12 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
King County v. HAROLD HIGHgreen2 sentences2001App. at 648 (quoting 8A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.192 (3d ed. 1986)); see also King County v. High, 36 Wn.2d 580, 582-83 , 219 P.2d 118 (1950). 2001App. at 648 (quoting 8A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.192 (3d ed. 1986)); see also King County v. High, 36 Wn.2d 580, 582-83 , 219 P.2d 118 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Van Sant v. City of Everett
green
2 sentences2017App. 641, 647-48 , 849 P.2d 1276 (1993), a City alleging abandonment of a use must show "(a) an intention to abandon; and (b) an overt act, or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner does not claim or retain any interest in the right to the nonconforming use." Both have been shown in this case. 2001University Place must establish “ ‘(a)[a]n intention to abandon; and (b) an overt act, or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner does not claim or retain any interest in the right to the nonconforming use.’ ” Id. at 648 (quoting 8A Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.192 (3d ed. 1986)). | 5 | 2001–2017 |
Oscar's, Inc. v. Washington State Liquor Control Board
green
1 sentence2012App. 498, 499, 505 , 3 P.3d 813 (2000) (remand for the Board to make a finding analogous to the criminal definition of “knowingly,” as stated in RCW 9A.08.010, that the owner of the bar knowingly allowed illegal drug activity on the premises). ¶21 Accordingly, because Dodge City is a corporation subject to civil penalties for chapter 66.44 RCW violations, and because the legislature has provided neither entrapment nor outrageous conduct as affirmative defenses available in civil enforcement proceedings, we hold that the ALJ did not err. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kupka v. Reid
green
1 sentence1991Kupka, 50 Wn.2d at 467 (citing Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 44 Wash. 239 , 87 P. 257 (1906)). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy
neutral
2 sentences1991Kupka, 50 Wn.2d at 467 (citing Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 44 Wash. 239 , 87 P. 257 (1906)). 1991Kupka, 50 Wn.2d at 467 (citing Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 44 Wash. 239 , 87 P. 257 (1906)). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Daniels
green
2 sentences1965This trust relationship is limited to instances in which a lien “. . . might lawfully be filed upon the property of another This situation was covered in Seattle Ass’n of Credit Men v. Daniels, 15 Wn.2d 393 , 130 P.2d 892 , where we held that an assignee for the benefit of creditors is entitled to interpose the failure to give notice of the furnishing of materials to the owner as a defense to the assertion of an enforceable lien in a preference action. 1965This trust relationship is limited to instances in which a lien “. . . might lawfully be filed upon the property of another This situation was covered in Seattle Ass’n of Credit Men v. Daniels, 15 Wn.2d 393 , 130 P.2d 892 , where we held that an assignee for the benefit of creditors is entitled to interpose the failure to give notice of the furnishing of materials to the owner as a defense to the assertion of an enforceable lien in a preference action. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
In Re MacDuff
neutral
1 sentence1957In re Klapproth v. Squier (1957), 50 Wn. (2d) 675, 314 P. (2d) 430 , overruled our former decision In re McDuff v. Cranor (1953), 42 Wn. (2d) 488, 256 P. (2d) 293 , and held that RCW 9.92.010 is the applicable sentencing statute, rather than RCW 9.95.010 when no specific penalty is provided for the offense in question; here, the intentional taking of a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner is a violation of RCW 9.54.020. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
In RE KLAPPROTH v. Squier
neutral
1 sentence1957In re Klapproth v. Squier (1957), 50 Wn. (2d) 675, 314 P. (2d) 430 , overruled our former decision In re McDuff v. Cranor (1953), 42 Wn. (2d) 488, 256 P. (2d) 293 , and held that RCW 9.92.010 is the applicable sentencing statute, rather than RCW 9.95.010 when no specific penalty is provided for the offense in question; here, the intentional taking of a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner is a violation of RCW 9.54.020. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Wood's Estate
neutral
2 sentences1952Christmas v. Russell, supra; In re Wood's Estate, 243 Pa. 211 , 89 Atl. 975 . 1952Christmas v. Russell, supra; In re Wood's Estate, 243 Pa. 211 , 89 Atl. 975 . | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Napier v. Runkel
green
1 sentence1946Cooley, Taxation (2d ed.), p. 405; Black, Tax Titles (2ded.), §112.’” In Napier v. Runkel, 9 Wn. (2d) 246, 114 P. (2d) 534 , 137 A. L. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
National Bank of Commerce v. Davies
neutral
1 sentence1926Cooley, Taxation (2d ed.), p. 405;-Black, Tax Titles (2d ed.), §112.” See, also, Continental Distributing Co. v. Smith, supra, and National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Davies, 112 Wash. 106 , 191 Pac. 870 , and cases there cited. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.