start hearing in California

2024At the start of the hearing on the motion to withdraw and for sentencing, Trood stated that he wanted to fire his appointed attorney, and the court held a hearing under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 .

2024At the start of the hearing on the motion to withdraw and for sentencing, Trood stated that he wanted to fire his appointed attorney, and the court held a hearing under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 .

2018At the start of the hearing, *1130 the wife sought a ruling on her objections to the husband's declarations, but the trial court replied that "it would take oral testimony and would rule on any objections made when questions were asked." ( Ibid . ) Following testimony, and during closing argument, the wife referenced her declaration as containing specific evidence; however, the court stated "the evidence in the hearing was the testimony and documents admitted, and '[n]othing else.' " ( Id . at p. 1267, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 799 .) The court took the *363 matter under submission and later granted the

2018Regarding the declarations, the court characterized them as " 'un-received evidence,' " ruling that "the only evidence was that presented by oral testimony and exhibits introduced into evidence." ( Ibid . ) On appeal, the wife challenged the trial court's failure to "automatically" admit the declarations. ( Shimkus , supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1269-1270, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 799 .) Rejecting her challenge, our colleagues in Division Three held that section 217 requires live testimony, "except under limited circumstances, i.e., the parties' stipulation or good cause." ( Id . at p. 1270, 198 Cal.

2010Absent equitable tolling (and it is uncertain whether an arbitrator would allow tolling), such `continuing violations' would be barred by the [provision]. . . ." ( Id. at p. 1077.) The Davis court distinguished Soltani, supra, 258 F.3d 1038 , which had concluded a similar provision was not substantively unconscionable because the contractually modified statute of limitations was triggered by the termination of employment, thereby eliminating any issue with regard to barring claims of continuing violations. ( Davis, supra, at p. 1077 ["This type of provision does not raise the concerns about nu

2010Absent equitable tolling (and it is uncertain whether an arbitrator would allow tolling), such `continuing violations' would be barred by the [provision]. . . ." ( Id. at p. 1077.) The Davis court distinguished Soltani, supra, 258 F.3d 1038 , which had concluded a similar provision was not substantively unconscionable because the contractually modified statute of limitations was triggered by the termination of employment, thereby eliminating any issue with regard to barring claims of continuing violations. ( Davis, supra, at p. 1077 ["This type of provision does not raise the concerns about nu

2023Saks notes that at the start of the hearing the trial court stated to the parties, “And I guess the question that I have is isn’t this just one day, so what’s my course of conduct?” The trial 20 court then directed the parties to consider Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1 (Leydon), where the Court of Appeal, applying a former version of section 527.6, reversed the issuance of a restraining order based on a single incident of abusive conduct.

2023Prior to the second day of the hearing, Saks filed a brief with the trial court clarifying that Leydon concerned a former version of section 527.6 that defined “harassment” as a “knowing and willful course of conduct” (Leydon, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 4 ; see Stats. 1987, ch. 1493, § 1), and that section 527.6 had since been amended to broaden the definition of “harassment” to also include “unlawful violence” and “a credible threat of violence” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3)).

2022At the start of the hearing, the court noted it had prepared a revised tentative order changing its decision and concluding, based on Corrales v. Corrales (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 221 (Corrales), that the partnership was already dissolved at the time Hudson provided his notice of withdrawal.

2015In Chavez v. Civil Service Com. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 324 (Chavez), an entire day of the administrative hearing could not be transcribed because of a defective tape.

2004As we held in People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 ] (Pompa-Ortiz), when a defendant presents, by way of a pretrial writ petition, claims that establish irregularities in preliminary hearing procedures, the court will grant relief— for example, dismissal and remand for a new, properly conducted preliminary hearing—“without any showing of prejudice.” (Id., at p. 529.) But when such claims are presented for the first time on appeal, “irregularities . . . which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the *462 appropriate sta

2004As we held in People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 ] (Pompa-Ortiz), when a defendant presents, by way of a pretrial writ petition, claims that establish irregularities in preliminary hearing procedures, the court will grant relief— for example, dismissal and remand for a new, properly conducted preliminary hearing—“without any showing of prejudice.” (Id., at p. 529.) But when such claims are presented for the first time on appeal, “irregularities . . . which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the *462 appropriate sta