Coffey motion in California

1995(Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 687 P.2d 904 ].) The court granted his Coffey motion and stated: “The allegation of prior felony conviction of 4/2/73 in Los Angeles County is stricken on constitutional grounds.” There is no evidence in the record the People appealed the ruling of the San Mateo court, and respondent has not shown otherwise.

1995(Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 687 P.2d 904 ].) The court granted his Coffey motion and stated: “The allegation of prior felony conviction of 4/2/73 in Los Angeles County is stricken on constitutional grounds.” There is no evidence in the record the People appealed the ruling of the San Mateo court, and respondent has not shown otherwise.

2005At the time of defendant Coffey’s plea and sentencing, section 296(a)(1) read: “ ‘Any person who is convicted of [a qualifying offense] . . . shall, regardless of sentence imposed or disposition rendered, be required to provide [specified body samples] for law enforcement identification analysis.’ ” (Coffey v. Superior Court, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 814 .) Juveniles were simply not included in this section.

1999Our decision was not based on an interpretation of either the federal or state Constitution, but on this court's assessment of "efficient judicial administration." (See Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 963 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 , 928 P.2d 572 .) In today's parlance, we would characterize the rule as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure. ( Id. at p. 964, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 858 , 928 P.2d 572 .) The question later arose whether the Coffey motion to strike procedure was available to challenge an alleged prior felony conviction on constitutional grounds other than denial of counsel.

1999Our decision was not based on an interpretation of either the federal or state Constitution, but on this court's assessment of "efficient judicial administration." (See Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 963 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 , 928 P.2d 572 .) In today's parlance, we would characterize the rule as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure. ( Id. at p. 964, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 858 , 928 P.2d 572 .) The question later arose whether the Coffey motion to strike procedure was available to challenge an alleged prior felony conviction on constitutional grounds other than denial of counsel.

1999Code, § 190.2 , subd. (a)(2)), on the grounds the defendant's Boykin-Tahl rights had been infringed and his prior guilty plea *Page 431 involuntary because he was intoxicated at the time of the plea. ( Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292 , 1296 ( Curl ).) History has shown that, at least in noncapital cases, Sumstine , supra , 36 Cal.3d 909 , represented the high water mark in this area of motions to strike.

1995(Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 687 P.2d 904 ].) The court granted his Coffey motion and stated: “The allegation of prior felony conviction of 4/2/73 in Los Angeles County is stricken on constitutional grounds.” There is no evidence in the record the People appealed the ruling of the San Mateo court, and respondent has not shown otherwise.

1995(Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 687 P.2d 904 ].) The court granted his Coffey motion and stated: “The allegation of prior felony conviction of 4/2/73 in Los Angeles County is stricken on constitutional grounds.” There is no evidence in the record the People appealed the ruling of the San Mateo court, and respondent has not shown otherwise.

1988(Id. at p. 919, fn. 6.) In People v. Amaya (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 313 ], the court specifically approved the use of a Coffey motion to attack a prior on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

1988(Id. at p. 919, fn. 6.) In People v. Amaya (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 313 ], the court specifically approved the use of a Coffey motion to attack a prior on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

1984(People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1169 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 920 , 459 P.2d 248 ].) In fact, we permitted Coffey to raise the issue of the denial of his right to counsel even though the appellate court of the state in which he had been previously convicted decided against him on this very issue soon after his incarceration. ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 210, fn. 5 .) We therefore disapprove People v. Gage, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 918 , and People v. Davis, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 270 , to the extent they suggest that motions to strike are governed by the same rules of timeliness as habeas corpus petitions.

1984For example, we have permitted defendants to raise inadequate assistance of counsel on a Coffey motion. ( People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1169 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 , 459 P.2d 248 ].) [7] In fact, we permitted Coffey to raise the issue of the denial of his right to counsel even though the appellate court of the state in which he had been previously convicted decided against him on this very issue soon after his incarceration. ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 210, fn. 5 .) [8] We therefore disapprove People v. Gage, supra, 126 Cal. App.3d 918 , and People v. Davis, supra, 103 Cal. App.3d 270 , to the e

1984(People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1169 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 920 , 459 P.2d 248 ].) In fact, we permitted Coffey to raise the issue of the denial of his right to counsel even though the appellate court of the state in which he had been previously convicted decided against him on this very issue soon after his incarceration. ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 210, fn. 5 .) We therefore disapprove People v. Gage, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 918 , and People v. Davis, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 270 , to the extent they suggest that motions to strike are governed by the same rules of timeliness as habeas corpus petitions.

1984For example, we have permitted defendants to raise inadequate assistance of counsel on a Coffey motion. ( People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1169 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 , 459 P.2d 248 ].) [7] In fact, we permitted Coffey to raise the issue of the denial of his right to counsel even though the appellate court of the state in which he had been previously convicted decided against him on this very issue soon after his incarceration. ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 210, fn. 5 .) [8] We therefore disapprove People v. Gage, supra, 126 Cal. App.3d 918 , and People v. Davis, supra, 103 Cal. App.3d 270 , to the e

1984For example, we have permitted defendants to raise inadequate assistance of counsel on a Coffey motion. ( People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1169 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 , 459 P.2d 248 ].) [7] In fact, we permitted Coffey to raise the issue of the denial of his right to counsel even though the appellate court of the state in which he had been previously convicted decided against him on this very issue soon after his incarceration. ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 210, fn. 5 .) [8] We therefore disapprove People v. Gage, supra, 126 Cal. App.3d 918 , and People v. Davis, supra, 103 Cal. App.3d 270 , to the e

1980To explore matters other than the easily determined fact of representation by, or waiver of, counsel could—and no doubt would—require a lengthy recess of the trial in order to procure witnesses and other evidence with the resultant possibility of frequent declaration of mistrials.” ( 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 272 , italics in original.) In Gaulden the same court, for the same reason, again rejected the propriety of such an attack. ( 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 776 .) In Gonzalez v. Municipal Court (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 706 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 612 ], however, the same court approved the use of a Coffey motion to

1980To explore matters other than the easily determined fact of representation by, or waiver of, counsel could—and no doubt would—require a lengthy recess of the trial in order to procure witnesses and other evidence with the resultant possibility of frequent declaration of mistrials.” ( 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 272 , italics in original.) In Gaulden the same court, for the same reason, again rejected the propriety of such an attack. ( 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 776 .) In Gonzalez v. Municipal Court (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 706 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 612 ], however, the same court approved the use of a Coffey motion to

1980(But cf. Salazar v. Municipal Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 1028 , intimating that the evidentiary burden imposed upon the defendant in Coffey may not apply to posttrial convictions.)

1980To explore matters other than the easily determined fact of representation by, or waiver of, counsel could—and no doubt would—require a lengthy recess of the trial in order to procure witnesses and other evidence with the resultant possibility of frequent declaration of mistrials.” ( 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 272 , italics in original.) In Gaulden the same court, for the same reason, again rejected the propriety of such an attack. ( 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 776 .) In Gonzalez v. Municipal Court (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 706 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 612 ], however, the same court approved the use of a Coffey motion to

1980To explore matters other than the easily determined fact of representation by, or waiver of, counsel could—and no doubt would—require a lengthy recess of the trial in order to procure witnesses and other evidence with the resultant possibility of frequent declaration of mistrials.” ( 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 272 , italics in original.) In Gaulden the same court, for the same reason, again rejected the propriety of such an attack. ( 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 776 .) In Gonzalez v. Municipal Court (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 706 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 612 ], however, the same court approved the use of a Coffey motion to

1977(Newton, supra, at pp. 386-387 .) Nor does People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 487 P.2d 1009 ], support respondent court’s action.

1977(Newton, supra, at pp. 386-387 .) Nor does People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 487 P.2d 1009 ], support respondent court’s action.

1955Extension of the Coffey rule would not be justified unless clearly required.” The language of the Third Circuit in the case referred to supra—United States v. One Dodge Sedan , 113 F.2d 552— was even more pointed.

1955Extension of the Coffey rule would not be justified unless clearly required.” The language of the Third Circuit in the case referred to supra—United States v. One Dodge Sedan , 113 F.2d 552— was even more pointed.