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15 California opinions name it 3 courts 1951–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2015Francis Memorial Hosp. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 507 , 511-512, 119 Cal.Rptr. 507 [noting that restrictive scope of review in cited case "was in no way based on mandate considerations"].) In other words, here as in so much of the law, substance must prevail over form. 2015Francis Memorial Hosp. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 507 , 511-512, 119 Cal.Rptr. 507 [noting that restrictive scope of review in cited case "was in no way based on mandate considerations"].) In other words, here as in so much of the law, substance must prevail over form. | 3 | 4 |
Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orangegreen2 sentences2015What was involved was the formulation, or to be more precise, the retention of a rule of general application, not the application of a rule to a specific set of facts or a particular individual. [¶] ... [W]e are confident the limited judicial review applicable to the quasi-legislative actions of a governmental administrative agency is also appropriately applied to judicial review of rule-making or policy-making actions of a nonprofit hospital corporation." ( Lewin, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at pp. 383-384, 146 Cal.Rptr. 892 ; see id. at p. 385, 146 Cal.Rptr. 892 , citing Ascherman v. St. 2015What was involved was the formulation, or to be more precise, the retention of a rule of general application, not the application of a rule to a specific set of facts or a particular individual. [¶] ... [W]e are confident the limited judicial review applicable to the quasi-legislative actions of a governmental administrative agency is also appropriately applied to judicial review of rule-making or policy-making actions of a nonprofit hospital corporation." ( Lewin, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at pp. 383-384, 146 Cal.Rptr. 892 ; see id. at p. 385, 146 Cal.Rptr. 892 , citing Ascherman v. St. | 1 | 4 |
Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beachgreen1 sentence2026(Accord, Long Beach Police Officers, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 72 [concluding that “silence” on the part of a statute “is important”].) It would be highly unusual for the Legislature to have intended for this court not only to infer a retention requirement within the statutory scheme but also to devise all of the details necessary to make such a requirement coherent, such as when a duty would be triggered and when it would terminate. | 1 | 1 |
Curtis v. Kellogg & Andelsongreen1 sentence1999(See Curtis v. Kellogg & Andelson, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 506 [in chapter 7 proceeding trustee has “sole capacity to represent the estate and sue or be sued”].) As special representative of the bankruptcy estate, OSHPD has standing to pursue Triad’s claims against MPG and Mr. Browning for professional negligence. *836 II-VI * Disposition The summary judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Rodrigues v. Stategreen2 sentences1993Second, we observed that the physical injury requirement "encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony." ( Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 929 .) We concluded that the retention of the requirement ought to be reconsidered because of the tendency of victims to exaggerate sick headaches, nausea, insomnia and other symptoms in order to make out a technical basis of bodily injury upon which to predicate a parasitic recovery for the more grievous disturbance, consisting of the mental and emotional distress endured. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, rather than adhere to what we perceived as an artific 1993Second, we observed that the physical injury requirement "encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony." ( Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 929 .) We concluded that the retention of the requirement ought to be reconsidered because of the tendency of victims to exaggerate sick headaches, nausea, insomnia and other symptoms in order to make out a technical basis of bodily injury upon which to predicate a parasitic recovery for the more grievous disturbance, consisting of the mental and emotional distress endured. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, rather than adhere to what we perceived as an artific | 1 | 1 |
Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenvereingreen2 sentences1951If the theories discussed and discarded by this court in the Silva and England cases do not justify immunity from liability in the case of a paying beneficiary, there is no logical justification for clinging to them in the case of the beneficiary who does not pay. ( Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 397, 398 [ 175 N.W. 699 ]; Sheehan v. North Country Com. 1951If the theories discussed and discarded by this court in the Silva and England cases do not justify immunity from liability in the case of a paying beneficiary, there is no logical justification for clinging to them in the case of the beneficiary who does not pay. ( Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 397, 398 [ 175 N.W. 699 ]; Sheehan v. North Country Com. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Falkowski v. Imation Corp.
green
2 sentences2019(Cf. Falkowski, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 509–510 [neither side offered extrinsic evidence; court relied only on contract language to determine contractual purpose].) The purpose of the retention clause was, as Legendary put it in oral argument, to “ensure proper performance.” This description is obviously correct. 2019(Cf. Falkowski, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 509–510 [neither side offered extrinsic evidence; court relied only on contract language to determine contractual purpose].) The purpose of the retention clause was, as Legendary put it in oral argument, to “ensure proper performance.” This description is obviously correct. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences2007The basic objection to the doctrine—grounded in the primal concept that in a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability— remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness.' (Id. at pp. 810-811, italics added.) After taking additional note of the untoward practical consequences of the doctrine in the litigation of cases and the increasing rejection of the doctrine in other jurisdictions, the Li court concluded that ‘[w]e are likewise persuaded that logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice counsel agains 1992With regard to that doctrine, the Li decision, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804 , observed: "Although several states which apply comparative negligence concepts retain the last clear chance doctrine [citation], the better reasoned position seems to be that when true comparative negligence is adopted, the need for last clear chance as a palliative of the hardships of the `all-or-nothing' rule disappears and its retention results only in a windfall to the plaintiff in direct contravention of the principle of liability in proportion to fault. [Citations.]" ( Id. at p. 824.) Accordingly, the court concluded t | 2 | 1992–2007 |
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
green
2 sentences1998First, ‘the classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive when viewed in the light of its purported purpose of screening false claims.’ ( 27 Cal.3d at p. 928 .) It is overinclusive in that it permits recovery whenever the suffering accompanies or results in physical injury, no matter how trivial (ibid..), yet underinclusive in that it mechanically denies court access to potentially valid claims that could be proved if the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial (id., at p. 929). [ft] Second, we observed that the physical injury requirement ‘encourages extravagant pleading and distor 1998First, ‘the classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive when viewed in the light of its purported purpose of screening false claims.’ ( 27 Cal.3d at p. 928 .) It is overinclusive in that it permits recovery whenever the suffering accompanies or results in physical injury, no matter how trivial (ibid..), yet underinclusive in that it mechanically denies court access to potentially valid claims that could be proved if the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial (id., at p. 929). [ft] Second, we observed that the physical injury requirement ‘encourages extravagant pleading and distor | 2 | 1993–1998 |
Adams v. Cook
green
1 sentence2021(See, e.g., Adams v. Cook (1940) 15 Cal.2d 352, 358-360 ; Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 763, 770 .) He insists the probate court erred by concluding the Trustees had no discretion to sell the Company stock. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.
green
1 sentence2021(See, e.g., Adams v. Cook (1940) 15 Cal.2d 352, 358-360 ; Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 763, 770 .) He insists the probate court erred by concluding the Trustees had no discretion to sell the Company stock. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hoffman v. Jones
green
1 sentence1975(Hoffman v. Jones (Fla. 1973) 280 So.2d 431 .) We are likewise persuaded that logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice counsel against the retention of the doctrine rendering contributory negligence a complete bar to recovery —and that it should be replaced in this state by a system under which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault. 6a The foregoing conclusion, however, clearly takes us only part of the way. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.