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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.green1 sentence2024(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 897, fn. 1 .) The version of rule 2(a) in effect at the time One Parcel was decided is substantially similar to the current version of rule 8.104(a). 12 trial court in this case expressly contemplated at the reconsideration hearing whether its signature on the minute order would constitute “substantial” compliance with rule 8.104(a), the law requires strict compliance in this context. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2022Nevertheless, a court has no authority to “ ‘ “ ‘declare that something was done which was not done.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117, 124 ; see Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 243, 256 [“ ‘[The] court can only make the record show that something was actually done at a previous time; . . . [it] cannot declare that something was done which was not done.’ ”].) Nothing in the record of the August 30 preliminary hearing suggests that the magistrate continued the preliminary hearing or considered his decisions merely tentative at the time. | 1 | 1 |
Dameshghi v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc.green2 sentences1995It would appear that the court’s consideration of oral argument after the rendition of its telephonic ruling is somewhat in the nature of a reconsideration hearing (see § 1008, subd. (a) *613 and Dameshghi v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1283 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 515 ]). 1995It would appear that the court’s consideration of oral argument after the rendition of its telephonic ruling is somewhat in the nature of a reconsideration hearing (see § 1008, subd. (a) *613 and Dameshghi v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1283 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 515 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Corns v. Millergreen2 sentences1992(Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 201-202 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 247 ].) At the reconsideration hearing, Dameshghi argued that Texaco had led El-Khoury to believe that Texaco had or would approve Dameshghi’s purchase of the franchise. 1992(Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 201-202 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 247 ].) At the reconsideration hearing, Dameshghi argued that Texaco had led El-Khoury to believe that Texaco had or would approve Dameshghi’s purchase of the franchise. | 1 | 1 |
Pebbles v. Steven C.green2 sentences1971Appellant contends that the constitutionally required standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ] and In re Steven C. (1970) 9 Cal. App.3d 255, 263 [ 88 Cal. Rptr. 97 ]. 1971Appellant contends that the constitutionally required standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ] and In re Steven C. (1970) 9 Cal. App.3d 255, 263 [ 88 Cal. Rptr. 97 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Phelan v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1962(Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 371-372 [ 217 P.2d 951 ] ; see also Parrott v. Furesz, 153 Cal.App.2d 26, 30-32 [ 314 P.2d 47 ].) A reconsideration of the rule announced in Kroiss as to its prospective operation would be pointless. 1962(Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 371-372 [ 217 P.2d 951 ] ; see also Parrott v. Furesz, 153 Cal.App.2d 26, 30-32 [ 314 P.2d 47 ].) A reconsideration of the rule announced in Kroiss as to its prospective operation would be pointless. | 1 | 1 |
Parrott v. Fureszgreen2 sentences1962(Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 371-372 [ 217 P.2d 951 ] ; see also Parrott v. Furesz, 153 Cal.App.2d 26, 30-32 [ 314 P.2d 47 ].) A reconsideration of the rule announced in Kroiss as to its prospective operation would be pointless. 1962(Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 371-372 [ 217 P.2d 951 ] ; see also Parrott v. Furesz, 153 Cal.App.2d 26, 30-32 [ 314 P.2d 47 ].) A reconsideration of the rule announced in Kroiss as to its prospective operation would be pointless. | 1 | 1 |
Rodabaugh v. Tekusgreen2 sentences1955I would also recommend to the majority, a rereading and a reconsideration of the analysis of this problem which was made in my dissenting opinion in Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290, 297, 303 . 1955I would also recommend to the majority, a rereading and a reconsideration of the analysis of this problem which was made in my dissenting opinion in Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290, 297, 303 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Geddes v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023We first discuss Geddes, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 417 , as we find it to be on point to all aspects of the analysis that we are called upon to undertake here. 2023We first discuss Geddes, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 417 , as we find it to be on point to all aspects of the analysis that we are called upon to undertake here. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Hyung Joon Kim
green
1 sentence2022Nevertheless, a court has no authority to “ ‘ “ ‘declare that something was done which was not done.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117, 124 ; see Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 243, 256 [“ ‘[The] court can only make the record show that something was actually done at a previous time; . . . [it] cannot declare that something was done which was not done.’ ”].) Nothing in the record of the August 30 preliminary hearing suggests that the magistrate continued the preliminary hearing or considered his decisions merely tentative at the time. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Animal Film, LLC v. D.E.J. Productions, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466, 472 .) Although O’Connor’s associate repayment agreement contained a forum selection and/or choice of law clause, respondent court did not rely on it in making its threshold decision at the reconsideration hearing. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bernstein v. Consolidated American Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2000Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 763, 774 , 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 817 stands for the proposition that Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 does not affect the trial court's "`... complete power to change its decision as the court may determine....'" Such an argument cannot be reasonably based upon a reading of our decisions in Gilberd and Hejmadi discussed above, and turns the forthright holding of Baldwin Hills on its head. 2000Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 763, 774 , 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 817 stands for the proposition that Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 does not affect the trial court's "`... complete power to change its decision as the court may determine....'" Such an argument cannot be reasonably based upon a reading of our decisions in Gilberd and Hejmadi discussed above, and turns the forthright holding of Baldwin Hills on its head. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1971Appellant contends that the constitutionally required standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ] and In re Steven C. (1970) 9 Cal. App.3d 255, 263 [ 88 Cal. Rptr. 97 ]. 1971Appellant contends that the constitutionally required standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ] and In re Steven C. (1970) 9 Cal. App.3d 255, 263 [ 88 Cal. Rptr. 97 ]. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences1970The case of People v. Davis (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 257 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 903 ] points to the circumstance that prior to 1967 the statutory provision for a reconsideration hearing was that it might be before a judge or jury; that in 1967 the law was changed to provide that the reconsideration hearing should be before a jury. 1970The case of People v. Davis (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 257 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 903 ] points to the circumstance that prior to 1967 the statutory provision for a reconsideration hearing was that it might be before a judge or jury; that in 1967 the law was changed to provide that the reconsideration hearing should be before a jury. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.