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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rousey v. Jacowaygreen1 sentence2024All that said, I believe the first clause also requires but-for causation, for three reasons: (1) we construe the statute to incorporate the same causal standard as its counterpart in Title VII; (2) as explained infra, but-for causation is the recognized default rule in the absence of language to the contrary; and (3) it would be incongruous for the first clause to have an unstated causal standard that is different 45 added.) The ordinary meaning of “on account of” in both common parlance and legal usage is “because of” or, synonymously, “by reason of.” 17 When these terms are used in statutes | 1 | 1 |
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.green1 sentence2024Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009))). 18 See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 212-14 (2014) (“Our insistence on but-for causality has not been restricted to statutes using the term ‘because of.’”); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350 ; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 ; see e.g., Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652-55 (2008) (recognizing that the phrase “by reason of” requires at least a showing of “but for” causation); Safeco Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.green2 sentences2024Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009))). 18 See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 212-14 (2014) (“Our insistence on but-for causality has not been restricted to statutes using the term ‘because of.’”); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350 ; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 ; see e.g., Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652-55 (2008) (recognizing that the phrase “by reason of” requires at least a showing of “but for” causation); Safeco Ins. 2024Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009))). 18 See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 212-14 (2014) (“Our insistence on but-for causality has not been restricted to statutes using the term ‘because of.’”); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350 ; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 ; see e.g., Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652-55 (2008) (recognizing that the phrase “by reason of” requires at least a showing of “but for” causation); Safeco Ins. | 1 | 1 |
University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassargreen2 sentences2024All that said, I believe the first clause also requires but-for causation, for three reasons: (1) we construe the statute to incorporate the same causal standard as its counterpart in Title VII; (2) as explained infra, but-for causation is the recognized default rule in the absence of language to the contrary; and (3) it would be incongruous for the first clause to have an unstated causal standard that is different 45 added.) The ordinary meaning of “on account of” in both common parlance and legal usage is “because of” or, synonymously, “by reason of.” 17 When these terms are used in statutes 2024Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009))). 18 See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 212-14 (2014) (“Our insistence on but-for causality has not been restricted to statutes using the term ‘because of.’”); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350 ; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 ; see e.g., Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652-55 (2008) (recognizing that the phrase “by reason of” requires at least a showing of “but for” causation); Safeco Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Burrage v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009))). 18 See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 212-14 (2014) (“Our insistence on but-for causality has not been restricted to statutes using the term ‘because of.’”); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350 ; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 ; see e.g., Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652-55 (2008) (recognizing that the phrase “by reason of” requires at least a showing of “but for” causation); Safeco Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gartrell v. Department of Correction
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Grillo v. National Bank of Washington
green
1 sentence2000The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act uses the same causal test as the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), see Tredway, 403 A.2d at 736 , which was the predecessor to the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act “and is similar [to it] in all relevant aspects,” see Grillo, 540 A.2d at 749 n. 15. . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Fazio v. Cardillo
green
2 sentences2000In comparison, in Fazio v. Cardillo, 71 App.D.C. 264 , 109 F.2d 835 (1940), coverage was denied because the claimant sustained his injuries in what the court found was a purely "personal altercation between the claimant and a co-employee, over a matter unrelated to the performance of their duties.” 71 App.D.C. at 265 , 109 F.2d at 836 . .The fact that Clark's injuries were sustained in the employer’s parking lot during her break, rather than in the building while she was actually performing her duties, does not preclude compensation — nor do the parties dispute the notion that injuries receive 2000In comparison, in Fazio v. Cardillo, 71 App.D.C. 264 , 109 F.2d 835 (1940), coverage was denied because the claimant sustained his injuries in what the court found was a purely "personal altercation between the claimant and a co-employee, over a matter unrelated to the performance of their duties.” 71 App.D.C. at 265 , 109 F.2d at 836 . .The fact that Clark's injuries were sustained in the employer’s parking lot during her break, rather than in the building while she was actually performing her duties, does not preclude compensation — nor do the parties dispute the notion that injuries receive | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Tredway v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence2000The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act uses the same causal test as the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), see Tredway, 403 A.2d at 736 , which was the predecessor to the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act “and is similar [to it] in all relevant aspects,” see Grillo, 540 A.2d at 749 n. 15. . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Cupp v. Naughten
green
2 sentences1995Viewed in its entirety, as it must be, see, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 , 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973), the instruction did not permit the negligible causal nexus appellants hypothesize. 1995Viewed in its entirety, as it must be, see, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 , 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973), the instruction did not permit the negligible causal nexus appellants hypothesize. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo
green
2 sentences1979Under both FECA and the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 11 the causal test has required only that “the work [bring] the worker within the orbit of whatever dangers the environment affords.” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, supra 72 App.D.C. at 55 , 112 F.2d at 14 . 1979Under both FECA and the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 11 the causal test has required only that “the work [bring] the worker within the orbit of whatever dangers the environment affords.” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, supra 72 App.D.C. at 55 , 112 F.2d at 14 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Stoner v. DISTRICT OF COL. POL. & FIRE., ETC.
green
2 sentences1977In a similar case, Stoner v. District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board, D.C.App., 368 A.2d 524 (No. 9654, 1977), we recently noted that while nonorganic disorders (such as petitioner's psychoneurosis) fall within the statutory concept of a compensable "injury or disease," the legislative standard specifies a causal analysis which is ill-adaptable to wholly psychiatric impairments. 1977Id., at 528 and nn. 6 & 7. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.