parole grant hearing in Utah

2012The district court found that a petition for extraordinary relief filed four years after the October 8, 2006 decision of the Board at the original parole grant hearing constituted "an unreasonable delay in which to file the petition" and therefore the petition should be dismissed as untimely under the doctrine of laches. 13 In Renn, the Utah Supreme Court stated that while petitions filed under rule 65B(d), which was formerly rule 65B(e), "should be filed within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been done or refused, there is no fixed limitation period governing the time for fi

2012The district court found that a petition for extraordinary relief filed four years afer the October 3, 2006 decision of the Board at the original parole grant hearing constituted “an unreasonable delay in which to file the petition” and therefore the petition should be dismissed as untimely under the doctrine of laches. ¶3 In Renn, the Utah Supreme Court stated that while petitions filed under rule 65B(d), which was formerly rule 65B(e), “should be filed within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been done or refused, there is no fixed limitation period governing the time for fil

2005Due process requirements do not apply to every parole hearing, but only to “those parole hearings at which an inmate’s release date is fixed or extended.” Neel, 886 P.2d at 1101 . ¶4 The Board’s scheduling of Bur-leigh’s original parole hearing was not, in and of itself, a hearing at which his release date was fixed or extended.

1996We have stated, "Until that initial term is set, any proceeding at which the issue is considered must be perceived as a threat to the prisoner's liberty," Neel, 886 P.2d at 1101 , and we extended the benefit of our decision in Neel "to those parole hearings at which an inmate's release date is fixed or extended.” Id.; see also Utah Admin.

2020Whether due process calls for the Parole Board to bolster an original parole-grant hearing with more procedural protections “depend[s] on the demands of the particular situation.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 24 ; Labrum, 870 P.2d at 911 (“The extent to which additional due process protections must be afforded inmates in this and other 8 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Opinion of the Court proceedings in the parole system will require case-by-case review.

2020Whether due process calls for the Parole Board to bolster an original parole-grant hearing with more procedural protections “depend[s] on the demands of the particular situation.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 24 ; Labrum, 870 P.2d at 911 (“The extent to which additional due process protections must be afforded inmates in this and other 8 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Opinion of the Court proceedings in the parole system will require case-by-case review.

2003IL Linden's Revocation 115 In Black v. Romano, the United States Supreme Court set forth the terms of the constitutionally mandated revocation analysis as follows: In identifying the procedural requirements of due process, we have observed that the decision to revoke probation typically involves two distinct components: (1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation. 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257 , 85

2003IL Linden's Revocation 115 In Black v. Romano, the United States Supreme Court set forth the terms of the constitutionally mandated revocation analysis as follows: In identifying the procedural requirements of due process, we have observed that the decision to revoke probation typically involves two distinct components: (1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation. 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257 , 85

2003While a prisoner facing an original parole grant hearing is not necessarily entitled to judicial review under the terms of the United States Constitution, a parolee who is facing a parole revocation hearing is entitled to judicial review in order " 'to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. " Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261 , 63 LEd.2d 552 (1980) (citation omitted). 1 14 We accordingly conclude that, under the terms of the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause, judicial review of the Board's revocations decisions is authorized and t

2003While a prisoner facing an original parole grant hearing is not necessarily entitled to judicial review under the terms of the United States Constitution, a parolee who is facing a parole revocation hearing is entitled to judicial review in order " 'to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. " Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261 , 63 LEd.2d 552 (1980) (citation omitted). 1 14 We accordingly conclude that, under the terms of the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause, judicial review of the Board's revocations decisions is authorized and t

1993Everything this court said regarding presentence investigation reports in State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), applies to the materials and information on which the Board relies at an original parole grant hearing: It is essential to both the form and substance of a fair proceeding that the defendant have the right to point out errors, misinterpretations, or even to demonstrate that he is not in fact the person who is the subject of the report.