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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Peabodygreen2 sentences1996Five.) CALJIC No. 4.45, the standard instruction on accident, also provides that the defense applies where “circumstances . . . show neither criminal intent nor purpose, nor [criminal] negligence . . . .” The use note for that instruction states: “If this instruction is given, an instruction defining ‘criminal negligence’ must be given sua sponte.” (CALJIC No. 4.45 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.) p. 174.) The “if,” however, presupposes, inter alia, that the charged offense can be committed with “criminal negligence.” Only “[w]here negligence is required as a predicate for a criminal act, . . .” (Peo 1996Five.) CALJIC No. 4.45, the standard instruction on accident, also provides that the defense applies where “circumstances . . . show neither criminal intent nor purpose, nor [criminal] negligence . . . .” The use note for that instruction states: “If this instruction is given, an instruction defining ‘criminal negligence’ must be given sua sponte.” (CALJIC No. 4.45 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.) p. 174.) The “if,” however, presupposes, inter alia, that the charged offense can be committed with “criminal negligence.” Only “[w]here negligence is required as a predicate for a criminal act, . . .” (Peo | 1 | 2 |
People v. Tannergreen1 sentence2016(Cf. People v. Tanner (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 948, 956, fn. 5 (Tanner); Use Note to CALJIC No. 3.33 (Fall 2014 ed.) p. 215.) Appellant was not charged with any strict liability offenses. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2003As set forth in the fifth edition, the instruction was worded as follows: “ ‘There has been evidence in this case indicating that a person other than defendant was or may have been involved in the crime for which the defendant is on trial. [|] Do not discuss or give any consideration to why the other person is not being prosecuted in this trial or whether [he] [she] has been or will be prosecuted.’ (CALJIC No. 2.11.5 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.).)” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 225, fn. 5 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 , 940 P.2d 710 ].) The Use Note to this instruction specifies that it is no 2003As set forth in the fifth edition, the instruction was worded as follows: “ ‘There has been evidence in this case indicating that a person other than defendant was or may have been involved in the crime for which the defendant is on trial. [|] Do not discuss or give any consideration to why the other person is not being prosecuted in this trial or whether [he] [she] has been or will be prosecuted.’ (CALJIC No. 2.11.5 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.).)” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 225, fn. 5 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 , 940 P.2d 710 ].) The Use Note to this instruction specifies that it is no | 1 | 1 |
People v. Babbittgreen2 sentences2002The Use Note to the instruction states, “Our recommended procedure may be more cumbersome than the suggestion advanced in [People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 718,] footnote number 26, but the Committee believes it is less likely to result in confusion to the jury.” Although trial in this case occurred shortly after adoption of the 1989 version of CALJIC No. 8.84.1, the trial court did not give that instruction. 6 Instead, it gave the previously standard instructions augmented with several special instructions. 2002The Use Note to the instruction states, "Our recommended procedure may be more cumbersome than the suggestion advanced in [ People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 718, [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 755 P.2d 253 ],] footnote number 26, but the Committee believes it is less likely to result in confusion to the jury." Although trial in this case occurred shortly after adoption of the 1989 version of CALJIC No. 8.84.1, the trial court did not give that instruction. [6] Instead, it gave the previously standard instructions augmented with several special instructions. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fordgreen2 sentences1997(People v. Brenner (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 335, 339 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 ]; *716 People v. Ford (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 989-990 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 684 ].) Although the Attorney General argues inserting the word “specific” before “intent” would not have added appreciably to the statutory language the court recited, if the court had given former CALJIC No. 17.20 presumably it would have followed the suggestion of the Use Note to that instruction and given additional instructions to explain the significance of specific intent. 1997(People v. Brenner (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 335, 339 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 ]; *716 People v. Ford (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 989-990 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 684 ].) Although the Attorney General argues inserting the word “specific” before “intent” would not have added appreciably to the statutory language the court recited, if the court had given former CALJIC No. 17.20 presumably it would have followed the suggestion of the Use Note to that instruction and given additional instructions to explain the significance of specific intent. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brennergreen2 sentences1997(People v. Brenner (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 335, 339 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 ]; *716 People v. Ford (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 989-990 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 684 ].) Although the Attorney General argues inserting the word “specific” before “intent” would not have added appreciably to the statutory language the court recited, if the court had given former CALJIC No. 17.20 presumably it would have followed the suggestion of the Use Note to that instruction and given additional instructions to explain the significance of specific intent. 1997(People v. Brenner (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 335, 339 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 ]; *716 People v. Ford (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 989-990 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 684 ].) Although the Attorney General argues inserting the word “specific” before “intent” would not have added appreciably to the statutory language the court recited, if the court had given former CALJIC No. 17.20 presumably it would have followed the suggestion of the Use Note to that instruction and given additional instructions to explain the significance of specific intent. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fonseca
green
2 sentences2013The issue of whether it was error to give this instruction in a trial in which unjoined coperpetrators testified was addressed most recently in People v. Fonseca (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 543 (Fonseca). 2013The issue of whether it was error to give this instruction in a trial in which unjoined coperpetrators testified was addressed most recently in People v. Fonseca (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 543 (Fonseca). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Brucker
green
2 sentences1996Five.) CALJIC No. 4.45, the standard instruction on accident, also provides that the defense applies where “circumstances . . . show neither criminal intent nor purpose, nor [criminal] negligence . . . .” The use note for that instruction states: “If this instruction is given, an instruction defining ‘criminal negligence’ must be given sua sponte.” (CALJIC No. 4.45 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.) p. 174.) The “if,” however, presupposes, inter alia, that the charged offense can be committed with “criminal negligence.” Only “[w]here negligence is required as a predicate for a criminal act, . . .” (Peo 1996Five.) CALJIC No. 4.45, the standard instruction on accident, also provides that the defense applies where “circumstances . . . show neither criminal intent nor purpose, nor [criminal] negligence . . . .” The use note for that instruction states: “If this instruction is given, an instruction defining ‘criminal negligence’ must be given sua sponte.” (CALJIC No. 4.45 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.) p. 174.) The “if,” however, presupposes, inter alia, that the charged offense can be committed with “criminal negligence.” Only “[w]here negligence is required as a predicate for a criminal act, . . .” (Peo | 2 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Bernhardt
green
1 sentence2013If there are ‗concurrent causes,‘ CALJIC 3.41 must be given. [¶] Where cause is an issue, this instruction thereon must be given sua sponte.‖ (CALJIC No. 8.55, Use Note [citing People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 591 ].) CALJIC No. 3.40 provides: ―[To constitute the crime of __________ there must be in addition to the (result of the crime) __________ an unlawful [act] [or] [omission] which was a cause of that (result of the crime) __________.] [¶] The criminal law has its own particular way of defining cause. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences1991The standard jury instruction on punitive damages given in this case expressly directed the jury to consider the “defendant’s financial condition.” (BAJI No. 14.71 (7th ed. 1986 bound vol.) p. 205.) The Use Note to this instruction explained that consideration of this factor was necessary under Neal, supra, 21 Cal.3d 910 . 1991The standard jury instruction on punitive damages given in this case expressly directed the jury to consider the "defendant's financial condition." (BAJI No. 14.71 (7th ed. 1986 bound vol.) p. 205.) The Use Note to this instruction explained that consideration of this factor was necessary under Neal, supra, 21 Cal.3d 910 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Palmer
green
2 sentences1988The latter category was an invention of the CALJIC drafters: although the Use Note to instruction No. 2.92 claims it “is based upon People v. West, 139 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ] . . . and People v. Palmer, 154 Cal.App.3d 79 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 474 ],” neither West, nor Palmer , nor any other reported decision contains any mention of an “ethnic” or “cross-ethnic” eyewitness identification factor. 1988The latter category was an invention of the CALJIC drafters: although the Use Note to instruction No. 2.92 claims it “is based upon People v. West, 139 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ] . . . and People v. Palmer, 154 Cal.App.3d 79 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 474 ],” neither West, nor Palmer , nor any other reported decision contains any mention of an “ethnic” or “cross-ethnic” eyewitness identification factor. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. West
green
2 sentences1988The latter category was an invention of the CALJIC drafters: although the Use Note to instruction No. 2.92 claims it “is based upon People v. West, 139 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ] . . . and People v. Palmer, 154 Cal.App.3d 79 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 474 ],” neither West, nor Palmer , nor any other reported decision contains any mention of an “ethnic” or “cross-ethnic” eyewitness identification factor. 1988The latter category was an invention of the CALJIC drafters: although the Use Note to instruction No. 2.92 claims it “is based upon People v. West, 139 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ] . . . and People v. Palmer, 154 Cal.App.3d 79 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 474 ],” neither West, nor Palmer , nor any other reported decision contains any mention of an “ethnic” or “cross-ethnic” eyewitness identification factor. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.