power to confer immunity in California

2021Legal Background In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father. “[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 ; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4

2021Legal Background In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father. “[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 ; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4

2021Legal Background In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father. “[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 ; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4

2021Legal Background In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father. “[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 ; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4

2016The California Supreme Court has recognized that generally “the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the 18 executive, that is, to the prosecution.” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 468 ; see Pen.

2016We previously have “characterized as ‘doubtful’ the ‘proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity.’ ” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 468 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656 , 93 P.3d 271 ] (Stewart).) We have noted that “the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the *1051 executive.” (Ibid., citing § 1324.) Moreover, “prosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 , 181 P.3d 1035 ]; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96,

2021Legal Background In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father. “[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 ; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4

2021Legal Background In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father. “[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 ; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4

2021Legal Background In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father. “[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 ; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4

2021Legal Background In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father. “[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 ; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4

2021(Id. at pp. 1051-1052.) The appropriate circumstances require a finding of prosecutorial misconduct—“ ‘intemperate behavior [that] is sufficiently egregious that it infects the trial with such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of [federal] due process.’ ” (Id. at p. 1052.) Without adopting them as California standards, the Supreme Court set forth the factors articulated in two federal cases, Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 964 , 972 and U.S. v. Quinn (3d Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 243, 251-257 , to evaluate claims of prosecutorial mis

2016We previously have “characterized as ‘doubtful’ the ‘proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity.’ ” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 468 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656 , 93 P.3d 271 ] (Stewart).) We have noted that “the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the *1051 executive.” (Ibid., citing § 1324.) Moreover, “prosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 , 181 P.3d 1035 ]; see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96,

2016(See Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 468-469; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 974 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) Smith held that a court has the inherent authority to grant immunity if the failure would otherwise prevent the defendant “from presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to [the defense’s] case.” (Smith, at p. 969.) Smith’s holding, however, has been partially abrogated in U.S. v. Quinn (3d Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 243, 251-257 (en banc) (Quinn), in which the Third Circuit explained that other courts had rejected the theory of judicial use immunity and that Smith’

2004The trial court, in denying the motion, observed that many courts— including this court (see Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 973 )—have recognized that the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive, that is, to the prosecution (see § 1324), and have questioned whether a trial court possesses inherent authority to grant such immunity.

2010Code,] § 1324), and have questioned whether a trial court possesses inherent authority to grant such immunity.” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 468 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656 , 93 P.3d 271 ].) In fact, the California Supreme Court has definitively declared: “The grant of immunity is an executive function, and prosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant. [Citations.] Similarly, we have expressed reservations concerning claims that trial courts possess inherent authority to grant immunity [citation], and even assuming the cou

2007We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough." ( Ibid. ) Arguments to the contrary "impose[d] risks on the deponent whether or not the deposition testimony properly can be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution." ( Id. at p. 262, 103 S.Ct. 608 , fn. omitted.) The trial court's order of compulsion could not be "justified by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled testimony." ( Ibid. ) The court again rejected such an argument in United States v. Doe (1984) 465 U.S. 605, 609-610 , 104 S.Ct. 1237 , 79 L.Ed.2d 552 , where the government asserted that a subpoena should be e

2004Indeed, addressing this question in People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ], our court characterized as “doubtful” the “proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity.” (Id., at p. 460; see also, e.g., Carter v. United States (D.C. 1996) 684 A.2d 331, 338-339 [citing and agreeing with “the overwhelming number of courts . . . that have rejected the concept of judicially imposed immunity,” and noting that “ ‘there is considerable force to the Government’s apprehension that defense witness immunity could create opportunities for under

2004Indeed, addressing this question in People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ], our court characterized as “doubtful” the “proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity.” (Id., at p. 460; see also, e.g., Carter v. United States (D.C. 1996) 684 A.2d 331, 338-339 [citing and agreeing with “the overwhelming number of courts . . . that have rejected the concept of judicially imposed immunity,” and noting that “ ‘there is considerable force to the Government’s apprehension that defense witness immunity could create opportunities for under

2004Indeed, addressing this question in People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ], our court characterized as “doubtful” the “proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity.” (Id., at p. 460; see also, e.g., Carter v. United States (D.C. 1996) 684 A.2d 331, 338-339 [citing and agreeing with “the overwhelming number of courts . . . that have rejected the concept of judicially imposed immunity,” and noting that “ ‘there is considerable force to the Government’s apprehension that defense witness immunity could create opportunities for under

2004Indeed, addressing this question in People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ], our court characterized as “doubtful” the “proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity.” (Id., at p. 460; see also, e.g., Carter v. United States (D.C. 1996) 684 A.2d 331, 338-339 [citing and agreeing with “the overwhelming number of courts . . . that have rejected the concept of judicially imposed immunity,” and noting that “ ‘there is considerable force to the Government’s apprehension that defense witness immunity could create opportunities for under

2004Indeed, addressing this question in People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ], our court characterized as “doubtful” the “proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity.” (Id., at p. 460; see also, e.g., Carter v. United States (D.C. 1996) 684 A.2d 331, 338-339 [citing and agreeing with “the overwhelming number of courts . . . that have rejected the concept of judicially imposed immunity,” and noting that “ ‘there is considerable force to the Government’s apprehension that defense witness immunity could create opportunities for under

1999“The doctrine has been applied, for example, when an action otherwise within the jurisdiction of the court raises a question of the validity of a rate or practice included in a tariff filed with an [administrative] agency . ... , particularly when the issue involves technical questions of fact” within the agency’s expertise. {Nader, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 303-304 [ 96 S.Ct. 1978, 1986, 1987 ].) Generally, the standards to be applied in a common law fraud action are within the conventional competence of the courts and involve no technical questions of fact requiring agency expertise. {Nader, su

1978Professor McCormick points out that this “immunity” result “can be required by the misconduct of a single officer, thus giving each officer involved in an investigation the power to confer immunity upon the subject by acting improperly.” (McCormick, Evidence (2d ed. 1972) § 166, p. 367.) And it is said that the accused subject of an unlawful search “is entitled to be as well off as if [law enforcement authority] had not unlawfully seized [evidence], but he is not entitled to be any better off.” (Lord v. Kelley (D.Mass. 1963) 223 F.Supp. 684, 691 [cert, den., 379 U.S. 961 ( 13 L.Ed.2d 556 , 85