owner claim in Texas

2009Prince v. North State Bank of Amarillo , 484 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Tex.Civ.App. 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1980Relying primarily on Prince v. North State Bank of Amarillo, 484 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.), Braden Steel says to sustain a claim of homestead there must be “proof of concurrence of usage and intent on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.” 1 In this connection, Braden Steel maintains, in essence, that no evidence or finding exists that McClure intended to claim the property in question as his homestead.

2016See Almanza, 2014 WL 554807 , at *3; Sanchez, 960 S.W.2d at 770 ; see Salomon, 369 S.W.3d at 554 (“It is well settled in Texas that in order to establish homestead rights, there must be proof of concurrence of usage and intent on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.”).

2006See 960 S.W.2d at 770 (“To establish homestead rights, the claimant must show a combination of both overt acts of homestead usage and the intention on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.”).

2013To establish a piece of property as homestead property “the claimant must show a combination of both overt acts of homestead usage and the intention on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.” Sims v. Beeson, 545 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).

2013To establish a piece of property as homestead property “the claimant must show a combination of both overt acts of homestead usage and the intention on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.” Sims v. Beeson, 545 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. Civ.

2022See id. (“In order to establish homestead rights, the proof must show a combination of both overt acts of homestead usage and the intention on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.”).

2003To establish homestead rights, a party must show “overt acts of homestead usage, and intention on the part of the owner to claim the property as homestead.” Lifemark, 655 S.W.2d at 314 .

2015When determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular property owner, “we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the covenant against the equities favoring other lot owners who acquired their property on the strength of the restriction.” See id. (citing Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458 , 812 S.W.2d 948, 946 (1958)).

2009Owners Ass’n, 737 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Tanglewood, 728 S.W.2d at 43–44; Hicks, 714 S.W.2d at 35 . 17 … See Cowling, 158 Tex. at 462–63, 312 S.W.2d at 946 (stating that in deciding restrictive covenant case, court’s “judgment must arise out of a balancing of equities or of relative hardships”); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“In determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular lot owner, we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the 9 to the nature and

2018“To establish homestead rights, the claimant must show a combination of both overt acts of homestead usage and the intention on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.” Dominguez v. Castaneda, 163 S.W.3d 318, 330 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied).

2014“To establish homestead rights, the claimant must show a combination of both overt acts of homestead usage and the intention on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.” Id.

2015When determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular property owner, “we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the covenant against the equities favoring other lot owners who acquired their property on the strength of the restriction.” See id. (citing Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458 , 812 S.W.2d 948, 946 (1958)).

2009Owners Ass’n, 737 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Tanglewood, 728 S.W.2d at 43–44; Hicks, 714 S.W.2d at 35 . 17 … See Cowling, 158 Tex. at 462–63, 312 S.W.2d at 946 (stating that in deciding restrictive covenant case, court’s “judgment must arise out of a balancing of equities or of relative hardships”); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“In determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular lot owner, we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the 9 to the nature and

2019Salomon v. Lesay, 369 S.W.3d 540, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) “No specific writing is needed to claim a homestead.

2016See Almanza, 2014 WL 554807 , at *3; Sanchez, 960 S.W.2d at 770 ; see Salomon, 369 S.W.3d at 554 (“It is well settled in Texas that in order to establish homestead rights, there must be proof of concurrence of usage and intent on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.”).

2018See River Consulting, Inc., 848 S.W.2d at 169 ; see also Duke v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 568 S.W.2d 470 , 472 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ) (where owner assigns all interest in a cause of action, parting with both legal and equitable title, he cannot bring suit, except in a representative capacity and with authority for the owner of the claim, as the assignor no longer owns any part of the claim and lacks the justiciable interest that is necessary to maintain any action).

2013See River Consulting, Inc., 848 S.W.2d at 169 ; see also Duke v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 568 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ) (where owner assigns all interest in a cause of action, parting with both legal and equitable title, he cannot bring suit, except in a representative capacity and with authority for the owner of the claim, as the assignor no longer owns any part of the claim and lacks the justicia-ble interest that is necessary to maintain any action).

1996In Stewart v. Welsh, 142 Tex. 314 , 178 S.W.2d 506, 508 (1944), the Court recognized the rule that an owner may waive his right to insist upon compliance with the restriction; but, the Court continued: [H]e is not precluded from enforcing a restriction against an owner whose violation of it materially affects him, by failing to complain of another’s violation which does not materially affect him in the enjoyment of his property or which is merely trivial.

1996In Stewart v. Welsh, 142 Tex. 314 , 178 S.W.2d 506, 508 (1944), the Court recognized the rule that an owner may waive his right to insist upon compliance with the restriction; but, the Court continued: [H]e is not precluded from enforcing a restriction against an owner whose violation of it materially affects him, by failing to complain of another’s violation which does not materially affect him in the enjoyment of his property or which is merely trivial.

2016No specific writing is needed to claim a homestead exemption, but instead merely “proof of concurrence of usage and intent on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.” Dodd v. Harper, 670 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).

2012“It is well settled in Texas that in order to establish homestead rights, there must be proof of concurrence of usage and intent on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.” Dodd, 670 S.W.2d at 649 .

2021Stewart v. Clark, 677 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).

2009Stewart v. Clark, 677 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).

2018See River Consulting, Inc., 848 S.W.2d at 169 ; see also Duke v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 568 S.W.2d 470 , 472 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ) (where owner assigns all interest in a cause of action, parting with both legal and equitable title, he cannot bring suit, except in a representative capacity and with authority for the owner of the claim, as the assignor no longer owns any part of the claim and lacks the justiciable interest that is necessary to maintain any action).

2013See River Consulting, Inc., 848 S.W.2d at 169 ; see also Duke v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 568 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ) (where owner assigns all interest in a cause of action, parting with both legal and equitable title, he cannot bring suit, except in a representative capacity and with authority for the owner of the claim, as the assignor no longer owns any part of the claim and lacks the justicia-ble interest that is necessary to maintain any action).

2009Owners Ass’n, 737 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Tanglewood, 728 S.W.2d at 43–44; Hicks, 714 S.W.2d at 35 . 17 … See Cowling, 158 Tex. at 462–63, 312 S.W.2d at 946 (stating that in deciding restrictive covenant case, court’s “judgment must arise out of a balancing of equities or of relative hardships”); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“In determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular lot owner, we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the 9 to the nature and

2009Owners Ass’n , 737 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Tanglewood , 728 S.W.2d at 43–44; Hicks , 714 S.W.2d at 35 . 17: See Cowling , 158 Tex. at 462–63, 312 S.W.2d at 946 (stating that in deciding restrictive covenant case, court’s “judgment must arise out of a balancing of equities or of relative hardships”); Gigowski v. Russell , 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“In determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular lot owner, we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the covenant against

2009Owners Ass’n, 737 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Tanglewood, 728 S.W.2d at 43–44; Hicks, 714 S.W.2d at 35 . 17 … See Cowling, 158 Tex. at 462–63, 312 S.W.2d at 946 (stating that in deciding restrictive covenant case, court’s “judgment must arise out of a balancing of equities or of relative hardships”); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“In determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular lot owner, we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the 9 to the nature and

2009Owners Ass’n , 737 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Tanglewood , 728 S.W.2d at 43–44; Hicks , 714 S.W.2d at 35 . 17: See Cowling , 158 Tex. at 462–63, 312 S.W.2d at 946 (stating that in deciding restrictive covenant case, court’s “judgment must arise out of a balancing of equities or of relative hardships”); Gigowski v. Russell , 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“In determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular lot owner, we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the covenant against

2004Wesco quotes Hunt Developers, which says, “[t]he Legislature did not intend that the materialman should lose his lien through the technicalities of a warning, where the owner was not misled to his prejudice,” to support the proposition that prejudice to the general contractor does not justify holding the materialman to the statutory notice requirements of the statute.5 409 S.W.2d at 449 (emphasis added).

2004Wesco quotes Hunt Developers , which says, "[t]he Legislature did not intend that the materialman should lose his lien through the technicalities of a warning, where the owner was not misled to his prejudice," to support the proposition that prejudice to the general contractor does not justify holding the materialman to the statutory notice requirements of the statute. (5) 409 S.W.2d at 449 (emphasis added).

2002See id. at 240 .

2002See id. at 240 .

2022Second, “[T]he Property Owner Rule falls within the ambit of Texas Rule of Evidence 701 and therefore does not relieve the owner of the requirement that a witness must be personally familiar with the property and its fair market value, but the Property Owner Rule creates a presumption as to both.” Id.

2015Importantly, however, ″the Property Owner Rule falls within the ambit of Texas Rule of Evidence 701 and therefore does not relieve the owner of the requirement that a witness must be personally familiar with the property and its fair market value … .″ Id.

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Van Brunt v. BancTexas Quorum, N.A., 804 S.W.2d 117 (1989) 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 931 [5] [6] [7] To establish homestead rights, the claimant VAN BRUNT AND SUSAN VAN must show a combination of both overt acts of homestead BRUNT; but if the following property usage and the intention on the part of the owner to claim the ever has been the homestead of those land as a homestead.

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Van Brunt v. BancTexas Quorum, N.A., 804 S.W.2d 117 (1989) 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 931 [5] [6] [7] To establish homestead rights, the claimant VAN BRUNT AND SUSAN VAN must show a combination of both overt acts of homestead BRUNT; but if the following property usage and the intention on the part of the owner to claim the ever has been the homestead of those land as a homestead.

2009Owners Ass’n, 737 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Tanglewood, 728 S.W.2d at 43–44; Hicks, 714 S.W.2d at 35 . 17 … See Cowling, 158 Tex. at 462–63, 312 S.W.2d at 946 (stating that in deciding restrictive covenant case, court’s “judgment must arise out of a balancing of equities or of relative hardships”); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“In determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular lot owner, we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the 9 to the nature and

2009Owners Ass’n , 737 S.W.2d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Tanglewood , 728 S.W.2d at 43–44; Hicks , 714 S.W.2d at 35 . 17: See Cowling , 158 Tex. at 462–63, 312 S.W.2d at 946 (stating that in deciding restrictive covenant case, court’s “judgment must arise out of a balancing of equities or of relative hardships”); Gigowski v. Russell , 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“In determining whether it would be inequitable to enforce a restrictive covenant against a particular lot owner, we must weigh the equities of the owner in violation of the covenant against

1991Braden Steel Corp. v. McClure, 603 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1980, no writ).

1991Braden Steel Corp. v. McClure, 603 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex.Civ.App—Amarillo 1980, no writ).

1990State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co., 510 S.W.2d 311 , 313-14 (Tex. 1974) (although article 3272a is commonly referred to as an escheat law, it is custodial in nature, and anyone may file a claim for such property with the state treasurer); Attorney General Opinion MW-186 (1980) ("the state never actually takes title to the property, since the owner may claim the property or its value at any time"); see also Uniform Unclaimed Property Act prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 216 (1981) ("Not only does the custodial type of statute more adequately preserve the owner's interests, but, in

1990Stnte,v.zLiauidatinu ru tees of ReD lit Petroleum Co,, 510 S.W.2d 311, 313-14 (zex: 1974) (altE:ugh article 3272a is commonly referred to as an escheat law. it is custodial in nature, and anyone may file a claim for such property with the state treasurer): Attorney General Opinion MW-186 (1980) ("the state never actually takes title to the property, since the owner may claim the property or its value at any time"); see also Uniform Unclaimed Property Act prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 216 (1981) ("Not only does the custodial type of statute more adequately preserve the owner's p:6527 Honorable Ralp

1976In Stewart v. Welsh, 142 Tex. 314 , 178 S.W.2d 506, 508 (1944), the Court recognized the rule that an owner may waive his right to insist upon compliance with the restriction; but, the Court continued: “[H]e is not precluded from enforcing a restriction against an owner whose violation of it materially affects him, by failing to complain of another’s violation which does not materially affect him in the enjoyment of his property or which is merely trivial.” 2 This rule is well recognized and has been applied in other cases, see, e. g., Ortiz v. Jeter, 479 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1

1971Ragan v. Mosher, 225 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.Civ.App., Galveston, 1949, wr. ref. n. r. e.); Eakens v. Garrison, 278 S.W.2d 510 , (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1955, wr. ref. n. r. e.); Barham v. Reames, 366 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1963, n. w. h.).

2026Park v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, 457 S.W.3d 571, 601 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2024See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 41.411 (a), 42.09(a); Public, Inc., 264 S.W.3d at 342 (presuming that the appraisal district failed to send the owner the notice required under Tax Code section 11.43(c) and concluding under Tax Code section 42.09 that the remedies under the Property Tax Code were the owner’s exclusive remedies).

2024See Hankins v. Harris, 500 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“No specific writing is needed to claim a homestead exemption, but instead merely ‘proof of concurrence of usage and intent on the part of the owner to claim the land as a homestead.’” (citation omitted)); In re Smith, No. 4:13-CV-1313, 2016 WL 1266522 , at *4 (S.D.

2024He retained Mallios to sue the owner of the bar under the Dram Shop 37 Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 318 (citation omitted); Gandy, 925 S.W.2d at 708 . 38 See Mallios, 11 S.W.3d at 169 (Hecht, J., concurring). 39 Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 314 . 40 Id. at 318 . 16 Act. 41 Mallios sued and obtained a default judgment for more than $1 40 million, but it turned out the defendant did not own the bar, and when that was discovered, limitations on Baker’s claim had run.