impeachment inquiry in Connecticut

2008Where the defendant admits to prior convictions on direct examination, the customary impeachment inquiry on cross-examination is limited to the name of the crime and the date of conviction . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vitale, 76 Conn. App. 1, 9 , 818 A.2d 134 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 906 , 826 A.2d 178 (2003).

2007The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible . . . because they must be excluded where their prejudicial tendency outweighs their probative value.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 906 , 826 A.2d 178 (2003).

2008Where the defendant admits to prior convictions on direct examination, the customary impeachment inquiry on cross-examination is limited to the name of the crime and the date of conviction . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vitale, 76 Conn. App. 1, 9 , 818 A.2d 134 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 906 , 826 A.2d 178 (2003).

2007The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible . . . because they must be excluded where their prejudicial tendency outweighs their probative value.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 906 , 826 A.2d 178 (2003).

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025This overly broad appli- cation of the impeachment exception too readily abandons the role that the exclusionary rule serves in 15 Although I have not found any federal court of appeals decisions that have squarely addressed the distinction I elaborate in this opinion between a contradiction and an inconsistency, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that the impeachment of a defendant’s trial testimony using illegally obtained statements ‘‘is governed by [the] common-law principles’’ of ‘‘impeachment by contradiction . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.)

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Ed. 2d 498 (1977); 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27 0 Conn. 0 ,0 29 State v. Haynes see State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 58 , 375 A.2d 1116 (1977) (illegally obtained statement may be used at trial only ‘‘for the purpose of impeaching [the defendant’s] credibility, not generally, but specifically with regard to a contradiction, reasonably inferred, between issues initiated by him on direct examination and the impeaching statement’’), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 , 98 S. Ct. 739 , 54 L.

2025Ed. 2d 498 (1977); 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27 0 Conn. 0 ,0 29 State v. Haynes see State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 58 , 375 A.2d 1116 (1977) (illegally obtained statement may be used at trial only ‘‘for the purpose of impeaching [the defendant’s] credibility, not generally, but specifically with regard to a contradiction, reasonably inferred, between issues initiated by him on direct examination and the impeaching statement’’), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 , 98 S. Ct. 739 , 54 L.

2025In line with these authorities, Maryland’s highest court has held that the impeachment exception for statements taken in violation of Miranda ‘‘does not extend to the defendant’s credibility generally, but to his specific credibility arising from a realistic contra- diction between the issues he initiated on direct exami- nation and the impeaching statement.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 49 , 375 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 , 98 S. Ct. 646 , 54 L.

2025In line with these authorities, Maryland’s highest court has held that the impeachment exception for statements taken in violation of Miranda ‘‘does not extend to the defendant’s credibility generally, but to his specific credibility arising from a realistic contra- diction between the issues he initiated on direct exami- nation and the impeaching statement.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 49 , 375 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 , 98 S. Ct. 646 , 54 L.

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Ed. 2d 498 (1977); 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27 0 Conn. 0 ,0 29 State v. Haynes see State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 58 , 375 A.2d 1116 (1977) (illegally obtained statement may be used at trial only ‘‘for the purpose of impeaching [the defendant’s] credibility, not generally, but specifically with regard to a contradiction, reasonably inferred, between issues initiated by him on direct examination and the impeaching statement’’), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 , 98 S. Ct. 739 , 54 L.

2025Ed. 2d 498 (1977); 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27 0 Conn. 0 ,0 29 State v. Haynes see State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 58 , 375 A.2d 1116 (1977) (illegally obtained statement may be used at trial only ‘‘for the purpose of impeaching [the defendant’s] credibility, not generally, but specifically with regard to a contradiction, reasonably inferred, between issues initiated by him on direct examination and the impeaching statement’’), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 , 98 S. Ct. 739 , 54 L.

2025In line with these authorities, Maryland’s highest court has held that the impeachment exception for statements taken in violation of Miranda ‘‘does not extend to the defendant’s credibility generally, but to his specific credibility arising from a realistic contra- diction between the issues he initiated on direct exami- nation and the impeaching statement.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 49 , 375 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 , 98 S. Ct. 646 , 54 L.

2025In line with these authorities, Maryland’s highest court has held that the impeachment exception for statements taken in violation of Miranda ‘‘does not extend to the defendant’s credibility generally, but to his specific credibility arising from a realistic contra- diction between the issues he initiated on direct exami- nation and the impeaching statement.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 49 , 375 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 , 98 S. Ct. 646 , 54 L.

2008“When prior convictions are admitted to impeach the credibility of a witness through a general inference of bad character, the facts underlying the conviction are generally inadmissible. . . . [CJross examination, in quest for the truth, provides a means for discrediting the testimony of a witness . . . and matters that may not otherwise be relevant become so for the purpose of credibility.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marino, 23 Conn. App. 392, 403 , 580 A.2d 990 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 818 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990).

2008“When prior convictions are admitted to impeach the credibility of a witness through a general inference of bad character, the facts underlying the conviction are generally inadmissible. . . . [CJross examination, in quest for the truth, provides a means for discrediting the testimony of a witness . . . and matters that may not otherwise be relevant become so for the purpose of credibility.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marino, 23 Conn. App. 392, 403 , 580 A.2d 990 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 818 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990).

2008“When prior convictions are admitted to impeach the credibility of a witness through a general inference of bad character, the facts underlying the conviction are generally inadmissible. . . . [CJross examination, in quest for the truth, provides a means for discrediting the testimony of a witness . . . and matters that may not otherwise be relevant become so for the purpose of credibility.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marino, 23 Conn. App. 392, 403 , 580 A.2d 990 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 818 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990).

2008“When prior convictions are admitted to impeach the credibility of a witness through a general inference of bad character, the facts underlying the conviction are generally inadmissible. . . . [CJross examination, in quest for the truth, provides a means for discrediting the testimony of a witness . . . and matters that may not otherwise be relevant become so for the purpose of credibility.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marino, 23 Conn. App. 392, 403 , 580 A.2d 990 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 818 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990).

2003The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible . . . because they must be excluded where their prejudicial tendency outweighs their probative value.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 765 , 772 A.2d 703 , cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921 , 774 A.2d 141 (2001).

2003The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible . . . because they must be excluded where their prejudicial tendency outweighs their probative value.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 765 , 772 A.2d 703 , cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921 , 774 A.2d 141 (2001).

2003The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible . . . because they must be excluded where their prejudicial tendency outweighs their probative value.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 765 , 772 A.2d 703 , cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921 , 774 A.2d 141 (2001).

2003The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible . . . because they must be excluded where their prejudicial tendency outweighs their probative value.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 765 , 772 A.2d 703 , cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921 , 774 A.2d 141 (2001).

2001The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible; State v. Denby, 198 Conn. 23, 30 , 501 A.2d 1206 (1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1097 , 106 S. Ct. 1497 , 89 L.

2001The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible; State v. Denby, 198 Conn. 23, 30 , 501 A.2d 1206 (1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1097 , 106 S. Ct. 1497 , 89 L.

2001Where the defendant admits to prior convictions on direct examination, the customary impeachment inquiry on cross-examination is limited to “the name of the crime and the date of conviction . . . .” State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 8 , 480 A.2d 489 (1984).

2001Where the defendant admits to prior convictions on direct examination, the customary impeachment inquiry on cross-examination is limited to “the name of the crime and the date of conviction . . . .” State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 8 , 480 A.2d 489 (1984).

2001The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible; State v. Denby, 198 Conn. 23, 30 , 501 A.2d 1206 (1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1097 , 106 S. Ct. 1497 , 89 L.

2001The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible; State v. Denby, 198 Conn. 23, 30 , 501 A.2d 1206 (1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1097 , 106 S. Ct. 1497 , 89 L.

2001The facts underlying the prior conviction are generally inadmissible; State v. Denby, 198 Conn. 23, 30 , 501 A.2d 1206 (1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1097 , 106 S. Ct. 1497 , 89 L.