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12 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Meraz v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 875 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (2000) (great weight and preponderance of evidence standard is standard properly utilized when appellant has burden of proving affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence, and on appeal hopes to demonstrate state of evidence preponderates greatly against jury’s finding). 2002Bigby v. State , 892 S.W.2d 864, 975 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Meraz v. State , 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Torres v. State , 976 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (2000) (great weight and preponderance of evidence standard is standard properly utilized when appellant has burden of proving affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence, and on appeal hopes to demonstrate state of evidence preponderates greatly against jury's finding) . | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Statered2 sentences2002Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 875 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (2000) (great weight and preponderance of evidence standard is standard properly utilized when appellant has burden of proving affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence, and on appeal hopes to demonstrate state of evidence preponderates greatly against jury’s finding). 2002Bigby v. State , 892 S.W.2d 864, 975 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Meraz v. State , 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Torres v. State , 976 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (2000) (great weight and preponderance of evidence standard is standard properly utilized when appellant has burden of proving affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence, and on appeal hopes to demonstrate state of evidence preponderates greatly against jury's finding) . | 2 | 2 |
Bigby v. Statered2 sentences2002Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 875 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (2000) (great weight and preponderance of evidence standard is standard properly utilized when appellant has burden of proving affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence, and on appeal hopes to demonstrate state of evidence preponderates greatly against jury’s finding). 2002Bigby v. State , 892 S.W.2d 864, 975 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Meraz v. State , 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Torres v. State , 976 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (2000) (great weight and preponderance of evidence standard is standard properly utilized when appellant has burden of proving affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence, and on appeal hopes to demonstrate state of evidence preponderates greatly against jury's finding) . | 2 | 2 |
Torres v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 875 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (2000) (great weight and preponderance of evidence standard is standard properly utilized when appellant has burden of proving affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence, and on appeal hopes to demonstrate state of evidence preponderates greatly against jury’s finding). 2002Bigby v. State , 892 S.W.2d 864, 975 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Meraz v. State , 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Torres v. State , 976 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (2000) (great weight and preponderance of evidence standard is standard properly utilized when appellant has burden of proving affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence, and on appeal hopes to demonstrate state of evidence preponderates greatly against jury's finding) . | 2 | 2 |
Matlock, Marcus Dewaynegreen2 sentences2025“If an appellate court conducting a factual-sufficiency review finds that the evidence supporting the affirmative defense so greatly outweighs the State’s contrary evidence that the verdict is manifestly unjust, then the appellate court may reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial.” Id. at 672 . - 16 - Under both our legal and factual sufficiency review of the evidence, we review the record as a whole and adhere to the principle that “[t]he jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and is free to accept or reject some, all, or none of the evidence 2021Petetan Opinion On Rehearing — 79 assessment of the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.139 An appellate court may sustain a factual sufficiency challenge on appeal only if, after setting out the relevant evidence and explaining precisely how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the verdict, the court clearly states why the verdict is so much against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased.140 If an appellate court conducting a factual-sufficiency review finds that the evidence supporting the | 1 | 10 |
Herrera v. Stategreen1 sentence2025“If an appellate court conducting a factual-sufficiency review finds that the evidence supporting the affirmative defense so greatly outweighs the State’s contrary evidence that the verdict is manifestly unjust, then the appellate court may reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial.” Id. at 672 . - 16 - Under both our legal and factual sufficiency review of the evidence, we review the record as a whole and adhere to the principle that “[t]he jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and is free to accept or reject some, all, or none of the evidence | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Texasgreen2 sentences2021Petetan Opinion On Rehearing — 80 First, the analysis must be informed by the current medical diagnostic framework for assessing intellectual disability.143 Specifically, courts cannot focus upon one aspect of diagnostic criteria when clinicians would consider other aspects to reach an overall conclusion regarding intellectual ability.144 In both Hall and Moore I, the Supreme Court rejected the use of IQ scores to foreclose inquiry into adaptive deficits because it created too great a risk that someone with an intellectual disability would be executed.145 Second, courts may not place undue emp 2021Petetan Opinion On Rehearing — 80 First, the analysis must be informed by the current medical diagnostic framework for assessing intellectual disability.143 Specifically, courts cannot focus upon one aspect of diagnostic criteria when clinicians would consider other aspects to reach an overall conclusion regarding intellectual ability.144 In both Hall and Moore I, the Supreme Court rejected the use of IQ scores to foreclose inquiry into adaptive deficits because it created too great a risk that someone with an intellectual disability would be executed.145 Second, courts may not place undue emp | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Floridagreen2 sentences2021Petetan Opinion On Rehearing — 80 First, the analysis must be informed by the current medical diagnostic framework for assessing intellectual disability.143 Specifically, courts cannot focus upon one aspect of diagnostic criteria when clinicians would consider other aspects to reach an overall conclusion regarding intellectual ability.144 In both Hall and Moore I, the Supreme Court rejected the use of IQ scores to foreclose inquiry into adaptive deficits because it created too great a risk that someone with an intellectual disability would be executed.145 Second, courts may not place undue emp 2021Petetan Opinion On Rehearing — 80 First, the analysis must be informed by the current medical diagnostic framework for assessing intellectual disability.143 Specifically, courts cannot focus upon one aspect of diagnostic criteria when clinicians would consider other aspects to reach an overall conclusion regarding intellectual ability.144 In both Hall and Moore I, the Supreme Court rejected the use of IQ scores to foreclose inquiry into adaptive deficits because it created too great a risk that someone with an intellectual disability would be executed.145 Second, courts may not place undue emp | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.