impeachment exception in Colorado

2021Johnson, ¶ 1. ¶10 The division majority primarily based its reasoning on the holdings from two United States Supreme Court cases: Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (recognizing the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule by holding that evidence unconstitutionally seized under the Fourth Amendment is admissible to impeach a defendant’s untruthful testimony), and James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 320 (1990) (holding that illegally obtained evidence may not be used to impeach a defense witness’s testimony).

2021Our decision in LeMasters makes it clear that the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule permits the prosecution to admit previously suppressed 12 evidence on cross-examination to impeach a defendant’s untruthful testimony on direct examination, but only when there is an apparent nexus between the defendant’s testimony and the suppressed evidence that contradicts the untruthful testimony. ¶27 Finally, in James, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the impeachment exception allowed the use of suppressed evidence to impeach the testimony of defense witnesses in order to dete

2021After stressing the “importance of arriving at the truth in criminal trials, as well as the defendant’s obligation to speak the truth in response to proper questions,” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , the Court held that “a defendant’s statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant’s direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is inadmissible on the government’s direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt,” id. at 627–28. 11 ¶24 While Havens

2021After stressing the “importance of arriving at the truth in criminal trials, as well as the defendant’s obligation to speak the truth in response to proper questions,” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 , the Court held that “a defendant’s statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant’s direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is inadmissible on the government’s direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt,” id. at 627–28. 11 ¶24 While Havens

2021See James, 493 U.S. at 318 (explaining that it is “far more than a ‘speculative possibility’ that police misconduct will be encouraged by permitting such use of illegally obtained evidence” because “police officers and their superiors would recognize that obtaining evidence through illegal means stacks the deck heavily in the prosecution’s favor” (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 )). ¶33 More significantly, expanding the impeachment exception to encompass defendants’ truthful testimony “likely would chill some defendants from presenting their best defense and sometimes any defense at all.” Id.

2021See James, 493 U.S. at 318 (explaining that it is “far more than a ‘speculative possibility’ that police misconduct will be encouraged by permitting such use of illegally obtained evidence” because “police officers and their superiors would recognize that obtaining evidence through illegal means stacks the deck heavily in the prosecution’s favor” (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 )). ¶33 More significantly, expanding the impeachment exception to encompass defendants’ truthful testimony “likely would chill some defendants from presenting their best defense and sometimes any defense at all.” Id.

2021Johnson, ¶ 1. ¶10 The division majority primarily based its reasoning on the holdings from two United States Supreme Court cases: Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (recognizing the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule by holding that evidence unconstitutionally seized under the Fourth Amendment is admissible to impeach a defendant’s untruthful testimony), and James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 320 (1990) (holding that illegally obtained evidence may not be used to impeach a defense witness’s testimony).

2021The Court held that the protection of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right did not provide “justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.” Id. ¶23 The Supreme Court revisited the impeachment exception in Havens.

2025People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (An issue for review is unpreserved when a party makes an objection “on unspecific grounds which would not have alerted the trial court to the issue of which the [party] now seeks review.”). ¶ 20 Accordingly we review this issue for plain error.

1983See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 , 99 S.Ct. 1292 , 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979), and Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1980).

1983See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 , 99 S.Ct. 1292 , 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979), and Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1980).

1983See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 , 99 S.Ct. 1292 , 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979), and Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1980).

1983See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 , 99 S.Ct. 1292 , 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979), and Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1980).