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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1886–1991 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
T.P.B. v. Superior Court of Alameda Countygreen2 sentences1991Dist. v. Superior Court (1920) 182 Cal. 315, 333 [ 187 P. 1056 ] [judge had remote interest in subject matter]; T.P.B. v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 881, 885-886 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 311 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is not clearly stated in the decisions, and the proposition itself is not uniformly accepted in its broadest form by all of them. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, op. cit. supra, Courts, § 74, pp. 88-90.) For example, Giometti v. Etienne, supra, states, “this court has on several occasions pointed out that a judgment rendered by a disqualified judge is void.” ( 219 Cal. a 1991Dist. v. Superior Court (1920) 182 Cal. 315, 333 [ 187 P. 1056 ] [judge had remote interest in subject matter]; T.P.B. v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 881, 885-886 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 311 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is not clearly stated in the decisions, and the proposition itself is not uniformly accepted in its broadest form by all of them. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, op. cit. supra, Courts, § 74, pp. 88-90.) For example, Giometti v. Etienne, supra, states, “this court has on several occasions pointed out that a judgment rendered by a disqualified judge is void.” ( 219 Cal. a | 1 | 1 |
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court of Tulare Cty.green2 sentences1991Dist. v. Superior Court (1920) 182 Cal. 315, 333 [ 187 P. 1056 ] [judge had remote interest in subject matter]; T.P.B. v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 881, 885-886 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 311 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is not clearly stated in the decisions, and the proposition itself is not uniformly accepted in its broadest form by all of them. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, op. cit. supra, Courts, § 74, pp. 88-90.) For example, Giometti v. Etienne, supra, states, “this court has on several occasions pointed out that a judgment rendered by a disqualified judge is void.” ( 219 Cal. a 1991Dist. v. Superior Court (1920) 182 Cal. 315, 333 [ 187 P. 1056 ] [judge had remote interest in subject matter]; T.P.B. v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 881, 885-886 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 311 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is not clearly stated in the decisions, and the proposition itself is not uniformly accepted in its broadest form by all of them. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, op. cit. supra, Courts, § 74, pp. 88-90.) For example, Giometti v. Etienne, supra, states, “this court has on several occasions pointed out that a judgment rendered by a disqualified judge is void.” ( 219 Cal. a | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1959The theory upon which the rule of disclosure making available to the defense the identity of the informant has developed, is to give the defendant an opportunity to uncover facts relating to the informer’s participation; permit an independent investigation of the information purportedly given to the officer by him; allow the defendant to locate and interview the informant and subpoena him; and give him a fair opportunity to substantiate his denial, impeach the testimony of the officer and obtain information useful in the preparation of his defense (People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 808-810 [ 3 1959The theory upon which the rule of disclosure making available to the defense the identity of the informant has developed, is to give the defendant an opportunity to uncover facts relating to the informer’s participation; permit an independent investigation of the information purportedly given to the officer by him; allow the defendant to locate and interview the informant and subpoena him; and give him a fair opportunity to substantiate his denial, impeach the testimony of the officer and obtain information useful in the preparation of his defense (People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 808-810 [ 3 | 1 | 1 |
Priestly v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1959The theory upon which the rule of disclosure making available to the defense the identity of the informant has developed, is to give the defendant an opportunity to uncover facts relating to the informer’s participation; permit an independent investigation of the information purportedly given to the officer by him; allow the defendant to locate and interview the informant and subpoena him; and give him a fair opportunity to substantiate his denial, impeach the testimony of the officer and obtain information useful in the preparation of his defense (People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 808-810 [ 3 1959The theory upon which the rule of disclosure making available to the defense the identity of the informant has developed, is to give the defendant an opportunity to uncover facts relating to the informer’s participation; permit an independent investigation of the information purportedly given to the officer by him; allow the defendant to locate and interview the informant and subpoena him; and give him a fair opportunity to substantiate his denial, impeach the testimony of the officer and obtain information useful in the preparation of his defense (People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 808-810 [ 3 | 1 | 1 |
People v. McShanngreen2 sentences1959The theory upon which the rule of disclosure making available to the defense the identity of the informant has developed, is to give the defendant an opportunity to uncover facts relating to the informer’s participation; permit an independent investigation of the information purportedly given to the officer by him; allow the defendant to locate and interview the informant and subpoena him; and give him a fair opportunity to substantiate his denial, impeach the testimony of the officer and obtain information useful in the preparation of his defense (People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 808-810 [ 3 1959The theory upon which the rule of disclosure making available to the defense the identity of the informant has developed, is to give the defendant an opportunity to uncover facts relating to the informer’s participation; permit an independent investigation of the information purportedly given to the officer by him; allow the defendant to locate and interview the informant and subpoena him; and give him a fair opportunity to substantiate his denial, impeach the testimony of the officer and obtain information useful in the preparation of his defense (People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 808-810 [ 3 | 1 | 1 |
Reclamation District No. 1500 v. Reclamation Boardgreen2 sentences1948No. 1500 v. Reclamation Board, 197 Cal. 482, 503 [ 241 P. 552 ], in holding that section 1915 of the Civil Code has no application to the state, cites with approval the following statement from Ruling Case Law: ‘ ‘ The theory upon which the rule is based is that whenever interest is allowed either by statute or by common law, except in cases where there has been a contract to pay interest, it is allowed for delay or default of the debtor. 1948No. 1500 v. Reclamation Board, 197 Cal. 482, 503 [ 241 P. 552 ], in holding that section 1915 of the Civil Code has no application to the state, cites with approval the following statement from Ruling Case Law: ‘ ‘ The theory upon which the rule is based is that whenever interest is allowed either by statute or by common law, except in cases where there has been a contract to pay interest, it is allowed for delay or default of the debtor. | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Skelton v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1935No. 136, 121 Cal. 522, 523 [ 50 Pac. 1068 , 53 Pac. 1085 ]; People v. Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 338, 341 [ 65 Pac. 749 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is that in quo warranto the state is not required to prove the usurpation or unlawful holding but the entire proceeding is one in the nature of an order upon the defendant to show that he is lawfully holding and exercising the office. 1935No. 136, 121 Cal. 522, 523 [ 50 Pac. 1068 , 53 Pac. 1085 ]; People v. Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 338, 341 [ 65 Pac. 749 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is that in quo warranto the state is not required to prove the usurpation or unlawful holding but the entire proceeding is one in the nature of an order upon the defendant to show that he is lawfully holding and exercising the office. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reclamation District No. 136green2 sentences1935No. 136, 121 Cal. 522, 523 [ 50 Pac. 1068 , 53 Pac. 1085 ]; People v. Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 338, 341 [ 65 Pac. 749 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is that in quo warranto the state is not required to prove the usurpation or unlawful holding but the entire proceeding is one in the nature of an order upon the defendant to show that he is lawfully holding and exercising the office. 1935No. 136, 121 Cal. 522, 523 [ 50 Pac. 1068 , 53 Pac. 1085 ]; People v. Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 338, 341 [ 65 Pac. 749 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is that in quo warranto the state is not required to prove the usurpation or unlawful holding but the entire proceeding is one in the nature of an order upon the defendant to show that he is lawfully holding and exercising the office. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Giometti v. Etienne
green
1 sentence1991Dist. v. Superior Court (1920) 182 Cal. 315, 333 [ 187 P. 1056 ] [judge had remote interest in subject matter]; T.P.B. v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 881, 885-886 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 311 ].) The theory upon which the rule rests is not clearly stated in the decisions, and the proposition itself is not uniformly accepted in its broadest form by all of them. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, op. cit. supra, Courts, § 74, pp. 88-90.) For example, Giometti v. Etienne, supra, states, “this court has on several occasions pointed out that a judgment rendered by a disqualified judge is void.” ( 219 Cal. a | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy
green
1 sentence1991(Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, supra, 214 Cal. 562, 569 .) *424 Witkin notes little is accomplished by calling the judgment of a disqualified judge “void”; the problem is one of jurisdiction. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Pastene v. Pardini
green
2 sentences1951(Pastene v. Pardini, 135 Cal. 431 [ 67 P. 681 ].) ” 17 *483 Regardless of the theory upon which an exception is required, defendant’s conduct was the equivalent of an exception. 1951(Pastene v. Pardini, 135 Cal. 431 [ 67 P. 681 ].) ” 17 *483 Regardless of the theory upon which an exception is required, defendant’s conduct was the equivalent of an exception. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Giraude v. Elec. Improvement Co. of San Jose
green
1 sentence1939Co., 107 Cal. 120 [ 40 P. 108 , 48 Am.St.Rep. 114 , 28 L.R.A. 596 ]; and it is quite apparent that the theory upon which the instruction is based finds support in the general language used in said opinion, as well as in the quotation therein from Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (sec. 87). | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Janes v. Bullard
green
1 sentence1939Co., 107 Cal. 120 [ 40 P. 108 , 48 Am.St.Rep. 114 , 28 L.R.A. 596 ]; and it is quite apparent that the theory upon which the instruction is based finds support in the general language used in said opinion, as well as in the quotation therein from Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (sec. 87). | 1 | 1939–1939 |
American Marine Paint Co. v. Nyno Line, Inc.
green
2 sentences1939However, assuming that the instruction in the form here presented and given deviated somewhat from the precise standard of conduct contended for by defendant, it cannot be said that the giving of this single instruction had the prejudicial effect claimed by defendant, for as said in the following cases, “in determining whether a jury has been properly instructed as to the law, the instructions taken as a whole must be considered; . . . and questionable instructions are not ground for reversal where the rights of appellant are clearly stated to the jury in other instructions ’ ’ (American Marin 1939However, assuming that the instruction in the form here presented and given deviated somewhat from the precise standard of conduct contended for by defendant, it cannot be said that the giving of this single instruction had the prejudicial effect claimed by defendant, for as said in the following cases, “in determining whether a jury has been properly instructed as to the law, the instructions taken as a whole must be considered; . . . and questionable instructions are not ground for reversal where the rights of appellant are clearly stated to the jury in other instructions ’ ’ (American Marin | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Anderson v. Parker
neutral
1 sentence1929In other words, the court may correct a clerical error in order to make the record speak the truth and show what was in fact determined by the court (Anderson v. Parker, 6 Cal. 197, 202 ; Bemmerly v. Woodward, 124 Cal. 568 [ 57 Pac. 561 ]; Chicago Clock Co. v. Tobin, 123 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 1007 ]; Fay v. Stubenrauch, 141 Cal. 573 [ 75 Pac. 174 ]; Erickson v. Stockton etc. R. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Chicago Clock Co. v. Tobin
green
2 sentences1929In other words, the court may correct a clerical error in order to make the record speak the truth and show what was in fact determined by the court (Anderson v. Parker, 6 Cal. 197, 202 ; Bemmerly v. Woodward, 124 Cal. 568 [ 57 Pac. 561 ]; Chicago Clock Co. v. Tobin, 123 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 1007 ]; Fay v. Stubenrauch, 141 Cal. 573 [ 75 Pac. 174 ]; Erickson v. Stockton etc. R. 1929In other words, the court may correct a clerical error in order to make the record speak the truth and show what was in fact determined by the court (Anderson v. Parker, 6 Cal. 197, 202 ; Bemmerly v. Woodward, 124 Cal. 568 [ 57 Pac. 561 ]; Chicago Clock Co. v. Tobin, 123 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 1007 ]; Fay v. Stubenrauch, 141 Cal. 573 [ 75 Pac. 174 ]; Erickson v. Stockton etc. R. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Bemmerly v. Woodward
green
2 sentences1929In other words, the court may correct a clerical error in order to make the record speak the truth and show what was in fact determined by the court (Anderson v. Parker, 6 Cal. 197, 202 ; Bemmerly v. Woodward, 124 Cal. 568 [ 57 Pac. 561 ]; Chicago Clock Co. v. Tobin, 123 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 1007 ]; Fay v. Stubenrauch, 141 Cal. 573 [ 75 Pac. 174 ]; Erickson v. Stockton etc. R. 1929In other words, the court may correct a clerical error in order to make the record speak the truth and show what was in fact determined by the court (Anderson v. Parker, 6 Cal. 197, 202 ; Bemmerly v. Woodward, 124 Cal. 568 [ 57 Pac. 561 ]; Chicago Clock Co. v. Tobin, 123 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 1007 ]; Fay v. Stubenrauch, 141 Cal. 573 [ 75 Pac. 174 ]; Erickson v. Stockton etc. R. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Fay v. Stubenrauch
green
2 sentences1929In other words, the court may correct a clerical error in order to make the record speak the truth and show what was in fact determined by the court (Anderson v. Parker, 6 Cal. 197, 202 ; Bemmerly v. Woodward, 124 Cal. 568 [ 57 Pac. 561 ]; Chicago Clock Co. v. Tobin, 123 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 1007 ]; Fay v. Stubenrauch, 141 Cal. 573 [ 75 Pac. 174 ]; Erickson v. Stockton etc. R. 1929In other words, the court may correct a clerical error in order to make the record speak the truth and show what was in fact determined by the court (Anderson v. Parker, 6 Cal. 197, 202 ; Bemmerly v. Woodward, 124 Cal. 568 [ 57 Pac. 561 ]; Chicago Clock Co. v. Tobin, 123 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 1007 ]; Fay v. Stubenrauch, 141 Cal. 573 [ 75 Pac. 174 ]; Erickson v. Stockton etc. R. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1923(People v. Elgar, 36 Cal. App. 114 [ 171 Pac. 697 ]; People v. Williams, 133 Cal. 165 [ 65 Pac. 323 ].) The theory upon which this instruction was denounced in those cases is stated therein as follows: “A verdict of guilty could have been rendered under such an instruction, although no two jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, or at all, of the truth of the charge as to any one of these separate offenses. 1923(People v. Elgar, 36 Cal. App. 114 [ 171 Pac. 697 ]; People v. Williams, 133 Cal. 165 [ 65 Pac. 323 ].) The theory upon which this instruction was denounced in those cases is stated therein as follows: “A verdict of guilty could have been rendered under such an instruction, although no two jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, or at all, of the truth of the charge as to any one of these separate offenses. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
People v. Elgar
green
2 sentences1923(People v. Elgar, 36 Cal. App. 114 [ 171 Pac. 697 ]; People v. Williams, 133 Cal. 165 [ 65 Pac. 323 ].) The theory upon which this instruction was denounced in those cases is stated therein as follows: “A verdict of guilty could have been rendered under such an instruction, although no two jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, or at all, of the truth of the charge as to any one of these separate offenses. 1923(People v. Elgar, 36 Cal. App. 114 [ 171 Pac. 697 ]; People v. Williams, 133 Cal. 165 [ 65 Pac. 323 ].) The theory upon which this instruction was denounced in those cases is stated therein as follows: “A verdict of guilty could have been rendered under such an instruction, although no two jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, or at all, of the truth of the charge as to any one of these separate offenses. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Niles v. Edwards
green
2 sentences1908(Niles v. Edwards, 90 Cal. 10, 15 , [ 27 Pac. 159, 296 ]; Fromm v. Sierra Nevada S. M. 1908(Niles v. Edwards, 90 Cal. 10, 15 , [ 27 Pac. 159, 296 ]; Fromm v. Sierra Nevada S. M. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
People v. Taylor
neutral
1 sentence1903This precise question was decided by this court in People v. Taylor, 57 Cal. 620 . | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Baldwin v. Kramer
neutral
1 sentence1886(Hastings v. Cunningham, 35 Cal. 550 ; Bell v. Thompson, 19 Cal. 706 ; Baldwin v. Kramer, 2 Cal. 582 ; Robb v. Robb, 6 Cal. 21 ; De Castro v. Richardson, 25 Cal. 52 ; Carpentier v. Hart, 5 Cal. 406 ; Blachmore's Case, 4 Coke, 156.) The theory upon which this doctrine proceeded in the English courts was, that during the term the record was in the breast or knowledge of the judges, and not in the roll, and it was not until the term closed that the record was made up and completed, after which it could not be disturbed. | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Carpentier v. Hart
green
1 sentence1886(Hastings v. Cunningham, 35 Cal. 550 ; Bell v. Thompson, 19 Cal. 706 ; Baldwin v. Kramer, 2 Cal. 582 ; Robb v. Robb, 6 Cal. 21 ; De Castro v. Richardson, 25 Cal. 52 ; Carpentier v. Hart, 5 Cal. 406 ; Blachmore's Case, 4 Coke, 156.) The theory upon which this doctrine proceeded in the English courts was, that during the term the record was in the breast or knowledge of the judges, and not in the roll, and it was not until the term closed that the record was made up and completed, after which it could not be disturbed. | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Robb v. Robb
neutral
1 sentence1886(Hastings v. Cunningham, 35 Cal. 550 ; Bell v. Thompson, 19 Cal. 706 ; Baldwin v. Kramer, 2 Cal. 582 ; Robb v. Robb, 6 Cal. 21 ; De Castro v. Richardson, 25 Cal. 52 ; Carpentier v. Hart, 5 Cal. 406 ; Blachmore's Case, 4 Coke, 156.) The theory upon which this doctrine proceeded in the English courts was, that during the term the record was in the breast or knowledge of the judges, and not in the roll, and it was not until the term closed that the record was made up and completed, after which it could not be disturbed. | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Bell v. Thompson
green
1 sentence1886(Hastings v. Cunningham, 35 Cal. 550 ; Bell v. Thompson, 19 Cal. 706 ; Baldwin v. Kramer, 2 Cal. 582 ; Robb v. Robb, 6 Cal. 21 ; De Castro v. Richardson, 25 Cal. 52 ; Carpentier v. Hart, 5 Cal. 406 ; Blachmore's Case, 4 Coke, 156.) The theory upon which this doctrine proceeded in the English courts was, that during the term the record was in the breast or knowledge of the judges, and not in the roll, and it was not until the term closed that the record was made up and completed, after which it could not be disturbed. | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.