owner claim in Pennsylvania

2018Id. at 374- 75 (citing Act of 1815, § 4, as set forth at 72 P.S. § 6091).

2018Id. at 374-75 (citing Act of 1815, § 4, as set forth at 72 P.S. § 6091 ).

1952It is the duty of the owner of a bar or taproom to keep it orderly and reasonably well policed: William Rommel v. Jacob Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579 , 11 A. 779 ; Wolk et al., v. Pittsburgh Hotels Co., 284 Pa. 545, 550 , 131 A. 537 ; Poulos v. Brady, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 150, 152 , 74 A. 2d 694 .

1952It is the duty of the owner of a bar or taproom to keep it orderly and reasonably well policed: William Rommel v. Jacob Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579 , 11 A. 779 ; Wolk et al., v. Pittsburgh Hotels Co., 284 Pa. 545, 550 , 131 A. 537 ; Poulos v. Brady, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 150, 152 , 74 A. 2d 694 .

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1970They lose sight of the fact, however, that in order to enable the owner to claim such right he must establish that his expenditures were made in reliance on a building permit previously issued to him, that they were made before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance, and that they were substantial in amount: Gold v. Building Committee of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10 , 5 A. 2d 367 (1939); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98 , 56 A. 2d 210 (1948); A. N. “Ab” Young Company Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429 , 61 A. 2d 839 (1948); Appeal of Mutual Supply Company, 366 Pa. 424 , 77 A. 2d 612 (1951); Appeal of Dun

1962As we pointed out in Brown v. Esposito, supra ( 157 Pa. Superior Ct. at page 149 , 42 A. 2d at page 94 ) : “When suit is brought against the defendant by a stranger to his contract, he is entitled to proof that the plaintiff is the owner of the claim against him.

1962As we pointed out in Brown v. Esposito, supra ( 157 Pa. Superior Ct. at page 149 , 42 A. 2d at page 94 ) : “When suit is brought against the defendant by a stranger to his contract, he is entitled to proof that the plaintiff is the owner of the claim against him.

1953The provision in the latter aspect was inserted, as was pointed out in Mellor v. City of Philadelphia, 160 Pa. 614, 621 , 28 A. 991 , “to provide against the great injustice that was continually resulting from the ruling of this court in O’Connor v. Pittsburgh [supra].” Article XYI, Section 8, reads as follows: “Municipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction or enlargement of their works, highways or improvements, which compensation s

1900Thus in Green v. Boro. of Reading, 9 Watts, 382 , the borough filled up the street in front of a house so as to obstruct the access and deprive the owner of the use of an alley; in Henry v. Pittsburg and Allegheny Bridge Co., 8 W. & S. 85 , a similar obstruction was made by the erection of the abutments of a bridge ; in O’Connor v. Pittsburg, 18 Pa. 187 , the street was lowered in grade to such extent as to impair the safety of the cathedral and perhaps necessitate taking it down ; and in Monongahela Nav.

1990The section of the ordinance quoted above does not condition the building of a home on an undersized lot upon the approval of the zoning hearing board. 1 In Rogers v. Zoning Hearing Board of East Pike-land Township, 103 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 478, 520 A.2d 922 (1987), Judge Craig described the three theories by which an owner can claim that he should be permitted to build a single-family dwelling on an undersized lot which existed before a zoning ordinance was enacted.

1984In Commonwealth v. Rutan, 229 Pa. Super. 400 (1974), Judge Spaeth (now President Judge) stated: “On the other hand, it has been said that ‘all persons are presumed to know the law and are therefore presumed to be so informed as to [their] rights.

1982In Tax Review Board v. Brine Corporation, 414 Pa. 488 , 200 A.2d 883 (1964), the Supreme Court said that the differences which lead to tax liability for net income or gross receipts from rental property in one case and not in the other are: . . . differences in how the property was acquired or circumstances under which it is retained, in how it is used, in .services performed by way of management, and in the overall objectives of the owner---- Applying this test, the court there decided that the corporate taxpayer had engaged in the business of leasing and was liable for the tax even though th

1982In Philadelphia Tax Review Board v. Weiner, 211 Pa. Superior Ct. 229 , 235 A.2d 184 (1967), the taxpayers purchased rental properties as investments with the sole objective of providing income for their retirement and they employed professional real estate brokers to lease and manage the properties.

1982In Philadelphia Tax Review Board v. Weiner, 211 Pa. Superior Ct. 229 , 235 A.2d 184 (1967), the taxpayers purchased rental properties as investments with the sole objective of providing income for their retirement and they employed professional real estate brokers to lease and manage the properties.

1981Mr. Baker then put his gun away, told his friends to get in the truck, received another six-pack of beer from the owner of the bar to replace the one that had been broken during the fight, and left. *42 The sole issue involved here is whether the actual present ability to inflict death or seriously bodily injury which is required by Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 261 Pa.Super. 109 , 395 A.2d 1337 (1978) has been shown by the Commonwealth in the instant case.

1981Mr. Baker then put his gun away, told his friends to get in the truck, received another six-pack of beer from the owner of the bar to replace the one that had been broken during the fight, and left. *42 The sole issue involved here is whether the actual present ability to inflict death or seriously bodily injury which is required by Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 261 Pa.Super. 109 , 395 A.2d 1337 (1978) has been shown by the Commonwealth in the instant case.

1981See: Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401 , 311 A.2d 576 (1973); Commonwealth v. Turner, 367 Pa. 403 , 80 A.2d 708 (1951).

1981See: Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401 , 311 A.2d 576 (1973); Commonwealth v. Turner, 367 Pa. 403 , 80 A.2d 708 (1951).

1981Short of acquisition of this estate by deed or descent, it is impossible for plaintiffs as owners of the surface to obtain title to these rights because the rights to surface and lateral support is a recognized estate in the land that may be conveyed away by waiver or express covenant, in which instance, the owner of the surface has no right to such support: Com. v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390 , 102 A. 2d 893 (1954); Gordon v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, 253 Pa. 110 , 97 2d 1032 (1916).

1981See: Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401 , 311 A.2d 576 (1973); Commonwealth v. Turner, 367 Pa. 403 , 80 A.2d 708 (1951).

1981See: Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401 , 311 A.2d 576 (1973); Commonwealth v. Turner, 367 Pa. 403 , 80 A.2d 708 (1951).

1981Short of acquisition of this estate by deed or descent, it is impossible for plaintiffs as owners of the surface to obtain title to these rights because the rights to surface and lateral support is a recognized estate in the land that may be conveyed away by waiver or express covenant, in which instance, the owner of the surface has no right to such support: Com. v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390 , 102 A. 2d 893 (1954); Gordon v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, 253 Pa. 110 , 97 2d 1032 (1916).

1981Short of acquisition of this estate by deed or descent, it is impossible for plaintiffs as owners of the surface to obtain title to these rights because the rights to surface and lateral support is a recognized estate in the land that may be conveyed away by waiver or express covenant, in which instance, the owner of the surface has no right to such support: Com. v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390 , 102 A. 2d 893 (1954); Gordon v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, 253 Pa. 110 , 97 2d 1032 (1916).

1980Cases involving the liability of an owner on a claim of unjust enrichment include the following: Constanzo, v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430 , 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (subcontractor recovered from owner on unjust enrichment theory where owner received benefit of subcontractor’s services, did not pay contractor for them, knew that subcontractor was concerned about payment, and had assured subcontractor that escrow arrangements for payment had been made); G and B Contractors, Inc. v. Coronet Developers, 134 Ga.App. 916 , 216 S.E.2d 705 (1975) (subcontractor may not recover from owner where no privity of

1980Cases involving the liability of an owner on a claim of unjust enrichment include the following: Constanzo, v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430 , 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (subcontractor recovered from owner on unjust enrichment theory where owner received benefit of subcontractor’s services, did not pay contractor for them, knew that subcontractor was concerned about payment, and had assured subcontractor that escrow arrangements for payment had been made); G and B Contractors, Inc. v. Coronet Developers, 134 Ga.App. 916 , 216 S.E.2d 705 (1975) (subcontractor may not recover from owner where no privity of

1980Cases involving the liability of an owner on a claim of unjust enrichment include the following: Constanzo, v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430 , 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (subcontractor recovered from owner on unjust enrichment theory where owner received benefit of subcontractor’s services, did not pay contractor for them, knew that subcontractor was concerned about payment, and had assured subcontractor that escrow arrangements for payment had been made); G and B Contractors, Inc. v. Coronet Developers, 134 Ga.App. 916 , 216 S.E.2d 705 (1975) (subcontractor may not recover from owner where no privity of

1980Cases involving the liability of an owner on a claim of unjust enrichment include the following: Constanzo, v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430 , 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (subcontractor recovered from owner on unjust enrichment theory where owner received benefit of subcontractor’s services, did not pay contractor for them, knew that subcontractor was concerned about payment, and had assured subcontractor that escrow arrangements for payment had been made); G and B Contractors, Inc. v. Coronet Developers, 134 Ga.App. 916 , 216 S.E.2d 705 (1975) (subcontractor may not recover from owner where no privity of

1980Cases involving the liability of an owner on a claim of unjust enrichment include the following: Constanzo, v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430 , 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (subcontractor recovered from owner on unjust enrichment theory where owner received benefit of subcontractor’s services, did not pay contractor for them, knew that subcontractor was concerned about payment, and had assured subcontractor that escrow arrangements for payment had been made); G and B Contractors, Inc. v. Coronet Developers, 134 Ga.App. 916 , 216 S.E.2d 705 (1975) (subcontractor may not recover from owner where no privity of

1980Cases involving the liability of an owner on a claim of unjust enrichment include the following: Constanzo, v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430 , 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (subcontractor recovered from owner on unjust enrichment theory where owner received benefit of subcontractor’s services, did not pay contractor for them, knew that subcontractor was concerned about payment, and had assured subcontractor that escrow arrangements for payment had been made); G and B Contractors, Inc. v. Coronet Developers, 134 Ga.App. 916 , 216 S.E.2d 705 (1975) (subcontractor may not recover from owner where no privity of