unfounded claim in California

1914It may properly be noted that we have no suggestion in this case of any assertion in bad faith of an unfounded claim for the purpose of bringing the ease within the jurisdiction of the superior court, a matter referred to in Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313 , [ 90 Pac. 689 ], as having some relevancy in determining whether jurisdiction actually exists.

1914It may properly be noted that we have no suggestion in this case of any assertion in bad faith of an unfounded claim for the purpose of bringing the ease within the jurisdiction of the superior court, a matter referred to in Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313 , [ 90 Pac. 689 ], as having some relevancy in determining whether jurisdiction actually exists.

1972Any other rule would be fraught with uncertainties and mischiefs beyond the power of anticipation." ( 120 Cal. at p. 543 .) It is generally recognized that the assertion in bad faith of an unfounded claim will not vest jurisdiction in the superior court.

1972Any other rule would be fraught with uncertainties and mischiefs beyond the power of anticipation.” ( 120 Cal. at p. 543 .) It is generally recognized that the assertion in bad faith of an unfounded claim will not vest jurisdiction in the superior court.

2016(Melikian v. Aquila, Ltd. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368 .) A receiver’s fees and expenses are usually paid out of the receivership estate, but sometimes the receivership estate does not have sufficient assets.

2013That would be a natural result of the jury’s rational evaluation of the evidence, however, 4 Although the appellants failed to preserve this issue by objecting to or seeking modification of the instruction in the trial court, we review the argument on the merits because error to which no objection was interposed may nevertheless warrant review, “if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1138 .) 6 and would not indicate its reliance on an unfounded presumption favoring the believability of the statements or the testimony

2005In other words, if anyone claimed that section 905 said what the dissent in People v. Thompson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 13 , asserted that the majority in Thompson had held (that section 905 prohibited a county from acquiring fee title), even after the 1955 amendment expressly indicating otherwise (that a county could acquire fee title to land for highway purposes), he or she had only until 1962 to assert such/an unfounded claim in court. 4 Hence, if the Legislature's amendment of section 905 in 1955 did not result in eliminating such claims altogether, the 1961 statute of limitations served to forev

2005In other words, if anyone claimed that section 905 said what the dissent in People v. Thompson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 13 , asserted that the majority in Thompson had held (that section 905 prohibited a county from acquiring fee title), even after the 1955 amendment expressly indicating otherwise (that a county could acquire fee title to land for highway purposes), he or she had only until 1962 to assert such/an unfounded claim in court. 4 Hence, if the Legislature's amendment of section 905 in 1955 did not result in eliminating such claims altogether, the 1961 statute of limitations served to forev

1998The Crowley court initially reviewed the “dual harms to society and to the individual that the cause of action for malicious prosecution is designed to redress: ‘The malicious commencement of a civil proceeding is actionable because it harms the individual against whom the claim is made, and also because it threatens the efficient administration of justice.’ (Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 50 .)” (Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 666, 677 .) The court again rejected a claim similar to that of Mrs. Hyatt’s attorneys here (that they had to file an unfounded claim or be guilty of malpractic

1998It is not the assertion of a claim that is actionable but rather the malicious character of the assertion.’ ( 13 Cal.3d at p. 52 .)” (Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 679 .) The court finally concluded that “litigation that is groundless and motivated by malice . . . has no place in our judicial system, and we are therefore unwilling to bear its costs.

1998The Crowley court initially reviewed the “dual harms to society and to the individual that the cause of action for malicious prosecution is designed to redress: ‘The malicious commencement of a civil proceeding is actionable because it harms the individual against whom the claim is made, and also because it threatens the efficient administration of justice.’ (Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 50 .)” (Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 666, 677 .) The court again rejected a claim similar to that of Mrs. Hyatt’s attorneys here (that they had to file an unfounded claim or be guilty of malpractic

1998It is not the assertion of a claim that is actionable but rather the malicious character of the assertion.’ ( 13 Cal.3d at p. 52 .)” (Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 679 .) The court finally concluded that “litigation that is groundless and motivated by malice . . . has no place in our judicial system, and we are therefore unwilling to bear its costs.

1973(MacMorris Sales Corp. v. Kozak, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 998, 1005 .) Those portions of the “Order re Petition for Fees, Petition for Discharge, Petition for Authority To Sell Property, Petition for Waiver of Compliance With Section 692.2 CCP, and Petition for *588 Confirmation of Sale” filed March 31, 1972, conditioning approval of the receiver’s account and his discharge on the failure of defendants to commence proceedings within 90 days against the receiver or his surety seeking alleged damages resulting from the sale of personal property at less than the fair market value are reversed with d

1959(See e.g., Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131 [ 163 P.2d 443 ].) A person who presses an unfounded claim to obtain money from an innocent party, who finds he must pay because of the circumstances in which he finds himself, is certainly guilty of fraudulent conduct.

1959(See e.g., Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131 [ 163 P.2d 443 ].) A person who presses an unfounded claim to obtain money from an innocent party, who finds he must pay because of the circumstances in which he finds himself, is certainly guilty of fraudulent conduct.

1959(Fearon v. Fodera, 169 Cal. 370, 379 [ 148 P. 200 , Ann.Cas 1916D 312]; Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 27 [ 272 P. 1045 ]; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541-543 [ 134 P.2d 217 ] ; Ezmirlian v. Otto, 139 Cal.App. 486 [ 34 P.2d 774 ] ; Davis v. Wood, 61 Cal.App.2d 788 [143 P.2d 740]; Kalajian v. Nash, 148 Cal.App.2d 495 [ 306 P.2d 921 ]; Rest., Torts, § 624; Prosser on Torts, 2d ed., 760, § 108.) [15] In an action for disparagement of title the plaintiff may recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff’s title.

1959(Fearon v. Fodera, 169 Cal. 370, 379 [ 148 P. 200 , Ann.Cas 1916D 312]; Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 27 [ 272 P. 1045 ]; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541-543 [ 134 P.2d 217 ] ; Ezmirlian v. Otto, 139 Cal.App. 486 [ 34 P.2d 774 ] ; Davis v. Wood, 61 Cal.App.2d 788 [143 P.2d 740]; Kalajian v. Nash, 148 Cal.App.2d 495 [ 306 P.2d 921 ]; Rest., Torts, § 624; Prosser on Torts, 2d ed., 760, § 108.) [15] In an action for disparagement of title the plaintiff may recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff’s title.

1959(Fearon v. Fodera, 169 Cal. 370, 379 [ 148 P. 200 , Ann.Cas 1916D 312]; Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 27 [ 272 P. 1045 ]; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541-543 [ 134 P.2d 217 ] ; Ezmirlian v. Otto, 139 Cal.App. 486 [ 34 P.2d 774 ] ; Davis v. Wood, 61 Cal.App.2d 788 [143 P.2d 740]; Kalajian v. Nash, 148 Cal.App.2d 495 [ 306 P.2d 921 ]; Rest., Torts, § 624; Prosser on Torts, 2d ed., 760, § 108.) [15] In an action for disparagement of title the plaintiff may recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff’s title.

1959(Fearon v. Fodera, 169 Cal. 370, 379 [ 148 P. 200 , Ann.Cas 1916D 312]; Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 27 [ 272 P. 1045 ]; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541-543 [ 134 P.2d 217 ] ; Ezmirlian v. Otto, 139 Cal.App. 486 [ 34 P.2d 774 ] ; Davis v. Wood, 61 Cal.App.2d 788 [143 P.2d 740]; Kalajian v. Nash, 148 Cal.App.2d 495 [ 306 P.2d 921 ]; Rest., Torts, § 624; Prosser on Torts, 2d ed., 760, § 108.) [15] In an action for disparagement of title the plaintiff may recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff’s title.

1959(Fearon v. Fodera, 169 Cal. 370, 379 [ 148 P. 200 , Ann.Cas 1916D 312]; Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 27 [ 272 P. 1045 ]; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541-543 [ 134 P.2d 217 ] ; Ezmirlian v. Otto, 139 Cal.App. 486 [ 34 P.2d 774 ] ; Davis v. Wood, 61 Cal.App.2d 788 [143 P.2d 740]; Kalajian v. Nash, 148 Cal.App.2d 495 [ 306 P.2d 921 ]; Rest., Torts, § 624; Prosser on Torts, 2d ed., 760, § 108.) [15] In an action for disparagement of title the plaintiff may recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff’s title.

1959(Fearon v. Fodera, 169 Cal. 370, 379 [ 148 P. 200 , Ann.Cas 1916D 312]; Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 27 [ 272 P. 1045 ]; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541-543 [ 134 P.2d 217 ] ; Ezmirlian v. Otto, 139 Cal.App. 486 [ 34 P.2d 774 ] ; Davis v. Wood, 61 Cal.App.2d 788 [143 P.2d 740]; Kalajian v. Nash, 148 Cal.App.2d 495 [ 306 P.2d 921 ]; Rest., Torts, § 624; Prosser on Torts, 2d ed., 760, § 108.) [15] In an action for disparagement of title the plaintiff may recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff’s title.

1890I. 206, 207.) In accordance with those principles, it has been held that a stockholder may restrain the directors from paying an unfounded claim of the secretary for extra services (Butts v. Woods, 37 N. Y. 317 ); and may compel the repayment of funds misappropriated by the directors (Sears v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn. 177 ; 65 Am.

1890Dec. 557 ); and may recover from a trustee property of the corporation which he has converted to his own use (Carpenter v. Roberts, 56 How.