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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clement v. State Reclamation Boardgreen2 sentences1998(Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628, 637-638 [ 220 P.2d 897 ]; Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 440 .) Thus, in Clement , waters contained by a levee that had been in existence for 60 years were considered natural stream waters that could not be diverted onto the lands of another. ( 35 Cal.2d at p. 636 .) The court decided that the public entity was liable for inverse condemnation, regardless of the common enemy exception, if the public entity caused water to enter plaintiffs’ land that would not have entered except for the public entity’s act 1998(Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628, 637-638 [ 220 P.2d 897 ]; Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 440 .) Thus, in Clement , waters contained by a levee that had been in existence for 60 years were considered natural stream waters that could not be diverted onto the lands of another. ( 35 Cal.2d at p. 636 .) The court decided that the public entity was liable for inverse condemnation, regardless of the common enemy exception, if the public entity caused water to enter plaintiffs’ land that would not have entered except for the public entity’s act | 3 | 4 |
Keys v. Romleygreen2 sentences2016(Id. at pp. 406, 408.) Though this was the case, the court found the rule could be unnecessarily rigid and unjust in developed areas (id. at p. 407), and that principles of tort liability were appropriately applied such that "[n]o party, whether an upper or a lower landowner, may act arbitrarily 3 One such rule was the common enemy rule. ( Keys, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 400- 402.) The court explained that the common enemy rule, "[s]tated in its extreme form, . . . holds that as an incident to the use of his own property, each landowner has an unqualified right, by operations on his own land, to 1987(See Keys v. Romley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 396, 410 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 412 P.2d 529 ].) Respondents argue that their view of the common enemy doctrine is necessary for the development and improvement of lands along low-lying river bottoms. | 1 | 2 |
Arreola v. County of Montereygreen2 sentences2008Under private water law analysis, these rules immunized the landowner from liability for resulting damage to downstream property.” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 738 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 ].) But in recent cases, the Archer exception has been curtailed and the murky rules pertaining to liability imposed upon government entities for damage caused by flowing water have been refined. 2008Under private water law analysis, these rules immunized the landowner from liability for resulting damage to downstream property.” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 738 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 ].) But in recent cases, the Archer exception has been curtailed and the murky rules pertaining to liability imposed upon government entities for damage caused by flowing water have been refined. | 1 | 1 |
Beckley v. Reclamation Boardgreen2 sentences1988In Beckley v. Reclamation Board (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 734, 752 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 428 ], the court rejected an argument based on Clement , noting that it showed “complete enchantment with the labels ‘flood waters’ and ‘common enemy.’ ” The court then reached for new metaphorical heights, observing, “[Fjlood waters only remain the common enemy so long as they are vagrant, i.e., ‘ “flowing wild” over the country.’ [Citation.] When the cougar roams the mountains it is every man for himself, but certainly that does not mean that one may capture the beast, bring him back to the city, then unleash him i 1988In Beckley v. Reclamation Board (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 734, 752 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 428 ], the court rejected an argument based on Clement , noting that it showed “complete enchantment with the labels ‘flood waters’ and ‘common enemy.’ ” The court then reached for new metaphorical heights, observing, “[Fjlood waters only remain the common enemy so long as they are vagrant, i.e., ‘ “flowing wild” over the country.’ [Citation.] When the cougar roams the mountains it is every man for himself, but certainly that does not mean that one may capture the beast, bring him back to the city, then unleash him i | 1 | 1 |
Holtz v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988(Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296, 306, 307 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 475 P.2d 441 ], fns. omitted.) However the nearly unanimous trend has been away from per se rules based on categorical judgments of “generally perceived reasonableness,” and toward fact-based determinations of reasonableness in the particular circumstances of each case. 1988(Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296, 306, 307 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 475 P.2d 441 ], fns. omitted.) However the nearly unanimous trend has been away from per se rules based on categorical judgments of “generally perceived reasonableness,” and toward fact-based determinations of reasonableness in the particular circumstances of each case. | 1 | 1 |
Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bellgreen2 sentences1987(Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1980) 30 Cal.3d 358, 362 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 636 P.2d 1121 ]; Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 331,338 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 670 ].) The respondents’ argue that if the common enemy doctrine requires a landowner to act reasonably in erecting defensive measures against flood-waters, the requirement of reasonableness is satisfied, as a matter of law, if the landowner (1) erects such defensive measures on his own land; (2) does not obstruct or interfere with the natural channel of the stream 1987(Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1980) 30 Cal.3d 358, 362 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 636 P.2d 1121 ]; Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 331,338 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 670 ].) The respondents’ argue that if the common enemy doctrine requires a landowner to act reasonably in erecting defensive measures against flood-waters, the requirement of reasonableness is satisfied, as a matter of law, if the landowner (1) erects such defensive measures on his own land; (2) does not obstruct or interfere with the natural channel of the stream | 1 | 1 |
Sprecher v. Adamson Companiesgreen2 sentences1987(Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1980) 30 Cal.3d 358, 362 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 636 P.2d 1121 ]; Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 331,338 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 670 ].) The respondents’ argue that if the common enemy doctrine requires a landowner to act reasonably in erecting defensive measures against flood-waters, the requirement of reasonableness is satisfied, as a matter of law, if the landowner (1) erects such defensive measures on his own land; (2) does not obstruct or interfere with the natural channel of the stream 1987(Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1980) 30 Cal.3d 358, 362 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 636 P.2d 1121 ]; Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 331,338 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 670 ].) The respondents’ argue that if the common enemy doctrine requires a landowner to act reasonably in erecting defensive measures against flood-waters, the requirement of reasonableness is satisfied, as a matter of law, if the landowner (1) erects such defensive measures on his own land; (2) does not obstruct or interfere with the natural channel of the stream | 1 | 1 |
Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1965(Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal.2d 193, 197 [ 143 P.2d 12 ].) It is also recognized that those with lands riparian to a changed channel have a right that such channel may not be returned to its former bed. 1965(Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal.2d 193, 197 [ 143 P.2d 12 ].) It is also recognized that those with lands riparian to a changed channel have a right that such channel may not be returned to its former bed. | 1 | 1 |
Dick v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1965Similarly, when water is diverted out of its natural channel, the party responsible therefor is liable for the resultant damage to the property of others, absent the necessity of protecting one’s property in time of peril under the common enemy doctrine. 4 (Clement v. State Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 636 [ 226 P.2d 817 ]; Dick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.App. 724, 729-730 [ 168 P. 703 ].) It is generally recognized that one who makes substantial expenditures in reliance on long continued diversion of water by another has the right to have the diversion continued if his investment wou 1965Similarly, when water is diverted out of its natural channel, the party responsible therefor is liable for the resultant damage to the property of others, absent the necessity of protecting one’s property in time of peril under the common enemy doctrine. 4 (Clement v. State Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 636 [ 226 P.2d 817 ]; Dick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.App. 724, 729-730 [ 168 P. 703 ].) It is generally recognized that one who makes substantial expenditures in reliance on long continued diversion of water by another has the right to have the diversion continued if his investment wou | 1 | 1 |
City of Redding v. Diestelhorstgreen2 sentences1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. 1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. 1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Temescal Water Co. v. Marvingreen2 sentences1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. 1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. | 1 | 1 |
City of Stockton v. Votegreen2 sentences1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. 1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. | 1 | 1 |
City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co.green2 sentences1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. 1950Dist., 272 F. 600 ; see cases collected in 69 A.L.R. 1231 .) The decisive consideration is whether the owner of the damaged property if uncompensated would contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking. ( Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal. App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal. App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal. App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal. App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the com | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Bishop
green
2 sentences2016(Ektelon, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 808-809, citing Linvill, at pp. 197, 198.) In Weaver v. Bishop (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1351 , the appellate court rejected application of the common enemy doctrine applicable to floodwaters in favor of a rule of reasonableness: "[T]he nearly unanimous trend has been away from per se rules based on categorical judgments of 'generally perceived reasonableness,' [which underlies the common enemy rule,] and toward fact-based determinations of reasonableness in the particular circumstances of each case." (Id. at p. 1357.) The Weaver court pointed out "it is now held th 2016(Ektelon, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 808-809, citing Linvill, at pp. 197, 198.) In Weaver v. Bishop (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1351 , the appellate court rejected application of the common enemy doctrine applicable to floodwaters in favor of a rule of reasonableness: "[T]he nearly unanimous trend has been away from per se rules based on categorical judgments of 'generally perceived reasonableness,' [which underlies the common enemy rule,] and toward fact-based determinations of reasonableness in the particular circumstances of each case." (Id. at p. 1357.) The Weaver court pointed out "it is now held th | 2 | 1994–2016 |
Armstrong v. Francis Corp.
green
2 sentences1970Keys recognizes that, “New Jersey, which had been one of the pioneers in adopting the common enemy doctrine and had applied it with considerable strictness, abandoned the old rule in Armstrong v. Francis Corp. (1956) 20 N.J. 320 [ 120 A.2d 4 , 59 A.L.R.2d 413 ],” and adopted a rule of reasonable use. 1970Keys recognizes that, “New Jersey, which had been one of the pioneers in adopting the common enemy doctrine and had applied it with considerable strictness, abandoned the old rule in Armstrong v. Francis Corp. (1956) 20 N.J. 320 [ 120 A.2d 4 , 59 A.L.R.2d 413 ],” and adopted a rule of reasonable use. | 2 | 1966–1970 |
Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control District
green
2 sentences2016(Ektelon, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 808-809, citing Linvill, at pp. 197, 198.) In Weaver v. Bishop (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1351 , the appellate court rejected application of the common enemy doctrine applicable to floodwaters in favor of a rule of reasonableness: "[T]he nearly unanimous trend has been away from per se rules based on categorical judgments of 'generally perceived reasonableness,' [which underlies the common enemy rule,] and toward fact-based determinations of reasonableness in the particular circumstances of each case." (Id. at p. 1357.) The Weaver court pointed out "it is now held th 2016(Ektelon, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 808-809, citing Linvill, at pp. 197, 198.) In Weaver v. Bishop (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1351 , the appellate court rejected application of the common enemy doctrine applicable to floodwaters in favor of a rule of reasonableness: "[T]he nearly unanimous trend has been away from per se rules based on categorical judgments of 'generally perceived reasonableness,' [which underlies the common enemy rule,] and toward fact-based determinations of reasonableness in the particular circumstances of each case." (Id. at p. 1357.) The Weaver court pointed out "it is now held th | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Locklin v. City of Lafayette
green
2 sentences2016(Belair, at p. 567, fn. 9.) In Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327 (Locklin), the California Supreme Court expanded the application of the Keys reasonableness standard to situations involving a natural watercourse. 2016(Belair, at p. 567, fn. 9.) In Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327 (Locklin), the California Supreme Court expanded the application of the Keys reasonableness standard to situations involving a natural watercourse. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water District
green
2 sentences1998(Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628, 637-638 [ 220 P.2d 897 ]; Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 440 .) Thus, in Clement , waters contained by a levee that had been in existence for 60 years were considered natural stream waters that could not be diverted onto the lands of another. ( 35 Cal.2d at p. 636 .) The court decided that the public entity was liable for inverse condemnation, regardless of the common enemy exception, if the public entity caused water to enter plaintiffs’ land that would not have entered except for the public entity’s act 1998(Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628, 637-638 [ 220 P.2d 897 ]; Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 440 .) Thus, in Clement , waters contained by a levee that had been in existence for 60 years were considered natural stream waters that could not be diverted onto the lands of another. ( 35 Cal.2d at p. 636 .) The court decided that the public entity was liable for inverse condemnation, regardless of the common enemy exception, if the public entity caused water to enter plaintiffs’ land that would not have entered except for the public entity’s act | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Linvill v. Perello
green
2 sentences1988(Linvill v. Perello (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 195 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 392 ].) As a general proposition, at least, this movement away from the traditional categorical rules seems inevitable given the seeming absence of any overarching rationale for those rules and the confusion they engendered on many crucial issues. 1988(Linvill v. Perello (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 195 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 392 ].) As a general proposition, at least, this movement away from the traditional categorical rules seems inevitable given the seeming absence of any overarching rationale for those rules and the confusion they engendered on many crucial issues. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
King v. Cade
green
2 sentences1966The Oklahoma court has given its approval to the common enemy doctrine as modified by the rule of reason, said the court in King v. Cade (1951) 205 Okla. 666 [ 240 P.2d 88 ], adding that under this rule each proprietor might divert surface water, casting it back on, or passing it along to, the next proprietor, provided he can do so without injury to the adjoining landowners, but no one is permitted to sacrifice his neighbor’s property in order to protect his own. 1966The Oklahoma court has given its approval to the common enemy doctrine as modified by the rule of reason, said the court in King v. Cade (1951) 205 Okla. 666 [ 240 P.2d 88 ], adding that under this rule each proprietor might divert surface water, casting it back on, or passing it along to, the next proprietor, provided he can do so without injury to the adjoining landowners, but no one is permitted to sacrifice his neighbor’s property in order to protect his own. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Lunsford v. Stewart
neutral
2 sentences1966In Lunsford v. Stewart (1953) 95 Ohio App. 383 [ 120 N.E.2d 136 ], it was held that as to urban areas the rule provided the land might be improved so as to divert surface waters so long as the landowner acted in a reasonable manner. 1966In Lunsford v. Stewart (1953) 95 Ohio App. 383 [ 120 N.E.2d 136 ], it was held that as to urban areas the rule provided the land might be improved so as to divert surface waters so long as the landowner acted in a reasonable manner. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Ogburn v. Connor
green
2 sentences1966(See, e.g., Kinyon and McClure, Interferences With Surface Waters (1940) supra, 24 Minn.L.Rev. 891.) While these criticisms may validly apply to both rules, we need not consider the common enemy rule for it has never been followed in California, and, in fact, was summarily rejected nearly a century ago in Ogburn v. Connor (1873) supra, 46 Cal. 346, 352 . 1966(See, e.g., Kinyon and McClure, Interferences With Surface Waters (1940) supra, 24 Minn.L.Rev. 891.) While these criticisms may validly apply to both rules, we need not consider the common enemy rule for it has never been followed in California, and, in fact, was summarily rejected nearly a century ago in Ogburn v. Connor (1873) supra, 46 Cal. 346, 352 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Elsasser v. Szymanski
green
2 sentences1966(Turner v. Smith (1950) 217 Ark. 441 [ 231 S.W.2d 110 ]; Stacy v. Walker (1953) 222 Ark. 819 [ 262 S.W.2d 889 ].) The common enemy doctrine, as modified by the requirement that the landowner must not negligently or unnecessarily injure his neighbor’s land was recognized in Elsasser v. Szymanski (1956) 163 Neb. 65 [ 77 N.W.2d 815 ]. 1966(Turner v. Smith (1950) 217 Ark. 441 [ 231 S.W.2d 110 ]; Stacy v. Walker (1953) 222 Ark. 819 [ 262 S.W.2d 889 ].) The common enemy doctrine, as modified by the requirement that the landowner must not negligently or unnecessarily injure his neighbor’s land was recognized in Elsasser v. Szymanski (1956) 163 Neb. 65 [ 77 N.W.2d 815 ]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Franklin v. Durgee
green
2 sentences1966(See also Franklin v. Durgee (1901) 71 N.H. 186 [ 51 A. 911 , 58 L.R.A. 112 ].) New Jersey, which had been one of the pioneers in adopting the common enemy doctrine and had applied it with considerable strictness, abandoned the old rule in Armstrong v. Francis Corp. (1956) 20 N.J. 320 [ 120 A.2d 4 , 59 A.L.R.2d *405 413]. 1966(See also Franklin v. Durgee (1901) 71 N.H. 186 [ 51 A. 911 , 58 L.R.A. 112 ].) New Jersey, which had been one of the pioneers in adopting the common enemy doctrine and had applied it with considerable strictness, abandoned the old rule in Armstrong v. Francis Corp. (1956) 20 N.J. 320 [ 120 A.2d 4 , 59 A.L.R.2d *405 413]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Stacy v. Walker
neutral
2 sentences1966(Turner v. Smith (1950) 217 Ark. 441 [ 231 S.W.2d 110 ]; Stacy v. Walker (1953) 222 Ark. 819 [ 262 S.W.2d 889 ].) The common enemy doctrine, as modified by the requirement that the landowner must not negligently or unnecessarily injure his neighbor’s land was recognized in Elsasser v. Szymanski (1956) 163 Neb. 65 [ 77 N.W.2d 815 ]. 1966(Turner v. Smith (1950) 217 Ark. 441 [ 231 S.W.2d 110 ]; Stacy v. Walker (1953) 222 Ark. 819 [ 262 S.W.2d 889 ].) The common enemy doctrine, as modified by the requirement that the landowner must not negligently or unnecessarily injure his neighbor’s land was recognized in Elsasser v. Szymanski (1956) 163 Neb. 65 [ 77 N.W.2d 815 ]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Town of Union v. Durkes
green
1 sentence1966The doctrine appears to have had its American inception in decisions of Massachusetts courts about 1850 or later, and *401 the “common enemy” phrase was apparently first used in stating the rule in Town of Union v. Durkes (1875) 38 N.J.L. 21 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Turner v. Smith
green
2 sentences1966(Turner v. Smith (1950) 217 Ark. 441 [ 231 S.W.2d 110 ]; Stacy v. Walker (1953) 222 Ark. 819 [ 262 S.W.2d 889 ].) The common enemy doctrine, as modified by the requirement that the landowner must not negligently or unnecessarily injure his neighbor’s land was recognized in Elsasser v. Szymanski (1956) 163 Neb. 65 [ 77 N.W.2d 815 ]. 1966(Turner v. Smith (1950) 217 Ark. 441 [ 231 S.W.2d 110 ]; Stacy v. Walker (1953) 222 Ark. 819 [ 262 S.W.2d 889 ].) The common enemy doctrine, as modified by the requirement that the landowner must not negligently or unnecessarily injure his neighbor’s land was recognized in Elsasser v. Szymanski (1956) 163 Neb. 65 [ 77 N.W.2d 815 ]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Archer v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. 1950(Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is set forth in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Hooker v. Farmers' Irr. Dist.
green
1 sentence1950Dist., 272 F. 600 ; see cases collected in 69 A.L.R. 1231 .) The decisive consideration is whether the owner of the damaged property if uncompensated would contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking. ( Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ]; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal. App. 369, 404 [ 244 P. 609 ]; City of Redding v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal. App.2d 184, 193 [ 59 P.2d 177 ]; City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal. App. 21, 25 [ 31 P.2d 463 ]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal. App. 512, 521 [ 9 P.2d 335 ].) The applicability of the com | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| The Weinberg Co. v. Bixby green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.