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7 California opinions name it 1 courts 2007–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Catlingreen2 sentences2019In a chain of custody claim, the party offering the evidence bears the burden to show that, “ ‘ “taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration.” ’ ” (Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 134 .) However, the reasonable certainty requirement is not met if some “ ‘ “vital link in the chain of possession” ’ ” is lacking. 2010(People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 134 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31 , 26 P.3d 357 ].) A chain of custody is adequate when the party offering the evidence shows to the satisfaction of the trial court that, “ ‘ “taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The reasonable certainty requirement is not met when some “ ‘ “vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence analyzed was | 1 | 2 |
GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc.green2 sentences2016Third, using the reasonable certainty standard for assessing a plaintiffs entitlement to loss of earning capacity damages while using the less onerous reasonable probability standard for assessing the extent of those damages dovetails neatly with the venerable principle that “ ‘[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.’ ” ( Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775, quoting GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873-874 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 191 2016Third, using the reasonable certainty standard for assessing a plaintiffs entitlement to loss of earning capacity damages while using the less onerous reasonable probability standard for assessing the extent of those damages dovetails neatly with the venerable principle that “ ‘[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.’ ” ( Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775, quoting GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873-874 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 191 | 1 | 1 |
Greenfield v. Insurance Inc.green2 sentences2016Third, using the reasonable certainty standard for assessing a plaintiffs entitlement to loss of earning capacity damages while using the less onerous reasonable probability standard for assessing the extent of those damages dovetails neatly with the venerable principle that “ ‘[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.’ ” ( Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775, quoting GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873-874 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 191 2016Third, using the reasonable certainty standard for assessing a plaintiffs entitlement to loss of earning capacity damages while using the less onerous reasonable probability standard for assessing the extent of those damages dovetails neatly with the venerable principle that “ ‘[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.’ ” ( Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775, quoting GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873-874 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 191 | 1 | 1 |
Piscitelli v. Friedenberggreen2 sentences2016(Ferguson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1048 [noting “public policy against speculative damages”]; Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) *896 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 989 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 ] [“it is fundamental that ‘damages which are speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible cannot serve as a legal basis for recovery’ ”].) Use of this standard also ensures that the jurors, faced with a vacuum of evidence, do not commit misconduct by impermissibly resorting to their own extra-record knowledge in attempting to agree upon the likelihood that the plaintiff would become fit and qualified 2016(Ferguson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1048 [noting “public policy against speculative damages”]; Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) *896 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 989 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 ] [“it is fundamental that ‘damages which are speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible cannot serve as a legal basis for recovery’ ”].) Use of this standard also ensures that the jurors, faced with a vacuum of evidence, do not commit misconduct by impermissibly resorting to their own extra-record knowledge in attempting to agree upon the likelihood that the plaintiff would become fit and qualified | 1 | 1 |
Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLPgreen1 sentence2016(Ferguson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1048 [noting “public policy against speculative damages”]; Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) *896 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 989 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 ] [“it is fundamental that ‘damages which are speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible cannot serve as a legal basis for recovery’ ”].) Use of this standard also ensures that the jurors, faced with a vacuum of evidence, do not commit misconduct by impermissibly resorting to their own extra-record knowledge in attempting to agree upon the likelihood that the plaintiff would become fit and qualified | 1 | 1 |
JMR Construction Corp. v. Environmental Assessment & Remediation Management, Inc.green2 sentences2016Third, using the reasonable certainty standard for assessing a plaintiffs entitlement to loss of earning capacity damages while using the less onerous reasonable probability standard for assessing the extent of those damages dovetails neatly with the venerable principle that “ ‘[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.’ ” ( Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775, quoting GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873-874 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 191 2016Third, using the reasonable certainty standard for assessing a plaintiffs entitlement to loss of earning capacity damages while using the less onerous reasonable probability standard for assessing the extent of those damages dovetails neatly with the venerable principle that “ ‘[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.’ ” ( Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775, quoting GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873-874 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 191 | 1 | 1 |
Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc.green2 sentences2016Third, using the reasonable certainty standard for assessing a plaintiffs entitlement to loss of earning capacity damages while using the less onerous reasonable probability standard for assessing the extent of those damages dovetails neatly with the venerable principle that “ ‘[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.’ ” ( Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775, quoting GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873-874 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 191 2016Third, using the reasonable certainty standard for assessing a plaintiffs entitlement to loss of earning capacity damages while using the less onerous reasonable probability standard for assessing the extent of those damages dovetails neatly with the venerable principle that “ ‘[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.’ ” ( Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775, quoting GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 873-874 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 191 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hall
green
2 sentences2014Left to such speculation the court must exclude the evidence. [Citation.] However, when there is only the barest speculation that the evidence was altered, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its weight. [Citation.]” (Hall, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 294 , internal quotations omitted.) Hall is instructive. 2013Left to such speculation the court must exclude the evidence.‟”‟ [Citation.] However, when there is only the barest speculation that the evidence was altered, „“„it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its weight.‟”‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Hall (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 282, 294 .) B. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
People v. Stanley
green
1 sentence2026Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) of the California Rules of Court requires an appellate brief to “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point[.]” No heading in Sheehan’s briefing asserts the complaint did not meet the reasonable certainty requirement. “ ‘Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.’ ” (Petrovich Development Co., LLC v. City of Sacramento (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 963 , 976, fn. 9.) California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) further requires that each separate point be s | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Esparza v. KS Indus., L.P.
green
1 sentence2026(See Bitner, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1065 [having “failed to raise or develop” issue in the trial court, appellants could not “raise the issue for the first time on appeal”].) It is true that we have “discretion to address questions not raised in the trial court when the theory presented for the first time on appeal involves only a legal question determinable from facts that are (1) uncontroverted in the record and (2) could not have been altered by the presentation of additional evidence.” (Esparza v. KS Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228 , 1237–1238.) However, “[m]erely because | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Dabney
green
2 sentences2007In State of Wisconsin v. Dabney (2003) 264 Wis.2d 843 , 663 N.W.2d 366 ( Dabney ), the court ruled that the DNA profile satisfied the reasonable certainty requirement for an arrest warrant in a case charging a sexual assault where the assailant was unknown to the victim and a DNA profile was subsequently developed from semen left by the assailant. 2007In State of Wisconsin v. Dabney (2003) 264 Wis.2d 843 , 663 N.W.2d 366 ( Dabney ), the court ruled that the DNA profile satisfied the reasonable certainty requirement for an arrest warrant in a case charging a sexual assault where the assailant was unknown to the victim and a DNA profile was subsequently developed from semen left by the assailant. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.