concept of judicial immunity in California

2013(See, e.g., Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 893 ] [“The concept of judicial immunity is long-standing and absolute . . . .”].) But that does not furnish a basis to sue SSA or its social workers acting under delegated judicial authority. *1381 Fourth and related, although social workers are not judicial officers entitled to judicial immunity, the trial court properly determined defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the immunity that shields discretionary decisions by public employees.

2013(See, e.g., Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 893 ] [“The concept of judicial immunity is long-standing and absolute . . . .”].) But that does not furnish a basis to sue SSA or its social workers acting under delegated judicial authority. *1381 Fourth and related, although social workers are not judicial officers entitled to judicial immunity, the trial court properly determined defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the immunity that shields discretionary decisions by public employees.

2023It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge’s jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be.” (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851 (Howard).) The judicial immunity doctrine derives from “ ‘a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in [the officer], shall be free to act upon [the officer’s] own conv

1990It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions [3] and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. ( Turpen v. Booth (1880) 56 Cal. 65, 68 ; Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 497, 507 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 770 ].) The judge is immune unless "he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]" ( Greene, *852 supra, at p. 507.) Beyond doubt, the doctrine of "civil immunity of the judiciary in the perf

2014(See, e.g., Howard[, supra,] 222 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 851 .. . [‘The concept of judicial immunity is long-standing and absolute . . . .’].) But that does not furnish a basis to sue SSA or its social workers acting under delegated judicial authority.” (Christina C., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380, italics omitted.) This case comes to us in a similar posture as the case of Christina C.

2014(See, e.g., Howard[, supra,] 222 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 851 [‘The concept of judicial immunity is long-standing and absolute’].) But that does not furnish a basis to sue SSA or its social workers acting under delegated judicial authority.” (Christina C., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380 .) This case comes to us in a similar posture as the case of Christina C.

2024A. Overview of Arbitral Immunity “Arbitrators have been extended the protection of judicial immunity, because they perform ‘“the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.”’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 909 ; accord Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 650 [“[the] rule—immunizing arbitrators in private contractual arbitration proceedings from tort liability—is well established in California”]; see also Stasz v. Schwab (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 420, 431 [“‘Arbitral immunity, like judicial immunity, promotes

2024A. Overview of Arbitral Immunity “Arbitrators have been extended the protection of judicial immunity, because they perform ‘“the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.”’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 909 ; accord Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 650 [“[the] rule—immunizing arbitrators in private contractual arbitration proceedings from tort liability—is well established in California”]; see also Stasz v. Schwab (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 420, 431 [“‘Arbitral immunity, like judicial immunity, promotes

2024A. Overview of Arbitral Immunity “Arbitrators have been extended the protection of judicial immunity, because they perform ‘“the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.”’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 909 ; accord Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 650 [“[the] rule—immunizing arbitrators in private contractual arbitration proceedings from tort liability—is well established in California”]; see also Stasz v. Schwab (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 420, 431 [“‘Arbitral immunity, like judicial immunity, promotes

1990It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions [3] and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. ( Turpen v. Booth (1880) 56 Cal. 65, 68 ; Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 497, 507 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 770 ].) The judge is immune unless "he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]" ( Greene, *852 supra, at p. 507.) Beyond doubt, the doctrine of "civil immunity of the judiciary in the perf

1990It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions [3] and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. ( Turpen v. Booth (1880) 56 Cal. 65, 68 ; Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 497, 507 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 770 ].) The judge is immune unless "he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]" ( Greene, *852 supra, at p. 507.) Beyond doubt, the doctrine of "civil immunity of the judiciary in the perf

1990It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions [3] and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. ( Turpen v. Booth (1880) 56 Cal. 65, 68 ; Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 497, 507 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 770 ].) The judge is immune unless "he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]" ( Greene, *852 supra, at p. 507.) Beyond doubt, the doctrine of "civil immunity of the judiciary in the perf

1990It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions [3] and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. ( Turpen v. Booth (1880) 56 Cal. 65, 68 ; Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 497, 507 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 770 ].) The judge is immune unless "he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]" ( Greene, *852 supra, at p. 507.) Beyond doubt, the doctrine of "civil immunity of the judiciary in the perf

1990It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions [3] and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. ( Turpen v. Booth (1880) 56 Cal. 65, 68 ; Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 497, 507 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 770 ].) The judge is immune unless "he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]" ( Greene, *852 supra, at p. 507.) Beyond doubt, the doctrine of "civil immunity of the judiciary in the perf

1990It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions [3] and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. ( Turpen v. Booth (1880) 56 Cal. 65, 68 ; Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 497, 507 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 770 ].) The judge is immune unless "he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]" ( Greene, *852 supra, at p. 507.) Beyond doubt, the doctrine of "civil immunity of the judiciary in the perf