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11 California opinions name it 3 courts 1900–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Manriquezgreen1 sentence2021(Id. at p. 50 [considering whether a defendant who fled from a hit and run causing injury used a deadly weapon under section 1203, subdivision (e)(2)]; see also id. at p. 50 [citing People v. Manriquez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1614, 1616-1620 [considering de novo whether presumptive ineligibility required personal carrying of a deadly weapon]; People v. Alvarez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 403, 408 [considering de novo whether presumptive ineligibility required personal use of a deadly weapon]].) Only if the court correctly applied the presumption do we evaluate whether the court abused its discretion i | 1 | 1 |
People v. Alvarezgreen1 sentence2021(Id. at p. 50 [considering whether a defendant who fled from a hit and run causing injury used a deadly weapon under section 1203, subdivision (e)(2)]; see also id. at p. 50 [citing People v. Manriquez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1614, 1616-1620 [considering de novo whether presumptive ineligibility required personal carrying of a deadly weapon]; People v. Alvarez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 403, 408 [considering de novo whether presumptive ineligibility required personal use of a deadly weapon]].) Only if the court correctly applied the presumption do we evaluate whether the court abused its discretion i | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nunogreen1 sentence2021(Id. at p. 50 [considering whether a defendant who fled from a hit and run causing injury used a deadly weapon under section 1203, subdivision (e)(2)]; see also id. at p. 50 [citing People v. Manriquez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1614, 1616-1620 [considering de novo whether presumptive ineligibility required personal carrying of a deadly weapon]; People v. Alvarez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 403, 408 [considering de novo whether presumptive ineligibility required personal use of a deadly weapon]].) Only if the court correctly applied the presumption do we evaluate whether the court abused its discretion i | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mosquedagreen2 sentences1972Defendant, conceding the correctness of the final instruction given with respect to present ability as an element of the crime of assault, urges that the preinstruction given in regard to such present ability was erroneous and that the inconsistency between the two- instructions confused the jury. 6 In its preinstruction the court correctly stated the principle declared in Penal Code section 240 that “An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” (See People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal.App.3d 540, 544 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 346 ].) Howe 1972Defendant, conceding the correctness of the final instruction given with respect to present ability as an element of the crime of assault, urges that the preinstruction given in regard to such present ability was erroneous and that the inconsistency between the two- instructions confused the jury. 6 In its preinstruction the court correctly stated the principle declared in Penal Code section 240 that “An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” (See People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal.App.3d 540, 544 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 346 ].) Howe | 1 | 1 |
Brenot v. Brenotgreen2 sentences1952In Brenot v. Brenot, 102 Cal. 294, 296 [ 36 P. 672 ], this court correctly stated the rule to be that “a court of equity is authorized to enter a judgment dismissing an action of divorce, where both parties are seeking a decree, and the evidence discloses them to be equally guilty of the misconduct alleged.” (Italics added.) Again, in Glass v. Glass, 4 Cal.App. 604, 607 [ 88 P. 734 ], the appellate court, in affirming the judgment with regard to property issues, observed without objection that the trial court had found both parties guilty of extreme cruelty but nevertheless had granted the pla 1952In Brenot v. Brenot, 102 Cal. 294, 296 [ 36 P. 672 ], this court correctly stated the rule to be that “a court of equity is authorized to enter a judgment dismissing an action of divorce, where both parties are seeking a decree, and the evidence discloses them to be equally guilty of the misconduct alleged.” (Italics added.) Again, in Glass v. Glass, 4 Cal.App. 604, 607 [ 88 P. 734 ], the appellate court, in affirming the judgment with regard to property issues, observed without objection that the trial court had found both parties guilty of extreme cruelty but nevertheless had granted the pla | 1 | 1 |
Glass v. Glassgreen2 sentences1952In Brenot v. Brenot, 102 Cal. 294, 296 [ 36 P. 672 ], this court correctly stated the rule to be that “a court of equity is authorized to enter a judgment dismissing an action of divorce, where both parties are seeking a decree, and the evidence discloses them to be equally guilty of the misconduct alleged.” (Italics added.) Again, in Glass v. Glass, 4 Cal.App. 604, 607 [ 88 P. 734 ], the appellate court, in affirming the judgment with regard to property issues, observed without objection that the trial court had found both parties guilty of extreme cruelty but nevertheless had granted the pla 1952In Brenot v. Brenot, 102 Cal. 294, 296 [ 36 P. 672 ], this court correctly stated the rule to be that “a court of equity is authorized to enter a judgment dismissing an action of divorce, where both parties are seeking a decree, and the evidence discloses them to be equally guilty of the misconduct alleged.” (Italics added.) Again, in Glass v. Glass, 4 Cal.App. 604, 607 [ 88 P. 734 ], the appellate court, in affirming the judgment with regard to property issues, observed without objection that the trial court had found both parties guilty of extreme cruelty but nevertheless had granted the pla | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Greenfield v. Mather
green
2 sentences2017V Equities of Applying Claim Preclusion Cal Sierra contends that claim preclusion is an equitable doctrine and "it will not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or *680 important considerations of policy." ( Greenfield v. Mather (1948) 32 Cal.2d 23 , 35, 194 P.2d 1 .) Cal Sierra argues it is inequitable to apply claim preclusion here because it never had the opportunity to litigate its claims against Reed and Basic Resources. 2017V Equities of Applying Claim Preclusion Cal Sierra contends that claim preclusion is an equitable doctrine and "it will not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or *680 important considerations of policy." ( Greenfield v. Mather (1948) 32 Cal.2d 23 , 35, 194 P.2d 1 .) Cal Sierra argues it is inequitable to apply claim preclusion here because it never had the opportunity to litigate its claims against Reed and Basic Resources. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Gilbert
green
1 sentence1969(See People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690, 705 .) Under these facts the court correctly applied the rule of the Monk case in the last paragraph of the instruction by requiring a finding that reasonable foreseeability of the risk of defendant’s intentional act establishes defendant’s responsibility for the resultant bodily harm. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
In Re the Estate of Vogt
green
1 sentence1957The Arizona Supreme Court distinguished Estate of Vogt, supra, 154 Cal. 508 , by reference to language in the Vogt will in which the testator declared that his estate consisted in part of separate property. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Owsley. v. Whelan Drug Co.
green
2 sentences1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. 1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Guttman v. Berry
green
2 sentences1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. 1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Ng v. Warren
green
2 sentences1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. 1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Rees v. Drinning
green
2 sentences1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. 1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Mayer v. Hazzard
green
2 sentences1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. 1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
San Diego Investment Co. v. Crane
green
1 sentence1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Harrison v. Ziegler
green
2 sentences1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. 1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Hamelin v. Foulkes
green
2 sentences1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. 1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Runyon v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence1951(See Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383 [ 180 P. 837 ]; Harrison v. Ziegler, 51 Cal.App. 429 [ 196 P. 914 ]; Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal.App. 458 [ 287 P. 526 ]; Owsley v. Whelan Drug Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 189 P.2d 50 ]; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.App.2d 54 [ 179 P.2d 41 ]; Mayer v. Hazzard, 10 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 51 P.2d 189 ]; Quitman v. Berry, 83 Cal.App.2d 507 [ 189 P.2d 41 ]; Rees v. Drinning, 64 Cal.App.2d 273 [ 148 P.2d 378 ]; Thompson on Real Property (Perm, ed.) § 1165 et seq.; 51 A.L.R. 1298 ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 293 et seq.; 32 Am. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Siberell v. Siberell
green
2 sentences1936It is evident that if the rule be strictly applied the conclusion follows that where personal propery is purchased with joint tenancy funds and title is placed in the name of one of the cotenants the joint tenancy estate is terminated by the destruction of one of its necessary unities (Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767 [ 7 Pac. (2d) 1003 ], namely, unity of title. 1936It is evident that if the rule be strictly applied the conclusion follows that where personal propery is purchased with joint tenancy funds and title is placed in the name of one of the cotenants the joint tenancy estate is terminated by the destruction of one of its necessary unities (Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767 [ 7 Pac. (2d) 1003 ], namely, unity of title. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Swartzbaugh v. Sampson
green
2 sentences1936I consider it necessary to briefly explain my concurrence in view of the recent case of Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 451 [ 54 Pac. (2d) 73 ], where this court said: “An estate in joint tenancy can be severed by destroying one or more of the necessary unities, either by operation of law, by death, by voluntary or certain involuntary acts of the joint tenants, or by certain acts or omissions of one joint tenant without the consent of the other. ’ ’ I believe this correctly states the rule applied at common law and prevailing in the great majority of the states which follow that law. 1936I consider it necessary to briefly explain my concurrence in view of the recent case of Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal.App.2d 451 [54 PaCal.2d 73], where this court said: "An estate in joint tenancy can be severed by destroying one or more of the necessary unities, either by operation of law, by death, by voluntary or certain involuntary acts of the joint tenants, or by certain acts or omissions of one joint tenant without the consent of the other." I believe this correctly states the rule applied at common law and prevailing in the great majority of the states which follow that law. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
People v. Horn
neutral
1 sentence1904It was said in People v. Horn, 70 Cal. 17 : “If a party is once placed upon his trial before a competent court and jury upon a valid indictment, the ‘jeopardy’ attaches, to which he cannot be again subjected, unless ihe jury be discharged from rendering a verdict by a legal necessity, or by his consent; or in case a verdict is rendered, if it be set aside at his instance.” I do not understand it to be disputed that this correctly states the rule. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Irwin v. County of Yuba
green
1 sentence1900Appellant also cites Irwin v. Yuba Co., 119 Cal. 686 , where a county supervisor sought to recover for extra services rendered the county, and it was said: “It may be safely stated as a rule that one who demands payment of a claim against a county must show some statute authorizing it, or that it arises from some contract, express or implied, which itself finds authority of law.” Conceding this to be a correctly stated rule, may we not apply it here in support of the judgment? | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.