a jury’s determination of endangerment where the evidence showed mother’s suicidal thoughts, suicide attempts, and neglect); In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ)

2021See id. (noting that a parent’s mental state may be considered in determine whether a child is endangered particularly if that mental state results in the parent engaging in conduct that jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of the child); see also In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re A.M.C., 2 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.) (upholding a jury’s determination of endangerment where the evidence showed mother’s suicidal thoughts, suicide attempts, and neglect); In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ)

2019“Thus, a parent may challenge an order of termination on the ground that court-appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance.” Id. (citing M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 544–45; In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. 2009)). 3 We note that the Texas Supreme Court has held that due process demands that we review the evidence supporting findings under Grounds D and E when they are challenged on appeal—even if the appellate court finds the evidence to support one of the other statutory grounds for termination—because termination of parental rights under these grounds “may have implications for . . . pa

2014Cf Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 522-23 (addressing waiver of immunity in “a suit brought to enforce a settlement agreement reached to dispose of a claim” for which the governmental entity’s immunity was waived). b.Terms Addressing Taking Claim Elements We consider whether the PUA settled or disposed of a claim for which the City’s immunity was waived—i.e., the City’s taking of portions of their properties.

2013See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 , 361–62 (Tex. 2003); Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2010See Fletcher v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet); In re B.K.D., 131 S.W.3d 10, 16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (holding that because the jury found four grounds for termination under section 161.001(1) and the father challenged only three of those grounds, we were not required to address his argument that the evidence was insufficient on the three challenged grounds); see also In re S.A.G., No. 02- 09-00125-CV, 2010 WL 1006301 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (overruling a parent‘s is

2000See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 , 87 S.Ct. at 620 ; see also Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 80 , 94 S.Ct. at 323 .

2000See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 , 87 S.Ct. at 620 ; see also Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 80 , 94 S.Ct. at 323 .

2000See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 , 87 S.Ct. at 620 ; see also Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 80 , 94 S.Ct. at 323 .

2000See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 , 87 S.Ct. at 620 ; see also Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 80 , 94 S.Ct. at 323 .

2000See DeLeon, 972 S.W.2d at 25-26 ; Butler, 522 S.W.2d at 199 ; Speer, 965 S.W.2d at 47 .

2000See DeLeon, 972 S.W.2d at 25-26 ; Butler, 522 S.W.2d at 199 ; Speer, 965 S.W.2d at 47 .

1998See Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). 2 The State argues that appellant was not in jeopardy of a criminal conviction in the administrative license suspension hearing, so collateral estoppel cannot arise.