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12 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1961–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Olson v. Stategreen2 sentences2001The removal of constitutional impediments as to the taking of a blood test “does not obviate the necessity of compliance with statutory provisions, even though statutory requirements may not now be constitutionally required.” Darland v. State, 582 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (quoting Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1969)). 1982Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), “have removed the constitutional impediment of consent as to the taking of a blood test or other chemical test;” however, “this does not obviate the necessity of compliance with statutory provisions, even though statutory requirements may not now be constitutionally required.” Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d at 772 . | 5 | 6 |
Darland v. Stategreen2 sentences2001The removal of constitutional impediments as to the taking of a blood test “does not obviate the necessity of compliance with statutory provisions, even though statutory requirements may not now be constitutionally required.” Darland v. State, 582 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (quoting Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1969)). 2000The removal of constitutional impediments as to the taking of a blood test "does not obviate the necessity of compliance with statutory provisions, even though statutory requirements may not now be constitutionally required." Darland v. State , 582 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Bennett v. Stategreen1 sentence1979Our statutory prohibition 5 against admission of non-consensual chemical analysis for blood alcohol content other than by breath analysis, has been held “by its explicit terms [to apply] only to persons who have been arrested.” Bennett v. State, 522 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1982Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), “have removed the constitutional impediment of consent as to the taking of a blood test or other chemical test;” however, “this does not obviate the necessity of compliance with statutory provisions, even though statutory requirements may not now be constitutionally required.” Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d at 772 . 1982Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), “have removed the constitutional impediment of consent as to the taking of a blood test or other chemical test;” however, “this does not obviate the necessity of compliance with statutory provisions, even though statutory requirements may not now be constitutionally required.” Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d at 772 . | 2 | 1979–1982 |
Burkhalter v. State
green
2 sentences1984Ground of error five is overruled." In Burkhalter v. State, 642 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.App.—Houston (14th Dist.)—1982), the court wrote: *127 "As we have noted above, a lack of consent to the taking of a blood test presents no constitutional barrier to admitting the results of the blood test into evidence where a defendant was unconscious and not under arrest when a blood sample was taken, the Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that the exigency of rapidly dissipating alcohol justified the obtaining of a blood sample without the donor's consent and the obtaining of a blood sample under those cir 1984Ground of error five is overruled.” In Burkhalter v. State, 642 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.App.—Houston (14th Dist.)—1982), the court wrote: As we have noted above, a lack of consent to the taking of a blood test presents no constitutional barrier to admitting the results of the blood test into evidence where a defendant was unconscious and not under arrest when a blood sample was taken, the Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that the exigency of rapidly dissipating alcohol justified the obtaining of a blood sample without the donor’s consent and the obtaining of a blood sample under those circumsta | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Whitley v. King
green
1 sentence1983Normally, expert fees necessary to establish an evidentiary matter are not “costs,” see Whitley v. King, 581 S.W.2d 541 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1979, no writ), but in the present case, the taking of a blood test by the parties is mandated by § 13.02 and properly taxed as court costs. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Trammell v. State
green
2 sentences1975Even though the overruling of Trammell [v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 543 , 287 S.W.2d 487 ] may have removed a constitutional impediment of consent as to the taking of a blood test or other chemical tests, this does not obviate the necessity of compliance with statutory provisions, even though statutory requirements may not now be constitutionally required.” The appellant relies solely upon the statutory provisions which were found in Article 802f, V.A.P.C. on the day of the alleged offense; these provisions have since been designated as 67011-5, V.A.C.S. by authority of Sec. 5, Acts 1973, 63rd Leg 1975Even though the overruling of Trammell [v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 543 , 287 S.W.2d 487 ] may have removed a constitutional impediment of consent as to the taking of a blood test or other chemical tests, this does not obviate the necessity of compliance with statutory provisions, even though statutory requirements may not now be constitutionally required.” The appellant relies solely upon the statutory provisions which were found in Article 802f, V.A.P.C. on the day of the alleged offense; these provisions have since been designated as 67011-5, V.A.C.S. by authority of Sec. 5, Acts 1973, 63rd Leg | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Burns v. State
neutral
1 sentence1968Only recently in Burns v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 432 S.W.2d 93 , this Court had occasion to pass upon the question of the admissibility of “exemplars” of handwriting specimens. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Lugo v. State
green
1 sentence1968On February 9, 1966, prior to appellant’s trial, this Court had told all trial judges in our opinion in Lugo v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 398 S.W.2d 769 , that the old confession statute, Art. 727, V.A.C.C.P., in effect at the time of appellant’s arrest, did not apply to the taking of a blood test. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Mora v. State
neutral
2 sentences1964Mora v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 321 , 263 S.W.2d 787 . 1964Mora v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 321 , 263 S.W.2d 787 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Sandel v. State
green
1 sentence1961The Court of Criminal Appeals held at page 916: "In view of this testimony we perceive no error in permitting the witness Chastaine to testify as to the result of the blood test and express his opinion as to the amount of alcohol or number of bottles of beer a per- son would have to consume in order to have a certain percentage of alcohol in his blood." In Sandel v. State, 253 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Crim. 1952) appellant complained on appeal of the introduction of testimony regarding the taking of a blood test and the results thereof. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.