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11 Arizona opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Throop v. FE Young and Companygreen2 sentences2014Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 158 , 382 P.2d 560, 568 (1963), quoting 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2388, at 855 (MeNaughton Rev. 1961), in which it had ruled that a waiver occurs when a privileged claimant’s conduct creates a situation in which “ ‘it would be unfair and inconsistent to permit the retention of the privilege.’ ” In other words, the privilege cannot be used as “ ‘both a sword and a shield.’ ” Id., quoting 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2388, at 855. ¶ 12 Sonntag argues that this is what Abeyta seeks to do. 2014Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 158 , 382 P.2d 560, 568 (1963), quoting 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2388, at 855 (MeNaughton Rev. 1961), in which it had ruled that a waiver occurs when a privileged claimant’s conduct creates a situation in which “ ‘it would be unfair and inconsistent to permit the retention of the privilege.’ ” In other words, the privilege cannot be used as “ ‘both a sword and a shield.’ ” Id., quoting 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2388, at 855. ¶ 12 Sonntag argues that this is what Abeyta seeks to do. | 3 | 7 |
Ulibarri v. Gerstenbergergreen1 sentence2020Modular Mining Sys., Inc. v. Jigsaw Techs., Inc., 221 Ariz. 515, 520, ¶ 19 (App. 2009); see also Ulibarri, 178 Ariz. at 161 (“If a party fails to lay adequate foundation for an expert’s affidavit in response to a motion for summary judgment, that testimony is not considered.” (citations omitted)). ¶37 Here, Sannes’ summary judgment motion demonstrated that, even assuming coverage, under the terms of the Greenberg Policy’s retention clause, Aguilera had to incur $7.5 million in costs or damages before Lloyd’s obligations under the policy were triggered. | 1 | 1 |
Modular Mining System, Inc. v. Jigsaw Technologies, Inc.green1 sentence2020Modular Mining Sys., Inc. v. Jigsaw Techs., Inc., 221 Ariz. 515, 520, ¶ 19 (App. 2009); see also Ulibarri, 178 Ariz. at 161 (“If a party fails to lay adequate foundation for an expert’s affidavit in response to a motion for summary judgment, that testimony is not considered.” (citations omitted)). ¶37 Here, Sannes’ summary judgment motion demonstrated that, even assuming coverage, under the terms of the Greenberg Policy’s retention clause, Aguilera had to incur $7.5 million in costs or damages before Lloyd’s obligations under the policy were triggered. | 1 | 1 |
Bain v. SUPER. CT. IN AND FOR MARICOPA CTY.green1 sentence2017See Bain, 148 Ariz. at 334 (“[W]here a privilege holder . . . places a particular medical condition at issue by means of a claim or affirmative defense, . . . then the privilege will be deemed waived with respect to that particular medical condition.”); see also 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 855, § 2388 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) (“A waiver is to be predicated . . . when the conduct (though not evincing that intention) places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence, that it would be unfair and inconsistent to permit the retention of the privilege. | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Leegreen2 sentences2009A party is not allowed to assert the privilege when doing so “places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence, that it would be unfair and inconsistent to permit the retention of the privilege” because the attorney-client privilege “is not to be both a sword and a shield.” Lee, 199 Ariz. at 56, ¶ 9 , 13 P.3d at 1173 (quoting Throop v. F.E. 2009A party is not allowed to assert the privilege when doing so “places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence, that it would be unfair and inconsistent to permit the retention of the privilege” because the attorney-client privilege “is not to be both a sword and a shield.” Lee, 199 Ariz. at 56, ¶ 9 , 13 P.3d at 1173 (quoting Throop v. F.E. | 1 | 1 |
Rawlings v. Apodacagreen2 sentences2000An insurer dealing with a first-party claim must "play fairly with its insured," give equal consideration in handling the claim, and do so in fairness and honesty. 196 Ariz. at 237 ¶¶ 19-20, 995 P.2d at 279 ¶¶ 19-20 (citing and quoting from Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 154 , 726 P.2d 565, 570 (1986)). [4] A waiver is to be predicated not only when the conduct indicates a plain intention to abandon the privilege, but also when the conduct (though not evincing that intention) places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence, that it would be unfair and inconsistent t 2000An insurer dealing with a first-party claim must "play fairly with its insured," give equal consideration in handling the claim, and do so in fairness and honesty. 196 Ariz. at 237 ¶¶ 19-20, 995 P.2d at 279 ¶¶ 19-20 (citing and quoting from Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 154 , 726 P.2d 565, 570 (1986)). [4] A waiver is to be predicated not only when the conduct indicates a plain intention to abandon the privilege, but also when the conduct (though not evincing that intention) places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence, that it would be unfair and inconsistent t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zilisch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2000An insurer dealing with a first-party claim must "play fairly with its insured," give equal consideration in handling the claim, and do so in fairness and honesty. 196 Ariz. at 237 ¶¶ 19-20, 995 P.2d at 279 ¶¶ 19-20 (citing and quoting from Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 154 , 726 P.2d 565, 570 (1986)). [4] A waiver is to be predicated not only when the conduct indicates a plain intention to abandon the privilege, but also when the conduct (though not evincing that intention) places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence, that it would be unfair and inconsistent t 2000An insurer dealing with a first-party claim must "play fairly with its insured," give equal consideration in handling the claim, and do so in fairness and honesty. 196 Ariz. at 237 ¶¶ 19-20, 995 P.2d at 279 ¶¶ 19-20 (citing and quoting from Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 154 , 726 P.2d 565, 570 (1986)). [4] A waiver is to be predicated not only when the conduct indicates a plain intention to abandon the privilege, but also when the conduct (though not evincing that intention) places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence, that it would be unfair and inconsistent t | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury
green
1 sentence1990Davis, 109 S.Ct. at 1506 . [Two] Michigan's tax system discriminates in favor of retired state employees and against retired federal employees. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.