notice pleading standard in Texas

2016It only indicated that, its claims could include market manipulation and securities fraud at the hearing on the Rule 202 petition, We take no position on the merits of Doe’s ability to challenge those additional potential claims. .Application of the TCPA process in a Rule 202 proceeding, as in a lawsuit, may require the party seeking equitable relief to provide more than “mere notice pleading.” See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590-91 (explaining that pleadings that might suffice to meet the notice-pleading standard in a non-TCPA case may not be enough to satisfy the TCPA’s clear-and-specific ev

2016In the Rule 202 context, on the record presented in this case, Doe’s asserted right of 9 Application of the TCPA process in a Rule 202 proceeding, as in a lawsuit, may require the party seeking equitable relief to provide more than “mere notice pleading.” See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590-91 (explaining that pleadings that might suffice to meet the notice-pleading standard in a non-TCPA case may not be enough to satisfy the TCPA’s clear-and-specific evidentiary requirement).

2023“Under the notice-pleading standard, fair notice is achieved ‘if the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy, and what type of evidence might be relevant.’” CVR, 500 S.W.3d at 80 .

2021“Under the notice-pleading standard, fair notice is achieved ‘if the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy, and what type of evidence might be relevant.’” Id. (quoting In re Greyhound Lines, No. 05-13-01646-CV, 2014 WL 1022329 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 21, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)); see also Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609 , 5 612 (Tex. 2007).

2025See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000); see also TEX.

2023“This notice-pleading requirement is ‘minimal’ and ‘can be satisfied with an allegation that the nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or committed tortious acts in Texas.’” Copeland v. Mayers, 657 S.W.3d 599 , 609–10 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2022 pet. denied) (quoting Gaddy v. Fenenbock, 652 S.W.3d 860 , 871 13 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.)); see also Steward Health Care System LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120 , 129 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.) (“A plaintiff’s petition satifies the long-arm statute when it alleges the defendant did business, which includes committing a tort in who

2022TEX.CIV.PRAC.& REM.CODE ANN. § 33.013(b)(1), (2)(A)-(N). 4 [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding) (referencing the notice pleading standard under TEX.R.CIV.P. 47 as it pertains to pleading facts in a motion for leave to designate a responsible third party); Pacheco-Serrant v. Munoz, 555 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex.App.--El Paso, 2018, no pet.) (discussing the notice pleading standard in Texas).

2021See, e.g., Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 . 4 The City did not challenge below, nor does it challenge on appeal, the adequacy of Furtado’s pleading of constructive knowledge.

2021“Under the notice-pleading standard, fair notice is achieved ‘if the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy, and what type of evidence might be relevant.’” Id. (quoting In re Greyhound Lines, No. 05-13-01646-CV, 2014 WL 1022329 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 21, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)); see also Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609 , 5 612 (Tex. 2007).

2016See Flowers, 407 S.W.3d at 458 (“[W]e cannot use a liberal construction of the petition to read into the petition a claim that it does not contain.”); see also King v. Lyons, 457 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“[A] prayer for general relief ... cannot be used to enlarge a pleading to the extent that it embraces an entirely different cause of action for which fair notice does not exist.”).

2016See Flowers, 407 S.W.3d at 458 (“[W]e cannot use a liberal construction of the petition to read into the petition a claim that it does not contain.”); see also King v. Lyons, 457 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“[A] prayer for general relief ... cannot be used to enlarge a pleading to the extent that it embraces an entirely different cause of action for which fair notice does not exist.”).

2010Roark v. Allen , 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982).