Mejia motion in California

2019(See Zakaryan , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 677 , 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 333 ["We agree with Lawson 's central holding but disagree with its subsidiary holding regarding the allocation of the 'civil penalties' recovered"].) The court did not rule on the related request for a stay of the remaining aspects of Mejia's claim, effectively denying the request.

2019(See Zakaryan , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 677 , 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 333 ["We agree with Lawson 's central holding but disagree with its subsidiary holding regarding the allocation of the 'civil penalties' recovered"].) The court did not rule on the related request for a stay of the remaining aspects of Mejia's claim, effectively denying the request.

1992(See e.g., People v. Stittsworth (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 280 ] [statutory]; People v. Lee (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 162 ] [constitutional]; People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 ] [both].) This court has recently held that the same analysis applies to an attempt to appeal the denial of a Mejia motion.

1992(See e.g., People v. Stittsworth (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 280 ] [statutory]; People v. Lee (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 162 ] [constitutional]; People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 ] [both].) This court has recently held that the same analysis applies to an attempt to appeal the denial of a Mejia motion.

2025“Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a propensity or disposition to engage in a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person’s conduct on a specified occasion.” (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159 (Villatorro), citing § 1101, subd. (a).) “This ban against admitting character evidence to prove conduct, however, does not prohibit admission of specific acts of misconduct to establish a material fact like intent, common design or plan, or identity (§ 1101, subd. (b)), and does not affect the admissibility of evidence regarding the credibility of a w

2025Where, as here, the sex offenses presented to the jury are “similar in character” and “not unduly remote,” those offenses are “ ‘extremely probative of appellant’s sexual misconduct when left alone with young female relatives.’ ” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 919 , italics added, quoting People v. Soto (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 966, 991 .) As was the case in Villatoro, “the victims’ accounts of their respective [abuse] . . . were strikingly similar in various respects” and, as a result, we conclude that the victims’ testimony about the abuse was “highly probative” of Mejia’s “propensity to co

2021(Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 311, fn. 8 .) Thus, we have not applied the doctrine of forfeiture to Mejia’s claim of instructional error.

2021(See People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219 (Watt) [collecting cases noting that Watson applies to failure to instruct on a lesser included offense, mistake of fact, and self-defense]; see also People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 [“ ‘ “[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” in Watson.’ ”].) burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used more force than was reasonable to protect pr

2021(See People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219 (Watt) [collecting cases noting that Watson applies to failure to instruct on a lesser included offense, mistake of fact, and self-defense]; see also People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 [“ ‘ “[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” in Watson.’ ”].) burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used more force than was reasonable to protect pr

2019Although the MBM defendants do not expressly explain the basis of their position in this regard, we understand the MBM defendants to be contending that the portion of Mejia's claim in which she seeks amounts sufficient to recover the underpaid wages of all affected employees pursuant to section 558 must be limited to a claim for only her own underpaid wages due to the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the parties that provides that employees agree to resolve their wage and hour claims on an individual basis. 4 [concluding that claim for unpaid or underpaid wages under sect

2019Although the MBM defendants do not expressly explain the basis of their position in this regard, we understand the MBM defendants to be contending that the portion of Mejia's claim in which she seeks amounts sufficient to recover the underpaid wages of all affected employees pursuant to section 558 must be limited to a claim for only her own underpaid wages due to the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the parties that provides that employees agree to resolve their wage and hour claims on an individual basis. 4 [concluding that claim for unpaid or underpaid wages under sect

2019(See Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649 [no authority to support trial court's decision to "split" PAGA claim and send question of whether the plaintiff was an "aggrieved employee" to arbitration; case law instead "suggests that a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an arbitrable individual claim and a nonarbitrable representative claim"]; Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale's, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 665 , 676–678 [rejecting defendant's argument that court "should compel arbitration of 'the individual portion of [the plaintiff's] PAGA claim' and stay 'the 5 W

2015Hampton v. Leibach (7th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 219, 258 [after promising defendant would testify, defense counsel advised defendant not to testify based on concern that “would have been obvious from the outset of the case”]; Ouber v. Guarino (1st Cir. 2002) 293 F.3d 19, 27-29 [no surprises during trial “justified a retreat from [the] promise previously made”]; cf. People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 983-984 [no ineffective assistance where defense counsel advised defendant not to testify after defendant’s “difficulty remembering information” became apparent during trial].) Here, Mejia’s claim o

2015Hampton v. Leibach (7th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 219, 258 [after promising defendant would testify, defense counsel advised defendant not to testify based on concern that “would have been obvious from the outset of the case”]; Ouber v. Guarino (1st Cir. 2002) 293 F.3d 19, 27-29 [no surprises during trial “justified a retreat from [the] promise previously made”]; cf. People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 983-984 [no ineffective assistance where defense counsel advised defendant not to testify after defendant’s “difficulty remembering information” became apparent during trial].) Here, Mejia’s claim o

2015Hampton v. Leibach (7th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 219, 258 [after promising defendant would testify, defense counsel advised defendant not to testify based on concern that “would have been obvious from the outset of the case”]; Ouber v. Guarino (1st Cir. 2002) 293 F.3d 19, 27-29 [no surprises during trial “justified a retreat from [the] promise previously made”]; cf. People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 983-984 [no ineffective assistance where defense counsel advised defendant not to testify after defendant’s “difficulty remembering information” became apparent during trial].) Here, Mejia’s claim o

1992(See e.g., People v. Stittsworth (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 280 ] [statutory]; People v. Lee (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 162 ] [constitutional]; People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 ] [both].) This court has recently held that the same analysis applies to an attempt to appeal the denial of a Mejia motion.

1992(See e.g., People v. Stittsworth (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 280 ] [statutory]; People v. Lee (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 162 ] [constitutional]; People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 ] [both].) This court has recently held that the same analysis applies to an attempt to appeal the denial of a Mejia motion.

1992(See People v. Reyes (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 524, 532 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) The act expressly proclaims that “charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation,” and its purpose is to eliminate or minimize these obstructions.

1992(See People v. Reyes (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 524, 532 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) The act expressly proclaims that “charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation,” and its purpose is to eliminate or minimize these obstructions.

1992(See e.g., People v. Stittsworth (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 280 ] [statutory]; People v. Lee (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 162 ] [constitutional]; People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 ] [both].) This court has recently held that the same analysis applies to an attempt to appeal the denial of a Mejia motion.

1992(See e.g., People v. Stittsworth (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 280 ] [statutory]; People v. Lee (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 162 ] [constitutional]; People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 ] [both].) This court has recently held that the same analysis applies to an attempt to appeal the denial of a Mejia motion.

1992(People v. Lopez (1988) 198 *1358 Cal.App.3d 135, 141-142 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 590 ]; accord, People v. McNabb (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 462, 470-471 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 11 ].) Thus, we regard the law as settled, although we feel constrained to note our disagreement with the one case disclosed by our research which suggests a contrary result.

1992(People v. Lopez (1988) 198 *1358 Cal.App.3d 135, 141-142 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 590 ]; accord, People v. McNabb (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 462, 470-471 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 11 ].) Thus, we regard the law as settled, although we feel constrained to note our disagreement with the one case disclosed by our research which suggests a contrary result.

1990(Cordova v. Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 177, 182, 184 .) A. Possession of Cocaine for Sale.

1988(See People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 424-425 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) 1.

1988(See People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 424-425 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) 1.