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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rose v. Clarkred2 sentences1993An application of harmless-error analysis would have a "corrosive impact on the administration of criminal justice." ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 588 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).) It "can only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting" the law "to the ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular case." ( Id. at pp. 588-589 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.); cf. Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88 [ 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 , 55 S.Ct. 629 ] [stating that the prosecutor 1993An application of harmless-error analysis would have a "corrosive impact on the administration of criminal justice." ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 588 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).) It "can only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting" the law "to the ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular case." ( Id. at pp. 588-589 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.); cf. Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88 [ 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 , 55 S.Ct. 629 ] [stating that the prosecutor | 2 | 2 |
People v. Blackburngreen2 sentences2021The California Supreme Court stated in Blackburn it would “treat a trial court’s failure to obtain a required personal jury trial waiver as tantamount to the denial of a jury trial, and as such, it constitutes a ‘miscarriage of justice’ under article VI, section 13.” (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134 ; see also Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169 .) However, Blackburn supports the application of harmless error rather than structural error for the trial court’s failure to directly advise C.O. of his right to a jury trial. 2017I, § 16.) Here, in contrast, defendant personally entered a jury waiver, meaning that we are not left to "speculate about whether [defendant] would have chosen a jury trial if he ... had been in a position to make a personal choice." ( Blackburn , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458 , 354 P.3d 268 .) Under somewhat analogous circumstances, Blackburn itself contemplated the application of harmless error analysis. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Burgosgreen1 sentence2022(Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 568.) The court cited to Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. __ [ 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1907 ], but that case concerned a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences2011(Cf. People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 756 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 ] (Carter); People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ] (Dyer).) Defendant attempts to avoid the application of harmless error by asserting that there is an inconsistency between the acquittal of felony assault and the guilty verdict on the felony child abuse count since both verdicts were grounded on the same conduct. 2011(Cf. People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 756 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 ] (Carter); People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ] (Dyer).) Defendant attempts to avoid the application of harmless error by asserting that there is an inconsistency between the acquittal of felony assault and the guilty verdict on the felony child abuse count since both verdicts were grounded on the same conduct. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dyergreen2 sentences2011(Cf. People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 756 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 ] (Carter); People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ] (Dyer).) Defendant attempts to avoid the application of harmless error by asserting that there is an inconsistency between the acquittal of felony assault and the guilty verdict on the felony child abuse count since both verdicts were grounded on the same conduct. 2011(Cf. People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 756 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 ] (Carter); People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ] (Dyer).) Defendant attempts to avoid the application of harmless error by asserting that there is an inconsistency between the acquittal of felony assault and the guilty verdict on the felony child abuse count since both verdicts were grounded on the same conduct. | 1 | 1 |
Berger v. United Statesred2 sentences1993An application of harmless-error analysis would have a "corrosive impact on the administration of criminal justice." ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 588 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).) It "can only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting" the law "to the ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular case." ( Id. at pp. 588-589 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.); cf. Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88 [ 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 , 55 S.Ct. 629 ] [stating that the prosecutor 1993An application of harmless-error analysis would have a "corrosive impact on the administration of criminal justice." ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 588 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).) It "can only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting" the law "to the ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular case." ( Id. at pp. 588-589 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.); cf. Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88 [ 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 , 55 S.Ct. 629 ] [stating that the prosecutor | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2015(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) 28 III CONSPIRACY ISSUES: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Michael next contends the evidence only supported a conclusion that he and Cristina reached only a single agreement to make continuing shipments of drugs into jail, so that as a matter of law, four of his conspiracy convictions must be reversed for insufficient evidence. 2015(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) 15 II ISSUES ON HEARSAY AND EXPERT TESTIMONY Michael contends the trial court misapplied the hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1223, for statements by coconspirators. | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Chapman v. California
yellow
2 sentences2015(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) 28 III CONSPIRACY ISSUES: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Michael next contends the evidence only supported a conclusion that he and Cristina reached only a single agreement to make continuing shipments of drugs into jail, so that as a matter of law, four of his conspiracy convictions must be reversed for insufficient evidence. 2015(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) 15 II ISSUES ON HEARSAY AND EXPERT TESTIMONY Michael contends the trial court misapplied the hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1223, for statements by coconspirators. | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Paterno v. State
green
2 sentences2024(Californians for Population Stabilization, at p. 294 [where one defendant’s liability was derivative of second defendant’s and trial court correctly ruled in trial that second defendant was not liable, any errors in grant of summary judgment to first defendant could not be prejudicial]; see Waller v. TJD, Inc., at p. 833 [denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion not prejudicial when jury later returns verdict against defendant]; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 102-103 , 105-109 [error in directing verdict on nuisance theory was not shown to be prejudicial where j 2024(Californians for Population Stabilization, at p. 294 [where one defendant’s liability was derivative of second defendant’s and trial court correctly ruled in trial that second defendant was not liable, any errors in grant of summary judgment to first defendant could not be prejudicial]; see Waller v. TJD, Inc., at p. 833 [denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion not prejudicial when jury later returns verdict against defendant]; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 102-103 , 105-109 [error in directing verdict on nuisance theory was not shown to be prejudicial where j | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Hawkins v. Wilton
green
2 sentences2024Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936 , 947 remarked, “It has been said that the erroneous granting of a summary judgment motion ‘lies outside the curative provisions’ of the harmless error provision of the California Constitution because such an error denies a party of its right to a jury trial.” However, the authorities cited in Hawkins date to an earlier era of summary judgment jurisprudence when summary judgment was viewed with disfavor. 2024Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936 , 947 remarked, “It has been said that the erroneous granting of a summary judgment motion ‘lies outside the curative provisions’ of the harmless error provision of the California Constitution because such an error denies a party of its right to a jury trial.” However, the authorities cited in Hawkins date to an earlier era of summary judgment jurisprudence when summary judgment was viewed with disfavor. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192 , 207 [§ 1109 does not apply retroactively to a 29 pending, petn. filed May 25, 2022.) In Burgos, the majority discussed the application of harmless error in this context, noting the “case law does not clearly establish whether or how harmless error analysis applies in this instance.” (Id. at p. 568.) Suggesting the failure to try the gang enhancements separately “likely constitutes ‘structural error,’ ” the court nonetheless concluded that even under a Watson standard of review, the error was prejudicial.15 (Burgos, at p. 568.) We disagree that failu | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Weaver v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2022(Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 568.) The court cited to Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. __ [ 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1907 ], but that case concerned a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Meneses
green
1 sentence2015(E.g., Meneses, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1668 .) It is unnecessary to reach Michael's arguments about the application of harmless error theory or federal constitutional standards for evaluating error, since no instructional error occurred. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.