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11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Singh v. Mortensungreen2 sentences2006See People v. Baker, supra; Estep v. People, supra; see also Singh v. Mortensun, 30 P.3d 853 (Colo.App.2001) (discussing difference between “good cause” standard applicable to motions for relief from entry of default under C.R.C.P. 55(c) and “excusable neglect” standard applicable to motions to set aside a default judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)). 2006See People v. Baker, supra; Estep v. People, supra; see also Singh v. Mortensun, 30 P.3d 853 (Colo.App.2001) (discussing difference between "good cause" standard applicable to motions for relief from entry of default under C.R.C.P. 55(c) and "excusable neglect" standard applicable to motions to set aside a default judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Bakergreen2 sentences2006See People v. Baker, supra; Estep v. People, supra; see also Singh v. Mortensun, 30 P.3d 853 (Colo.App.2001) (discussing difference between “good cause” standard applicable to motions for relief from entry of default under C.R.C.P. 55(c) and “excusable neglect” standard applicable to motions to set aside a default judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)). 2006See People v. Baker, supra; Estep v. People, supra; see also Singh v. Mortensun, 30 P.3d 853 (Colo.App.2001) (discussing difference between "good cause" standard applicable to motions for relief from entry of default under C.R.C.P. 55(c) and "excusable neglect" standard applicable to motions to set aside a default judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)). | 4 | 4 |
Estep v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2024Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo. 1973); see Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241, 1247 (Colo. 1988) (adopting the excusable neglect standard from Farmers Insurance Group in the context of criminal appeals). 1991Group." Estep, 753 P.2d at 1247 . | 1 | 2 |
Farmers Insurance Gr. v. District Court of SEC. JDgreen1 sentence2024Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo. 1973); see Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241, 1247 (Colo. 1988) (adopting the excusable neglect standard from Farmers Insurance Group in the context of criminal appeals). | 1 | 1 |
Goodman Associates, LLC v. WP Mountain Properties, LLCgreen2 sentences2018See Goodman, 222 P.3d at 320 . ¶ 83 From the information presently available (and acknowledging that Taylor’s claim has not been tested by the adversary process), it 35 appears that Taylor has a meritorious cause of action resulting from a foreign object being left in her body during surgery, and significant injuries suffered from that alleged malpractice. 2018To the contrary, on the very day that the court dismissed the case, she moved to set aside the dismissal and ultimately presented extensive evidence explaining her failure to timely serve the defendants. ¶ 86 Considering (balancing) the three components of the excusable neglect test, there is no reasonable result other than to give Taylor 36 an opportunity to prove her claims on the merits.4 “[B]ecause resolution of disputes on their merits is favored, the criteria for vacating a default judgment should be liberally construed in favor of the movant, especially when the motion is promptly made. | 1 | 1 |
Sumler v. District Court, City & County of Denvergreen1 sentence2018Court, 889 P.2d 50, 56 (Colo. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martinez-Huertagreen1 sentence2017People v. Martinez-Huerta, 2015 COA 69, ¶ 12 (citing Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015, 1019-20 (Colo. 2008); Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 441-42 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Xue Xionggreen1 sentence2017People v. Xiong, 940 P.2d 1119, 1119 (Colo. App. 1997) (A court may summarily deny an untimely request “if the defendant has failed to allege facts which, if true, would establish justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.”). | 1 | 1 |
Close v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2017People v. Martinez-Huerta, 2015 COA 69, ¶ 12 (citing Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015, 1019-20 (Colo. 2008); Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 441-42 ). | 1 | 1 |
Biella v. State Department of Highwaysgreen1 sentence2010See Biella v. State Dep't of Highways, 652 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Colo.App. 1982) (citing Riss v. Air Rental, Inc., 136 Colo. 216 , 315 P.2d 820 (1957); see also Williams v. Swanson, 57 Fed.Appx. 784, 788 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that the requirement of a meritorious defense "is in addition to the threshold showing of excusable neglect," (emphasis in original), and that upon finding no excusable neglect, the trial court was not required to address arguments as to a meritorious defense). | 1 | 1 |
Riss v. Air Rental, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Biella v. State Dep't of Highways, 652 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Colo.App. 1982) (citing Riss v. Air Rental, Inc., 136 Colo. 216 , 315 P.2d 820 (1957); see also Williams v. Swanson, 57 Fed.Appx. 784, 788 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that the requirement of a meritorious defense "is in addition to the threshold showing of excusable neglect," (emphasis in original), and that upon finding no excusable neglect, the trial court was not required to address arguments as to a meritorious defense). 2010See Biella v. State Dep't of Highways, 652 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Colo.App. 1982) (citing Riss v. Air Rental, Inc., 136 Colo. 216 , 315 P.2d 820 (1957); see also Williams v. Swanson, 57 Fed.Appx. 784, 788 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that the requirement of a meritorious defense "is in addition to the threshold showing of excusable neglect," (emphasis in original), and that upon finding no excusable neglect, the trial court was not required to address arguments as to a meritorious defense). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Swansongreen1 sentence2010See Biella v. State Dep't of Highways, 652 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Colo.App. 1982) (citing Riss v. Air Rental, Inc., 136 Colo. 216 , 315 P.2d 820 (1957); see also Williams v. Swanson, 57 Fed.Appx. 784, 788 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that the requirement of a meritorious defense "is in addition to the threshold showing of excusable neglect," (emphasis in original), and that upon finding no excusable neglect, the trial court was not required to address arguments as to a meritorious defense). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wiedemer
green
2 sentences2017People v. Martinez-Huerta, 2015 COA 69, ¶ 12 (citing Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015, 1019-20 (Colo. 2008); Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 441-42 ). 1996A division of this court remanded the cause with directions that the trial court reconsider its ruling with respect to the 1989 conviction in light of the excusable neglect exception announced in People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo.1993). | 2 | 1996–2017 |
SL GROUP, LLC v. Go West Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011While "excusable neglect" is not defined by statute, "it is clearly an element of a statutory scheme designed ... to increase the likelihood that parties actually affected by the adjudication will have a meaningful opportunity to be heard, despite the statute's abandonment of a requirement of personal service." Id. 2011In SL Group, 42 P.3d at 641 , we construed the excusable neglect requirement in the 1969 Act as an extension of due process notice concerns. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.