insured tendered defense in California

2019(Evanston, supra, 768 F.Supp.2d at p. 1008 .) The insured did not pay the SIR until about 15 months after its tender of defense, and the issue was when defendant’s duty to defend attached – at the time of tender of defense or upon payment of the SIR.

2019In Evanston , the insured tendered its defense to defendant, and defendant did request payment of the SIR. ( *329 Evanston, supra, 768 F.Supp.2d at p. 1008 .) The insured did not pay the SIR until about 15 months after its tender of defense, and the issue was when defendant's duty to defend attached - at the time of tender of defense or upon payment of the SIR.

2014In CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co., supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 598 , the insured tendered the defense of an amended complaint to the insurer about four months after it was filed and the insurer denied the tender.

2014In CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co., supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 598 , the insured tendered the defense of an amended complaint to the insurer about four months after it was filed and the insurer denied the tender.

2013(Eigner v. Worthington (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 188, 196, fn. 5 .) In denying the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment, the trial court apparently relied on the legal principle articulated in Sunseri v. Camperos Del Valle Stables, Inc., supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 559 , in which the court denied the section 473 motion to vacate a stipulated judgment because the insured tendered the defense, but the insurer rejected the opportunity to defend.

2013(Eigner v. Worthington (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 188, 196, fn. 5 .) In denying the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment, the trial court apparently relied on the legal principle articulated in Sunseri v. Camperos Del Valle Stables, Inc., supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 559 , in which the court denied the section 473 motion to vacate a stipulated judgment because the insured tendered the defense, but the insurer rejected the opportunity to defend.

2013The insurer made a “conscious decision to reject the defense of the underlying action.” (Sunseri v. Camperos Del Valle Stables, Inc., supra, at p. 561 .) Therefore, there was no justification to set aside the stipulated judgment on the grounds of “ ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.’ ” (Ibid.) 8 The denial of a section 473 motion to vacate is appealable as a special order made after final judgment. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2); Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008 .) 7 Here, unlike Sunseri, there is no evidence Marian even tendered her defense of the s

2010The underlying action in Buena Vista Mines alleged that the insured had violated the Clean Water Act by improperly discharging pollutants into Santa Rosa Creek. ( 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 485 .) To avoid running afoul of the Clean Water Act's five-year statute of limitations, the complaint expressly limited its claims to "`the period June 11, 1992 to date.'" ( 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 485 , italics omitted.) Notwithstanding this limitation, the insured tendered the claim to insurers who had issued CGL policies prior to 1992. ( Id. at pp. 485-486.) The court held that the insurers had no duty to defend

2010The underlying action in Buena Vista Mines alleged that the insured had violated the Clean Water Act by improperly discharging pollutants into Santa Rosa Creek. ( 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 485 .) To avoid running afoul of the Clean Water Act's five-year statute of limitations, the complaint expressly limited its claims to "`the period June 11, 1992 to date.'" ( 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 485 , italics omitted.) Notwithstanding this limitation, the insured tendered the claim to insurers who had issued CGL policies prior to 1992. ( Id. at pp. 485-486.) The court held that the insurers had no duty to defend

2010In each case the insured tendered its defense to Safeco and Century; in each case, Safeco provided a defense under a reservation of rights and provided indemnity in the cases that settled, but Century rejected all tenders and refused to participate. ( Ibid. ) Following the settlements, Safeco sued Century for equitable contribution and declaratory relief, alleging that Century had breached its duty to defend the carriers' mutual insureds, thus obligating Century to reimburse Safeco for its equitable share of the costs of defense and underlying actions. ( Safeco, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 87

2007The insured tendered defense of the suit to the insurer, claiming coverage under an insurance policy that defined advertising injury as “ ‘oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.’ ” ( 392 F.3d at p. 940 .) American States held that this advertising-injury policy clause *153 provided coverage for injury arising from violation of secrecy privacy and did not provide liability coverage for the normal consequences of unsolicited faxed advertisements.

2007(Id. at p. 943.) Resource Bankshares, supra, 407 F.3d 631 , also involved a class action suit brought by recipients of an insured’s faxes claiming violations of the TCPA.

2007(Id. at p. 943.) Resource Bankshares, supra, 407 F.3d 631 , also involved a class action suit brought by recipients of an insured’s faxes claiming violations of the TCPA.

2003Co. v. Ridout Roofing Co., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 495 , where the insured tendered defense of multiple claims to its insurer and allowed the insurer to pay all the expenses of the litigation, but balked at paying the policy’s deductible of $5,000 per occurrence after the claims were settled.

2002Co. (1961) 57 Cal.2d 27 , 17 Cal.Rptr. 12 , 366 P.2d 455 , the insured tendered the defense of the underlying action to three insurers.

2002Co. (1961) 57 Cal.2d 27 , 17 Cal.Rptr. 12 , 366 P.2d 455 , the insured tendered the defense of the underlying action to three insurers.

2002Relying on the formulation in Frank and Freedus, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 461 , the Rocky Cola court reasoned that it was “difficult to see how [the shift supervisor’s] alleged statement that [plaintiff] was a ‘sexually promiscuous and calculating bitch’ is employment-related.” (Rocky Cola, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 126 .) “We conclude,” the court wrote, “that, as in HS Services and unlike the statement in Frank and Freedus, the defamatory statement [concerning plaintiff] was not made in the context of [plaintiff’s] employment.

2002Relying on the formulation in Frank and Freedus, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 461 , the Rocky Cola court reasoned that it was “difficult to see how [the shift supervisor’s] alleged statement that [plaintiff] was a ‘sexually promiscuous and calculating bitch’ is employment-related.” (Rocky Cola, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 126 .) “We conclude,” the court wrote, “that, as in HS Services and unlike the statement in Frank and Freedus, the defamatory statement [concerning plaintiff] was not made in the context of [plaintiff’s] employment.

2002Relying on the formulation in Frank and Freedus, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 461 , the Rocky Cola court reasoned that it was “difficult to see how [the shift supervisor’s] alleged statement that [plaintiff] was a ‘sexually promiscuous and calculating bitch’ is employment-related.” (Rocky Cola, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 126 .) “We conclude,” the court wrote, “that, as in HS Services and unlike the statement in Frank and Freedus, the defamatory statement [concerning plaintiff] was not made in the context of [plaintiff’s] employment.