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11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Russogreen2 sentences1994“Considerable discretion” has specifically been given to a causal challenge pursuant to section 16-10 — 103(l)(j), especially when the prospective juror “disavows any prejudicial bent of mind.” Russo, 713 P.2d at 362 . 1986In Russo, 713 P.2d at 362 , we recently considered the propriety of denying a challenge for cause under circumstances similar to those present here and stated: When a causal challenge for enmity or bias is made against a prospective juror who disavows any prejudicial bent of mind but nonetheless acknowledges some experience or knowledge that counsel believes could possibly affect the juror’s competence to serve on the case, the trial court must be accorded considerable discretion in passing on the challenge. ... | 1 | 2 |
People v. Merrowgreen1 sentence2024See Blasingame, ¶¶ 13, 21, 27 (concluding the trial court erred by failing to dismiss a juror who gave “uncertain answers” about whether she could follow the law and was never sufficiently rehabilitated); see also People v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319, 321 (Colo. App. 2007) (noting that when a prospective juror’s statements “compel the inference” that they cannot decide issues fairly, “a challenge for cause must be granted in the absence of rehabilitative questioning or other counter-balancing information”). ¶ 15 The People attempt to salvage the court’s ruling by suggesting that Juror T’s statement | 1 | 1 |
People v. Younggreen1 sentence2020The court found credible Juror N’s representation that “she can be a fair and very unbiased juror in this case.” And the record does not show that Juror N “evinc[ed] enmity or bias toward 11 the defendant or the state.” § 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2019; see People v. Young, 16 P.3d 821, 824 (Colo. 2001) (in reviewing denial of causal challenge, appellate courts defer to trial court’s assessment of a prospective juror’s credibility; and recognizing trial court’s ability to evaluate a juror’s demeanor and body language). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sellhausengreen1 sentence2018A. The Error ¶ 94 Several courts have concluded that it is error for a trial judge to permit a member of his or her immediate family to serve on a jury. ¶ 95 In State v. Tody, 764 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. 2009), abrogated by State v. Sellhausen, 809 N.W.2d 14, 28-29 (Wis. 2012) (Ziegler, J., concurring), the circuit court judge denied a causal challenge to the circuit court judge’s mother serving on a jury over which the judge presided. | 1 | 1 |
Meddock v. County of Yolo CA3green2 sentences2015In Meddock v. County of Yolo, 220 Cal.App.4th 170 , 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 796, 799 (2013), the plaintiff argued that because he was on improved property-a paved parking lot-and using it as intended when a tree adjacent to the lot fell on him, the county waived its governmental immunity. 2015In Meddock v. County of Yolo, 220 Cal.App.4th 170 , 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 796, 799 (2013), the plaintiff argued that because he was on improved property-a paved parking lot-and using it as intended when a tree adjacent to the lot fell on him, the county waived its governmental immunity. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Drakegreen1 sentence1994“This standard recognizes that the trial judge is the only judicial officer able to perform the critical assessments by personal observation of the credibility and demeanor of the prospective juror.” People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Colo.1988); see also Russo, 713 P.2d at 362 (stating that “the resolution of the challenge will ultimately turn on an assessment of such intangibles as the juror’s credibility with respect to his own state of mind and his attitude toward the serious responsibility of jury duty”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abbottgreen2 sentences1986See Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 ; People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538 , 549 P.2d 1320 (1976). 1986See Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 ; People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538 , 549 P.2d 1320 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Todyred1 sentence2018A. The Error ¶ 94 Several courts have concluded that it is error for a trial judge to permit a member of his or her immediate family to serve on a jury. ¶ 95 In State v. Tody, 764 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. 2009), abrogated by State v. Sellhausen, 809 N.W.2d 14, 28-29 (Wis. 2012) (Ziegler, J., concurring), the circuit court judge denied a causal challenge to the circuit court judge’s mother serving on a jury over which the judge presided. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kastner
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 1264 . 2010Id. | 3 | 2010–2012 |
Redinger v. Clapper's Tree Service Inc.
green
2 sentences2015It also noted, significantly, that “the fact that the land in question was a partially developed . . . tract is of no consequence; unimproved portions of it may still come under the liability limitation of the [statute].†Id. ¶31      These courts’ holdings lend support to our conclusion that a causal analysis should control immunity here. 3. 2015It also noted, significantly, that "the fact that the land in question was a partially developed ... tract is of no consequence; unimproved portions of it may still come under the liability limitation of the [statute]." Id. [ 31 These courts' holdings lend support to our conclusion that a causal analysis should control immunity here. 3. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMichael
green
2 sentences2003In McMichael , we described the causal analysis as requiring a claimant to "show that the accident would not have occurred but for the vehicle's use." McMichael, 906 P.2d at 103 . 2003In McMichael, we described the causal analysis as requiring a claimant to "show that the accident would not have occurred but for the vehicle's use." McMichael, 906 P.2d at 108 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. McCrary
green
2 sentences1986See Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 ; People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538 , 549 P.2d 1320 (1976). 1986See Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 ; People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538 , 549 P.2d 1320 (1976). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Russo
green
2 sentences1986Stating that “ ‘Qjustice would have been served by excusing this potential juror,’ ” Russo, 677 P.2d at 388 , the court of appeals concluded that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s causal challenge was reversible error. 1986Stating that "`[j]ustice would have been served by excusing this potential juror,'" Russo, 677 P.2d at 388 , the court of appeals concluded that the trial court's denial of the defendant's causal challenge was reversible error. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.