conflict between rule in California

1962In Johndrow v. Thomas, 31 Cal.2d 202 [ 187 P.2d 681 ], the Supreme Court discussed the conflict between the rule that findings are to be construed liberally to support the judgment, and the proposition that, merely because a negative pregnant exists, the findings are insufficient.

1962In Johndrow v. Thomas, 31 Cal.2d 202 [ 187 P.2d 681 ], the Supreme Court discussed the conflict between the rule that findings are to be construed liberally to support the judgment, and the proposition that, merely because a negative pregnant exists, the findings are insufficient.

2022Our colleagues in Division Three of the First District considered Evidence Code section 662 first, finding “the presumption favoring stability of title found in Evidence Code section 662 is in direct conflict with the presumption of undue influence arising where one spouse obtains an advantage over the other in an interspousal property transaction.” (Delaney, at p. 997.) Citing “the unique protected status of marriage,” the court stated that “applying the presumption of Evidence Code section 662, with its higher evidentiary standard, would in every case inevitably defeat the spousal protection

2013“An instruction that omits a required definition of or misdescribes an element of an offense is harmless only if ‘it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 774 .) Unlike in Maurer, there was not as clear a conflict between the instruction stating motive was not required (CALCRIM No. 370) and the instructions on the crime elements, because in the instant case the instructions on the crime elements referred to the need for a finding of sexual “purpose,” rather than “moti

1999According to the majority, "if a duty of care were imposed in each case where there was some progressive, increased chance of injury stemming from a pre-existing harm, the special relationship doctrine would be in irremediable conflict with the traditional duty analysis derived from Rowland ...." (Maj. opn. at p. 222.) *239 This is so, the majority reasons, because "[i]n volatile situations, one can always argue that the arrival of police officers caused an incremental increase in tension at the scene, and thus increased the risk of injury occurring." (Maj. opn., at p. 222.) In order to solve

1999According to the majority, "if a duty of care were imposed in each case where there was some progressive, increased chance of injury stemming from a pre-existing harm, the special relationship doctrine would be in irremediable conflict with the traditional duty analysis derived from Rowland ...." (Maj. opn. at p. 222.) *239 This is so, the majority reasons, because "[i]n volatile situations, one can always argue that the arrival of police officers caused an incremental increase in tension at the scene, and thus increased the risk of injury occurring." (Maj. opn., at p. 222.) In order to solve

1999The majority also endeavors to undermine the special relationship doctrine by creating a false conflict between that doctrine and Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 , and using this as the excuse to virtually do away with the special relationship doctrine as it applies to law enforcement officers.

1999The majority also endeavors to undermine the special relationship doctrine by creating a false conflict between that doctrine and Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108 , and using this as the excuse to virtually do away with the special relationship doctrine as it applies to law enforcement officers.

1989The parol evidence rule in general does not preclude proof of fraudulent oral misrepresentations (2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) *484 §§ 997, 999, pp. 944-945), but the early case of Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass (1935) 4 Cal.2d 258 [ 48 P.2d 659 ] perceived a conflict between the rule and promissory fraud relating to the principal terms of an agreement.

1989The parol evidence rule in general does not preclude proof of fraudulent oral misrepresentations (2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) *484 §§ 997, 999, pp. 944-945), but the early case of Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass (1935) 4 Cal.2d 258 [ 48 P.2d 659 ] perceived a conflict between the rule and promissory fraud relating to the principal terms of an agreement.

1979(See North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 38 , fns. 10 and 11 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171-172 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ].) For example, the minor may tender an admission coupled with protestations of innocence, creating, in the words of Lyons , “a conflict between the defense and the court.” (Lyons v. Superior Court, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 628 .) Finally, whether the admission be straight or part of a “plea bargain,” the exact disposition to be given the minor is left open to question and there is possibility of a contest between the petitioner and the minor as to what that sentence should be.

1979(See Lyons v. Superior Court, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 628 .) If it finds that the minor is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the court “shall then proceed to hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor.” The court may continue the hearing, if necessary, to receive the probation officer’s social study or other evidence.

1979(See North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 38 , fns. 10 and 11 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171-172 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ].) For example, the minor may tender an admission coupled with protestations of innocence, creating, in the words of Lyons , “a conflict between the defense and the court.” (Lyons v. Superior Court, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 628 .) Finally, whether the admission be straight or part of a “plea bargain,” the exact disposition to be given the minor is left open to question and there is possibility of a contest between the petitioner and the minor as to what that sentence should be.

1979(See North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 38 , fns. 10 and 11 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171-172 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ].) For example, the minor may tender an admission coupled with protestations of innocence, creating, in the words of Lyons , “a conflict between the defense and the court.” (Lyons v. Superior Court, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 628 .) Finally, whether the admission be straight or part of a “plea bargain,” the exact disposition to be given the minor is left open to question and there is possibility of a contest between the petitioner and the minor as to what that sentence should be.

1972Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 540 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 178 ].

1972Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 540 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 178 ].

1971Plaintiffs properly rely on Blevens v. Sfetku, 259 Cal.App.2d 527 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 486 ], which held the California motorboat guest statute unconstitutional on the basis of such a conflict.

1971Plaintiffs properly rely on Blevens v. Sfetku, 259 Cal.App.2d 527 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 486 ], which held the California motorboat guest statute unconstitutional on the basis of such a conflict.