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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
STATE EX REL. METZ v. Farmers Group, Inc.green2 sentences2017When reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, it is our duty to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action under any theory. ( Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 272 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 397 P.3d 210 .) As defendants must concede, Nee concluded, albeit in dicta, that Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), "extend liability to persons other than those who actually file the suspect claim" for workers' compensation benefits. ( Nee , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 450 , 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ; see Metz , supra , 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 , 67 Cal.R 2017When reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, it is our duty to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action under any theory. ( Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 272 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 397 P.3d 210 .) As defendants must concede, Nee concluded, albeit in dicta, that Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), "extend liability to persons other than those who actually file the suspect claim" for workers' compensation benefits. ( Nee , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 450 , 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ; see Metz , supra , 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 , 67 Cal.R | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Nee v. Unumprovident Corp.green2 sentences2017When reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, it is our duty to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action under any theory. ( Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 272 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 397 P.3d 210 .) As defendants must concede, Nee concluded, albeit in dicta, that Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), "extend liability to persons other than those who actually file the suspect claim" for workers' compensation benefits. ( Nee , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 450 , 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ; see Metz , supra , 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 , 67 Cal.R 2017When reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, it is our duty to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action under any theory. ( Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 272 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 397 P.3d 210 .) As defendants must concede, Nee concluded, albeit in dicta, that Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), "extend liability to persons other than those who actually file the suspect claim" for workers' compensation benefits. ( Nee , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 450 , 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ; see Metz , supra , 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 , 67 Cal.R | 1 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences1988(Id. at p. 878.) Although we could theorize by analogy to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ], a derivative right to counsel designed to safeguard the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, it is unlikely such a derivative right to counsel will be recognized federally (see 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, supra, § 11.1(c), p. 11) and, in any event, such a derivative right to counsel would not be violated by a Border Patrol agent’s giving of a suspect a waiver form regarding the retention of deportable a 1988(Id. at p. 878.) Although we could theorize by analogy to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ], a derivative right to counsel designed to safeguard the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, it is unlikely such a derivative right to counsel will be recognized federally (see 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, supra, § 11.1(c), p. 11) and, in any event, such a derivative right to counsel would not be violated by a Border Patrol agent’s giving of a suspect a waiver form regarding the retention of deportable a | 1 | 2 |
Pennsylvania v. Munizgreen1 sentence2019Where-as here-officers *652 did not yet have probable cause to arrest the suspect, but instead were trying to continue their investigation, they would have no choice but to release the suspect. 7 Cooper's argument as to the fifth listed statement-that she didn't want to take any more tests-similarly fails. 8 A police inquiry to a suspect as to whether she will submit to a chemical test is not an "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda . ( South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 ; Muniz , supra , 496 U.S. at pp. 604-605, 110 S.Ct. 2638 [officer re | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dickeygreen2 sentences2007(Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 ; People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 135-136 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 ].) The test for a patdown search is whether “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ].) Moreover, when the office 2007(Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 ; People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 135-136 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 ].) The test for a patdown search is whether “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ].) Moreover, when the office | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ian C.green2 sentences2007(Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 ; People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 135-136 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 ].) The test for a patdown search is whether “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ].) Moreover, when the office 2007(Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 ; People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 135-136 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 ].) The test for a patdown search is whether “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ].) Moreover, when the office | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2007(Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 ; People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 135-136 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 ].) The test for a patdown search is whether “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ].) Moreover, when the office 2007(Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 ; People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 135-136 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 ].) The test for a patdown search is whether “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ].) Moreover, when the office | 1 | 1 |
People v. Moseleygreen2 sentences1969(See People v. Moseley, 240 Cal.App.2d 859, 863 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 67 ].) *333 The Miranda Error Miranda permits no questioning of a suspect in custody without first informing the suspect in warning fashion of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and without a subsequent waiver by him of that privilege. 1969(See People v. Moseley, 240 Cal.App.2d 859, 863 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 67 ].) *333 The Miranda Error Miranda permits no questioning of a suspect in custody without first informing the suspect in warning fashion of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and without a subsequent waiver by him of that privilege. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Arnoldgreen2 sentences1969Custodial interrogation is defined in Miranda as ‘ ‘ questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (italics added), and as being-equivalent in meaning to the words, as nsed in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ], “an investigation focusing on an accused.” ( 384 U.S. at p. 444 , fn. 4 at p. 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ].) Miranda does not; however, require prior warnings and a waiver as a preliminary to “ [g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to 1969Custodial interrogation is defined in Miranda as ‘ ‘ questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (italics added), and as being-equivalent in meaning to the words, as nsed in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ], “an investigation focusing on an accused.” ( 384 U.S. at p. 444 , fn. 4 at p. 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ].) Miranda does not; however, require prior warnings and a waiver as a preliminary to “ [g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara
green
2 sentences2017When reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, it is our duty to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action under any theory. ( Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 272 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 397 P.3d 210 .) As defendants must concede, Nee concluded, albeit in dicta, that Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), "extend liability to persons other than those who actually file the suspect claim" for workers' compensation benefits. ( Nee , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 450 , 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ; see Metz , supra , 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 , 67 Cal.R 2017When reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, it is our duty to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action under any theory. ( Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 272 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 397 P.3d 210 .) As defendants must concede, Nee concluded, albeit in dicta, that Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), "extend liability to persons other than those who actually file the suspect claim" for workers' compensation benefits. ( Nee , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 450 , 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ; see Metz , supra , 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 , 67 Cal.R | 2 | 2017–2017 |
South Dakota v. Neville
green
2 sentences2019Where-as here-officers *652 did not yet have probable cause to arrest the suspect, but instead were trying to continue their investigation, they would have no choice but to release the suspect. 7 Cooper's argument as to the fifth listed statement-that she didn't want to take any more tests-similarly fails. 8 A police inquiry to a suspect as to whether she will submit to a chemical test is not an "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda . ( South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 ; Muniz , supra , 496 U.S. at pp. 604-605, 110 S.Ct. 2638 [officer re 2019Where-as here-officers *652 did not yet have probable cause to arrest the suspect, but instead were trying to continue their investigation, they would have no choice but to release the suspect. 7 Cooper's argument as to the fifth listed statement-that she didn't want to take any more tests-similarly fails. 8 A police inquiry to a suspect as to whether she will submit to a chemical test is not an "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda . ( South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 ; Muniz , supra , 496 U.S. at pp. 604-605, 110 S.Ct. 2638 [officer re | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Pga W. Residential Ass'n, Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017(Cf. PGA West Residential Assn ., Inc . v. Hulven Internat ., Inc . (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156 , 171, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 353 .) A false report submitted by or prepared to be submitted by an employer in response to a claim for workers' compensation insurance benefits, fraudulently disputing liability for the claimed injury, is a false oral or written statement "in support of or opposition to" a claim for benefits within the meaning of Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2). 2017(Cf. PGA West Residential Assn ., Inc . v. Hulven Internat ., Inc . (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156 , 171, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 353 .) A false report submitted by or prepared to be submitted by an employer in response to a claim for workers' compensation insurance benefits, fraudulently disputing liability for the claimed injury, is a false oral or written statement "in support of or opposition to" a claim for benefits within the meaning of Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Patane
green
1 sentence2013(United States v. Patane, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 637 .) The court explained “the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause,” which “is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement.” (Id. at p. 636.) This is because the admission of physical evidence obtained through voluntary statements cannot violate the right against self-incrimination as the right itself is a trial right. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2007(Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 ; People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 135-136 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 ].) The test for a patdown search is whether “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ].) Moreover, when the office | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Ass'n
green
2 sentences1982(Id., at p. 881.) *300 In Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 629 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 526 P.2d 1169 ], the court found enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon sale of the encumbered property by installment contract constituted an unreasonable restraint against alienation. 1982(Id., at p. 881.) *300 In Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 629 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 526 P.2d 1169 ], the court found enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon sale of the encumbered property by installment contract constituted an unreasonable restraint against alienation. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Pacific Air Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1981The added phrase accurately reflects the holding in Pacific Air Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 587 , that an averment of truth need not be included in a statement made under penalty of perjury where it can be inferred from the circumstances that the statements are being presented as true facts. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Enriquez
green
1 sentence1979The Enriquez court made it clear that “just as Miranda prohibits continued police interrogation into the substantive crime after a clear indication that a suspect wants an attorney present, it also prohibits continued police efforts to extract from a suspect a waiver of his rights to have an attorney present after a clear indication that the suspect desires such an attorney.” ( Enriquez, supra, 19 Cal.3d 221, 238 .) It follows also that Miranda prohibits continued police efforts to extract from a suspect a waiver of his rights to remain silent *63 after a clear indication that he does not real | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Escobedo v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1969Custodial interrogation is defined in Miranda as ‘ ‘ questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (italics added), and as being-equivalent in meaning to the words, as nsed in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ], “an investigation focusing on an accused.” ( 384 U.S. at p. 444 , fn. 4 at p. 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ].) Miranda does not; however, require prior warnings and a waiver as a preliminary to “ [g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to 1969Custodial interrogation is defined in Miranda as ‘ ‘ questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (italics added), and as being-equivalent in meaning to the words, as nsed in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ], “an investigation focusing on an accused.” ( 384 U.S. at p. 444 , fn. 4 at p. 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ].) Miranda does not; however, require prior warnings and a waiver as a preliminary to “ [g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.