owner claim in Massachusetts

2026In Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Watch Co., 249 Mass. 14, 19 (1924), the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that "no consideration is required to constitute a valid assignment . . . in cases of gifts . . . ." "A valid assignment may be made by any words or acts which fairly indicate an intention to make the assignee the owner of a claim." Id.

2026In Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Watch Co., 249 Mass. 14, 19 (1924), the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that "no consideration is required to constitute a valid assignment . . . in cases of gifts . . . ." "A valid assignment may be made by any words or acts which fairly indicate an intention to make the assignee the owner of a claim." Id.

2013Co., 285 Mass. 532, 538 (1934).

1943Responsibility for operation of the motor vehicle accompanying possession conferred by the owner is the test, not whether the particular operation was with the express or implied consent of the owner.” O’Roak v. Lloyds Casualty Co. 285 Mass. 532, 536, 538 .

2013While “[n]o particular form of words or of conduct is necessary to constitute ... an assignment^] ‘[a] valid assignment may be made by any words or acts which fairly indicate an intention to make the assignee the owner of a claim.’ ” Kagan v. Wattendorf & Co., 294 Mass. 588, 596 (1936), quoting from Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Watch Co., 249 Mass. 14, 19 (1924).

1994“A valid assignment may be made by any words or act which fairly indicate an intention to make the assignee the owner of a claim.” Kagan v. Wattendorf & Co. Inc., 294 Mass. 588, 596 (1936), quoting Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Watch Co., 249 Mass. 14, 19 (1924).

2015While deference is still appropriate, the revised abuse of discretion standard confirms that an appellate court is entitled to correct a decision that is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. 10 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 124-125 (2000) (defendant convicted of murder despite insanity defense where victim’s organs were removed and impaled on stake). 11 Dr. Fox testified as a witness for the defense as requested by counsel notwithstanding his advice that “PTSD might be a defense worth pursuing” and that “further evaluat

2013The statute requires only that the insured consent to responsibility on the part of the person, against whom judgment is obtained, for the operation of the automobile somewhere, and that the judgment be based upon an operation or use of the automobile ‘upon the ways of the commonwealth.’ ” Id. at 571-572 (citations and quotations omitted).

2004Co., 153 Mass. 120, 121-122 (1891) (after executing an express release of right of way granted by a deed, which provided access to the public road, the owner could not then claim a way by necessity, as such arises from the presumed intention of the parties, rather than any public policy against landlocked parcels); Orpin v. Morrison, 230 Mass. 529, 533 (1918) (right of way by necessity implied by law to be the parties’ intent when the granted premises were otherwise inaccessible).

2004Co., 153 Mass. 120, 121-122 (1891) (after executing an express release of right of way granted by a deed, which provided access to the public road, the owner could not then claim a way by necessity, as such arises from the presumed intention of the parties, rather than any public policy against landlocked parcels); Orpin v. Morrison, 230 Mass. 529, 533 (1918) (right of way by necessity implied by law to be the parties’ intent when the granted premises were otherwise inaccessible).

1993See Franklin v. Spadafora, supra at 772-774 . *458 When enacting the pet restriction in issue, the trustees expressed concern with “pet problems.” The record indicates that they had received several complaints involving dogs and one that concerned a boa constrictor.

1984Cf. Commonwealth v. Leslie, 376 Mass. 647, 656 (1978) (Liacos, J., concurring), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910 (1979). 11 The defendant’s assertion that his trial counsel knew about an altercation between the defendant and a member of the Hell’s Angels depended mostly on this same woman’s testimony. 12 The defendant’s brief makes much of trial counsel’s “inexplicable refusal” to summons the owner of the bar where the victims spent the evening *677 of November 7-8, 1973, “to prove the drunken and violent behavior of the victims” on that night.