reasonable certainty requirement in Texas

2020Only a reasonable degree of certainty is required, id. (citing Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689 ), and the reasonable-certainty requirement “‘does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.’” Signad, 682 S.W.2d at 646–47 (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932)).

2012Only a reasonable degree of certainty is required, id. (citing Pennington , 606 S.W.2d at 689 ), and the reasonable-certainty requirement "'does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.'" Signad , 682 S.W.2d at 646 -47 (quoting Sproles v. Binford , 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932)).

2020Moreover, “the mere fact that the parties disagree as to [an ordinance’s] meaning does not mean we must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Mills v. Fletcher, 229 S.W.3d 765, 770 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.); see Vista Healthcare, 324 S.W.3d at 273 .

2012Moreover, "the mere fact that the parties disagree as to [an ordinance's] meaning does not mean we must necessarily guess at its meaning." Mills v. Fletcher , 229 S.W.3d 765, 770 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2007, no pet.); see Vista Healthcare , 324 S.W.3d at 273 .

2020Only a reasonable degree of certainty is required, id. (citing Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689 ), and the reasonable-certainty requirement “‘does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.’” Signad, 682 S.W.2d at 646–47 (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932)).

2012Only a reasonable degree of certainty is required, id. (citing Pennington , 606 S.W.2d at 689 ), and the reasonable-certainty requirement "'does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.'" Signad , 682 S.W.2d at 646 -47 (quoting Sproles v. Binford , 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932)).

2020Only a reasonable degree of certainty is required, id. (citing Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689 ), and the reasonable-certainty requirement “‘does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.’” Signad, 682 S.W.2d at 646–47 (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932)).

2014LEXIS 9563, at *13 (stating that “the reasonable-certainty requirement ‘does not preclude the use of ordinary terms' to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding’ ”); Webster v. Signad, Inc., 682 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e).

2025The reasonable-certainty requirement is a flexible one, which is intended “to accommodate the myriad circumstances in which claims for lost profits arise.” Phillips, 475 S. W.3d at 278 .

2025While what constitutes reasonably certain evidence of lost profits is a fact-intensive determination, the reasonable-certainty test for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for lost profits contains the minimum parameter that “opinions or estimates of lost profits must be based on objective facts, figures, or data from which the amount of lost profits can be ascertained.” Id. at 279 .

2025Here, Original and Circle sought to prove their lost-profits damages by, among other things, offering expert testimony. “[E]xperts need not introduce foundational data supporting their conclusions unless the opposing party or trial court insists.” Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., 520 S.W.3d 848, 865 (Tex. 2017); see also id. (explaining that when demonstratives with witness’s lost-profit calculations were not admitted into evidence, it 21 did not render evidence of lost profits insufficient when witness explained his opinions).

2025Here, Original and Circle sought to prove their lost-profits damages by, among other things, offering expert testimony. “[E]xperts need not introduce foundational data supporting their conclusions unless the opposing party or trial court insists.” Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., 520 S.W.3d 848, 865 (Tex. 2017); see also id. (explaining that when demonstratives with witness’s lost-profit calculations were not admitted into evidence, it 21 did not render evidence of lost profits insufficient when witness explained his opinions).

2016Id.; City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharbo-neau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex.2001) (discussing “comparable sales” method to determining markét value).

2016While the reasonable certainty requirement “is intended to be flexible enough to accommodate the myriad circumstances in which claims for lost profits arise,” we cannot forget that it “serves to align the law with reality by limiting a recovery of damages to what the claimant might have expected to realize in the real world had his rights not been violated.” Phillips, 475 S.W.3d at 278, 280 (emphasis added); Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex.1994).

2015PX-416. 53883200 36 model based on projections that were “demonstrably unrealistic”); Ramco, 207 S.W.3d at 822-23 (criticizing expert for failing to “quantify the risk of failure” and holding that expert’s characterization of calculations as reasonably certain or conservative did not satisfy the reasonable certainty test).

2006Co. v. Wheeler, 550 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1976) (stating an obiter dictum in legal-sufficiency analysis in condemnation case that did not involve lost *824 profits or the reasonable-certainty test), ajf d on other grounds, 551 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1977). 31 .