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11 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1923–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sinclair v. Friedlandergreen2 sentences2023Rather, a plaintiff seeking 2 See also Steagald v. Eason, 300 Ga. 717, 719 ( 797 SE2d 838 ) (2017) (“Even when it is shown that a dog is, in fact, vicious or dangerous, proof that its owner or keeper knows of the peculiar propensities that render the dog in question vicious or dangerous is an essential element of a lawsuit under OCGA § 51-2-7”); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 800 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944) (knowledge of owner required “although the Code section [is] silent as to the necessity of its being shown”). 8 to recover under the second sentence of OCGA § 51-2-7 must prove both that 2023Rather, a plaintiff seeking 2 See also Steagald v. Eason, 300 Ga. 717, 719 ( 797 SE2d 838 ) (2017) (“Even when it is shown that a dog is, in fact, vicious or dangerous, proof that its owner or keeper knows of the peculiar propensities that render the dog in question vicious or dangerous is an essential element of a lawsuit under OCGA § 51-2-7”); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 800 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944) (knowledge of owner required “although the Code section [is] silent as to the necessity of its being shown”). 8 to recover under the second sentence of OCGA § 51-2-7 must prove both that | 1 | 1 |
Steagald v. Easongreen2 sentences2023Rather, a plaintiff seeking 2 See also Steagald v. Eason, 300 Ga. 717, 719 ( 797 SE2d 838 ) (2017) (“Even when it is shown that a dog is, in fact, vicious or dangerous, proof that its owner or keeper knows of the peculiar propensities that render the dog in question vicious or dangerous is an essential element of a lawsuit under OCGA § 51-2-7”); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 800 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944) (knowledge of owner required “although the Code section [is] silent as to the necessity of its being shown”). 8 to recover under the second sentence of OCGA § 51-2-7 must prove both that 2023Rather, a plaintiff seeking 2 See also Steagald v. Eason, 300 Ga. 717, 719 ( 797 SE2d 838 ) (2017) (“Even when it is shown that a dog is, in fact, vicious or dangerous, proof that its owner or keeper knows of the peculiar propensities that render the dog in question vicious or dangerous is an essential element of a lawsuit under OCGA § 51-2-7”); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 800 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944) (knowledge of owner required “although the Code section [is] silent as to the necessity of its being shown”). 8 to recover under the second sentence of OCGA § 51-2-7 must prove both that | 1 | 1 |
S&S TOWING & RECOVERY, LTD v. CHARNOTAgreen2 sentences2023Rather, a plaintiff seeking 2 See also Steagald v. Eason, 300 Ga. 717, 719 ( 797 SE2d 838 ) (2017) (“Even when it is shown that a dog is, in fact, vicious or dangerous, proof that its owner or keeper knows of the peculiar propensities that render the dog in question vicious or dangerous is an essential element of a lawsuit under OCGA § 51-2-7”); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 800 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944) (knowledge of owner required “although the Code section [is] silent as to the necessity of its being shown”). 8 to recover under the second sentence of OCGA § 51-2-7 must prove both that 2023Our Supreme Court reiterated that the second sentence of OCGA § 51-2-7 “does not displace the requirement in the common law, which the courts have read into the statute’s first sentence, that a plaintiff seeking to recover under OCGA § 51-2-7 must also prove that the owner had knowledge of the vicious or dangerous propensity of the animal.” S&S Towing & Recovery, Ltd., 309 Ga. at 121 (2).2 The statute’s second sentence did not create an “irrebutable statutory presumption that an owner of a dog is aware of the dog’s vicious propensity” in every instance where an owner is in violation of a gover | 1 | 1 |
Whatley v. THE ALTO CORPORATIONgreen2 sentences1990If, however, materialmen’s liens have previously been filed, payment that is thereafter made to any other materialman as a potential lien claimant is not payment which is “properly appropriated” and may not be set up by the owner in defense of the subsequent foreclosure of those previously filed liens. “ Tf a claim of lien has been filed and recorded, then the owner must see that such materialman or laborer is satisfied out of the money paid by him to the contractor, or he will be held liable for the amount in the event, upon suit brought, it should be determined that the claim was valid.’ ” ( 1990If, however, materialmen’s liens have previously been filed, payment that is thereafter made to any other materialman as a potential lien claimant is not payment which is “properly appropriated” and may not be set up by the owner in defense of the subsequent foreclosure of those previously filed liens. “ Tf a claim of lien has been filed and recorded, then the owner must see that such materialman or laborer is satisfied out of the money paid by him to the contractor, or he will be held liable for the amount in the event, upon suit brought, it should be determined that the claim was valid.’ ” ( | 1 | 1 |
Jones Brick Co. v. Seagler Bros.green2 sentences1990See Jones Brick Co. v. Seagler Bros., 146 Ga. 19 (1) ( 90 SE 473 ) (1916). 1990See Jones Brick Co. v. Seagler Bros., 146 Ga. 19 (1) ( 90 SE 473 ) (1916). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences1983Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 243 ( 3 SE2d 907 ); overruled in part on other grounds, 248 Ga. 372, 376 ( 283 SE2d 466 ). “ ‘Generally speaking, the measure of damages is the market value of the property to be taken, and when this would give just and adequate compensation to the owner this rule should be applied.’ [Cit.] But when the evidence shows that the property has some unique and special value to the condemnee other than, or over and above, fair market value, and that fair market value will not afford just and adequate compensation to the condemnee, other criteria than fair market valu 1983Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 243 ( 3 SE2d 907 ); overruled in part on other grounds, 248 Ga. 372, 376 ( 283 SE2d 466 ). “ ‘Generally speaking, the measure of damages is the market value of the property to be taken, and when this would give just and adequate compensation to the owner this rule should be applied.’ [Cit.] But when the evidence shows that the property has some unique and special value to the condemnee other than, or over and above, fair market value, and that fair market value will not afford just and adequate compensation to the condemnee, other criteria than fair market valu | 1 | 1 |
State Highway Department v. Thomasgreen1 sentence1983Dept. v. Thomas, 106 Ga. App. 849, 853 ( 128 SE2d 520 ). | 1 | 1 |
State Highway Board v. Bridgesgreen2 sentences1983Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 243 ( 3 SE2d 907 ); overruled in part on other grounds, 248 Ga. 372, 376 ( 283 SE2d 466 ). “ ‘Generally speaking, the measure of damages is the market value of the property to be taken, and when this would give just and adequate compensation to the owner this rule should be applied.’ [Cit.] But when the evidence shows that the property has some unique and special value to the condemnee other than, or over and above, fair market value, and that fair market value will not afford just and adequate compensation to the condemnee, other criteria than fair market valu 1983Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 243 ( 3 SE2d 907 ); overruled in part on other grounds, 248 Ga. 372, 376 ( 283 SE2d 466 ). “ ‘Generally speaking, the measure of damages is the market value of the property to be taken, and when this would give just and adequate compensation to the owner this rule should be applied.’ [Cit.] But when the evidence shows that the property has some unique and special value to the condemnee other than, or over and above, fair market value, and that fair market value will not afford just and adequate compensation to the condemnee, other criteria than fair market valu | 1 | 1 |
Housing Authority of Augusta v. Hollowaygreen2 sentences1962“Generally speaking, the measure of damages is the market value of the property to be taken, and when this would give just and adequate compensation to the owner this rule should be applied.” Housing Authority of Augusta v. Holloway, 63 Ga. App. 485, 486 ( 11 SE2d 418 ). 1962“Generally speaking, the measure of damages is the market value of the property to be taken, and when this would give just and adequate compensation to the owner this rule should be applied.” Housing Authority of Augusta v. Holloway, 63 Ga. App. 485, 486 ( 11 SE2d 418 ). | 1 | 1 |
Dunaway v. Windsorgreen2 sentences1957See also Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 (4) ( 30 S. E. 2d 627 ). 1957See also Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 (4) ( 30 S. E. 2d 627 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cook v. Gammon
neutral
2 sentences1957“Merely-passing through an alley ... in a city, belonging to the owner of adjacent property and kept open by him for his own use or the use of his tenants, will not ripen into a right to continue such passing by any lapse of time, no repairs being made nor any other acts being done so as to give notice to the owner of a claim of right to pass as distinguished from a mere license or permission.” Cook v. Gammon, 93 Ga. 298 ( 20 S. E. 332 ). 1957“Merely-passing through an alley ... in a city, belonging to the owner of adjacent property and kept open by him for his own use or the use of his tenants, will not ripen into a right to continue such passing by any lapse of time, no repairs being made nor any other acts being done so as to give notice to the owner of a claim of right to pass as distinguished from a mere license or permission.” Cook v. Gammon, 93 Ga. 298 ( 20 S. E. 332 ). | 2 | 1957–1969 |
McCrary v. Barberi
green
2 sentences1965The contract itself, however, is what establishes this sum, and under the decision in McCrary v. Barberi, 100 Ga. App. 167 ( 110 SE2d 426 ), the mere fact that the owner may have a defense of failure of consideration against the contractor as to the full contract price will not affect the rights of materialmen who have performed their own contracts in a proper manner. 1965The contract itself, however, is what establishes this sum, and under the decision in McCrary v. Barberi, 100 Ga. App. 167 ( 110 SE2d 426 ), the mere fact that the owner may have a defense of failure of consideration against the contractor as to the full contract price will not affect the rights of materialmen who have performed their own contracts in a proper manner. | 2 | 1965–1965 |
Henderson v. Cochran
green
2 sentences1965It might also be argued that this case differs from Henderson v. Cochran, 213 Ga. 642 ( 100 SE2d 910 ) because the contract there made payment of the contractor’s debts a condition precedent to payment by the owner to the contractor, whereas here the contract merely provides that the sum is “to be paid during construction.” In Henderson (p. 645) it was observed: “It is unnecessary to dwell at length on the possible dire effect upon the purchaser’s finances if he paid the contractor without insisting that the potential lienors are satisfied.” We take the provision in the contract here not to be 1965It might also be argued that this case differs from Henderson v. Cochran, 213 Ga. 642 ( 100 SE2d 910 ) because the contract there made payment of the contractor’s debts a condition precedent to payment by the owner to the contractor, whereas here the contract merely provides that the sum is “to be paid during construction.” In Henderson (p. 645) it was observed: “It is unnecessary to dwell at length on the possible dire effect upon the purchaser’s finances if he paid the contractor without insisting that the potential lienors are satisfied.” We take the provision in the contract here not to be | 2 | 1965–1965 |
MacOn-bibb County Water & Sewerage Authority v. Reynolds
green
2 sentences1983Auth. v. Reynolds, 165 Ga. App. 348 ( 299 SE2d 594 ), this court, after distinguishing between “unique” and “peculiar,” cited both the comparable sales test and the Chambers unique to the owner rule. 1983Auth. v. Reynolds, 165 Ga. App. 348 ( 299 SE2d 594 ), this court, after distinguishing between “unique” and “peculiar,” cited both the comparable sales test and the Chambers unique to the owner rule. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Nassar v. Salter
green
2 sentences1969Cook v. Gammon, 93 Ga. 298 ( 20 SE 332 ); Nassar v. Salter, 213 Ga. 253 ( 98 SE2d 557 ). 1969Cook v. Gammon, 93 Ga. 298 ( 20 SE 332 ); Nassar v. Salter, 213 Ga. 253 ( 98 SE2d 557 ). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Elbert County v. Brown
green
2 sentences1940But it was held by this court in Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga. App. 834 (8), 847 ( 86 S. E. 651 ) : “ffe have already adverted to the measure of recovery as included within the word ‘just and adequate compensation.’ We have also pointed out that in some instances one might not be justly compensated for the taking of his property unless he was awarded an amount adequate to repay the cost of the particular property or to replace just such property as was taken from him; and hence it is only necessary to say, in regard to the rulings and charge of -the trial judge upon the measure of damages of 1940But it was held by this court in Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga. App. 834 (8), 847 ( 86 S. E. 651 ) : “ffe have already adverted to the measure of recovery as included within the word ‘just and adequate compensation.’ We have also pointed out that in some instances one might not be justly compensated for the taking of his property unless he was awarded an amount adequate to repay the cost of the particular property or to replace just such property as was taken from him; and hence it is only necessary to say, in regard to the rulings and charge of -the trial judge upon the measure of damages of | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Rice v. State
green
2 sentences1923In Harrell v. State, 121 Ga. 608 , Justice Evans said: “In cases of arson the offense is not so much against the property in-interest in the house as it is - against the security of the house, and an allegation of ownership in an indictment is sustained by proof of the occupancy of the alleged owner under a claim of right.” The above is quoted with approval in Rice v. State, 16 Ga. App. 128 (3) ( 84 S. E. 609 ). 1923In Harrell v. State, 121 Ga. 608 , Justice Evans said: “In cases of arson the offense is not so much against the property in-interest in the house as it is - against the security of the house, and an allegation of ownership in an indictment is sustained by proof of the occupancy of the alleged owner under a claim of right.” The above is quoted with approval in Rice v. State, 16 Ga. App. 128 (3) ( 84 S. E. 609 ). | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.