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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Robbinsred2 sentences2023(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 759 ; People v. Miller (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 873, 881-882 .) In order “to avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 .) An exception to any timeliness bar applies here. 2020(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 759 ; People v. Miller (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 873, 881-882 .) In order “to avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the 34 delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 .) Here, regardless of any delay, the trial court properly granted defendant’s writ petition challenging defendant’s 2006 sentence, because the juvenile carjacking adjudication does not qualify as | 5 | 9 |
In Re Clarkyellow2 sentences2023(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 759 ; People v. Miller (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 873, 881-882 .) In order “to avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 .) An exception to any timeliness bar applies here. 2020(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 759 ; People v. Miller (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 873, 881-882 .) In order “to avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the 34 delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 .) Here, regardless of any delay, the trial court properly granted defendant’s writ petition challenging defendant’s 2006 sentence, because the juvenile carjacking adjudication does not qualify as | 2 | 5 |
Royal Globe Insurance v. Whitakergreen2 sentences1998Co. v. Whitaker (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 532, 537 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 435 ]; Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 963, 978, fn. 13 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 ].) However, there are few published appellate decisions in California which have considered the issue of whether the insured or the insurer has the burden of proving that coverage is restored to an otherwise excluded claim because the claim falls within an exception to the exclusion. 1998Co. v. Whitaker (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 532, 537 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 435 ]; Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 963, 978, fn. 13 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 ].) However, there are few published appellate decisions in California which have considered the issue of whether the insured or the insurer has the burden of proving that coverage is restored to an otherwise excluded claim because the claim falls within an exception to the exclusion. | 2 | 2 |
Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998Co. v. Whitaker (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 532, 537 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 435 ]; Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 963, 978, fn. 13 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 ].) However, there are few published appellate decisions in California which have considered the issue of whether the insured or the insurer has the burden of proving that coverage is restored to an otherwise excluded claim because the claim falls within an exception to the exclusion. 1998Co. v. Whitaker (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 532, 537 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 435 ]; Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 963, 978, fn. 13 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 ].) However, there are few published appellate decisions in California which have considered the issue of whether the insured or the insurer has the burden of proving that coverage is restored to an otherwise excluded claim because the claim falls within an exception to the exclusion. | 2 | 2 |
In re Simsgreen2 sentences2024Since we found the first claim was not untimely, we likewise find this claim is not untimely. 13. presenting a claim bars consideration of the merits.” (Sims, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 .) “[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. [¶] Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. 2024“A criminal defendant mounting a collateral attack on a final judgment of conviction must do so in a timely manner. [Citation.] Thus, a petitioner is required to explain and justify any significant delay in seeking habeas corpus relief. [Citation.] An unjustified delay in presenting a claim bars consideration of the merits.” (In re Sims (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 195, 204 (Sims).) “[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. [¶] Substantial delay is meas | 1 | 1 |
In Re Huddlestongreen2 sentences2011(In re Huddleston (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1031, 1034 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 595 , 458 P.2d 507 ].) Rather, the general rule is that the petition must be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow . . . .” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ] (Clark).) An untimely petition for writ of habeas corpus may still be considered if the delay is justified by the petitioner, who bears the burden of demonstrating either: “(i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” (In re 2011(In re Huddleston (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1031, 1034 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 595 , 458 P.2d 507 ].) Rather, the general rule is that the petition must be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow . . . .” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ] (Clark).) An untimely petition for writ of habeas corpus may still be considered if the delay is justified by the petitioner, who bears the burden of demonstrating either: “(i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” (In re | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Miller
green
2 sentences2023(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 759 ; People v. Miller (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 873, 881-882 .) In order “to avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 .) An exception to any timeliness bar applies here. 2020(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 759 ; People v. Miller (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 873, 881-882 .) In order “to avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the 34 delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 .) Here, regardless of any delay, the trial court properly granted defendant’s writ petition challenging defendant’s 2006 sentence, because the juvenile carjacking adjudication does not qualify as | 2 | 2020–2023 |
In Re Estrada
green
1 sentence2020Writ relief “will always issue to review an invalid sentence, when, without the redetermination of any facts, the judgment may be corrected to accord with the proper determination of the circumstances.” (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 750 .) As in the instant case, writ relief has been issued “where the trial court has sentenced a defendant to a term in excess of the maximum provided by law.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, the record shows good cause for defendant delaying filing his writ petition until January 5, 2018. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Horowitz
green
1 sentence2012(In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775; In re Horowitz, supra, 33 Cal.2d at pp. 546-547.) In addition, because the facts underlying the claim were known at the time of retrial in 1987, petitioner presents the claim after a substantial and unexplained delay. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.