improperly rejected claim in Connecticut

2026II The petitioner contends that the court improperly rejected his claim that McIntyre provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise claims in his prior habeas action regarding Pickering’s failure (1) to object to the admission of certain evidence pertaining to the victim’s autopsy on the basis that it violated the petitioner’s right to confrontation under the United States constitution pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , because the associate medical examiner who conducted the autopsy did not testify at the petitioner’s criminal trial and therefore was not subject to

2025On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly rejected his claim that his prior habeas counsel performed deficiently by failing to allege that (1) both his trial counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise the claim that the admission of a jailhouse informant’s statements at trial violated his right to confrontation under the United States constitution pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), and (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he waived the petitioner’s claim

2019II We next turn to the petitioner's claim that the court improperly rejected his claim that the prosecution suppressed evidence favorable to him in violation of Brady v. Maryland , supra, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 .

2019II We next turn to the petitioner's claim that the court improperly rejected his claim that the prosecution suppressed evidence favorable to him in violation of Brady v. Maryland , supra, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 .

2025On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly rejected his claim that his prior habeas counsel performed deficiently by failing to allege that (1) both his trial counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise the claim that the admission of a jailhouse informant’s statements at trial violated his right to confrontation under the United States constitution pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), and (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he waived the petitioner’s claim

2025On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly rejected his claim that his prior habeas counsel performed deficiently by failing to allege that (1) both his trial counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise the claim that the admission of a jailhouse informant’s statements at trial violated his right to confrontation under the United States constitution pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), and (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he waived the petitioner’s claim

2024Put another way, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor harbored genuine animus toward the defendant, or was prevailed upon to bring the charges by another with animus such that the prosecutor could be considered a stalking horse, and (2) [the defendant] would not have been prosecuted except for the animus.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lee, 86 Conn. App. 323, 328 , 860 A.2d 1268 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 921 , 867 A.2d 839 (2005). ‘‘A . . . court’s factual findings on prosecutorial vindictiveness are reviewed for clear error and the legal principles which guide

2024Put another way, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor harbored genuine animus toward the defendant, or was prevailed upon to bring the charges by another with animus such that the prosecutor could be considered a stalking horse, and (2) [the defendant] would not have been prosecuted except for the animus.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lee, 86 Conn. App. 323, 328 , 860 A.2d 1268 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 921 , 867 A.2d 839 (2005). ‘‘A . . . court’s factual findings on prosecutorial vindictiveness are reviewed for clear error and the legal principles which guide

2024Put another way, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor harbored genuine animus toward the defendant, or was prevailed upon to bring the charges by another with animus such that the prosecutor could be considered a stalking horse, and (2) [the defendant] would not have been prosecuted except for the animus.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lee, 86 Conn. App. 323, 328 , 860 A.2d 1268 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 921 , 867 A.2d 839 (2005). ‘‘A . . . court’s factual findings on prosecutorial vindictiveness are reviewed for clear error and the legal principles which guide

2024Put another way, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor harbored genuine animus toward the defendant, or was prevailed upon to bring the charges by another with animus such that the prosecutor could be considered a stalking horse, and (2) [the defendant] would not have been prosecuted except for the animus.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lee, 86 Conn. App. 323, 328 , 860 A.2d 1268 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 921 , 867 A.2d 839 (2005). ‘‘A . . . court’s factual findings on prosecutorial vindictiveness are reviewed for clear error and the legal principles which guide

2024On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly rejected his claim of selective prosecution, arguing that the court ignored the allegations of a ‘‘ ‘scheme’ ’’ that allegedly involved several individuals, all of whom, he contends, were similarly situated, and that the only difference between him and those other individuals was that he was the only one who exercised his right to counsel. ‘‘In cases in which the defense of selective prosecution has been asserted, before a motion to dismiss can be granted, the defendant must prove (1) that others similarly situated have generally not be

2024On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly rejected his claim of selective prosecution, arguing that the court ignored the allegations of a ‘‘ ‘scheme’ ’’ that allegedly involved several individuals, all of whom, he contends, were similarly situated, and that the only difference between him and those other individuals was that he was the only one who exercised his right to counsel. ‘‘In cases in which the defense of selective prosecution has been asserted, before a motion to dismiss can be granted, the defendant must prove (1) that others similarly situated have generally not be

2022C Next, the petitioner claims that the court improperly rejected his claim that the representation he received from trial counsel was ineffective because they failed to ‘‘make an adequate and appropriate objection, pursuant to State v. Morales, [ 232 Conn. 707 , 657 A.2d 585 (1995)], to the state’s failure to preserve and make available the vehicle that the officers occupied at the time of the shooting . . . .’’ We are not persuaded.

2022C Next, the petitioner claims that the court improperly rejected his claim that the representation he received from trial counsel was ineffective because they failed to ‘‘make an adequate and appropriate objection, pursuant to State v. Morales, [ 232 Conn. 707 , 657 A.2d 585 (1995)], to the state’s failure to preserve and make available the vehicle that the officers occupied at the time of the shooting . . . .’’ We are not persuaded.

2015This court is not compelled to consider issues neither alleged in the habeas petition nor considered at the habeas proceeding . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, 131 Conn. App. 820, 822 , 29 8 As one of the grounds set forth in his petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner stated that ‘‘[the] court erred in its ruling to admit . . . [federal Drug Enforcement Agency] phone records only as a partial, and not [a] full, exhibit.’’ In the context of the present claim, the petitioner does not set forth a claim with respect

2013The petitioner argues that he presented “newly discovered evidence” in support of this claim, specifically, “[the] previously unavailable testimony of Dr. Kapoor indicating that [he] had spatial and perceptual deficits which greatly supported his claim of innocence.” “In Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745, 747 , 700 A.2d 1108 (1997), our Supreme Court held that the proper standard for evaluating a freestanding claim of actual innocence ... is twofold.

2013The petitioner argues that he presented “newly discovered evidence” in support of this claim, specifically, “[the] previously unavailable testimony of Dr. Kapoor indicating that [he] had spatial and perceptual deficits which greatly supported his claim of innocence.” “In Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745, 747 , 700 A.2d 1108 (1997), our Supreme Court held that the proper standard for evaluating a freestanding claim of actual innocence ... is twofold.

2012“To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, *156 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2012“To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, *156 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2009The petitioner asserts that pursuant to State v. Jurado, 109 Conn. App. 628 , 952 A.2d 812 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 937 , 958 A.2d *387 1246 (2008), prejudice must be presumed “[w]here a potentially biased juror is allowed to sit on a jury . . . .” We conclude that counsel’s performance was not deficient and that this is dispositive of the petitioner’s claim.

2009The petitioner asserts that pursuant to State v. Jurado, 109 Conn. App. 628 , 952 A.2d 812 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 937 , 958 A.2d *387 1246 (2008), prejudice must be presumed “[w]here a potentially biased juror is allowed to sit on a jury . . . .” We conclude that counsel’s performance was not deficient and that this is dispositive of the petitioner’s claim.

2009The petitioner asserts that pursuant to State v. Jurado, 109 Conn. App. 628 , 952 A.2d 812 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 937 , 958 A.2d *387 1246 (2008), prejudice must be presumed “[w]here a potentially biased juror is allowed to sit on a jury . . . .” We conclude that counsel’s performance was not deficient and that this is dispositive of the petitioner’s claim.

2006A sentence imposed in an illegal manner is one “within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates [a] defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 444 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988). 2 I The defendant argues t

2006A sentence imposed in an illegal manner is one “within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates [a] defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 444 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988). 2 I The defendant argues t

2006The defendant did not raise that claim in his motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the court, therefore, did not address it. “[B]ecause [appellate] review is limited to matters in the record, we will not address issues not decided by the trial court.” Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 52 , 717 A.2d 77 (1998).

2006The defendant did not raise that claim in his motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the court, therefore, did not address it. “[B]ecause [appellate] review is limited to matters in the record, we will not address issues not decided by the trial court.” Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 52 , 717 A.2d 77 (1998).

2006A sentence imposed in an illegal manner is one “within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates [a] defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 444 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988). 2 I The defendant argues t

2006A sentence imposed in an illegal manner is one “within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates [a] defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 444 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988). 2 I The defendant argues t

1992He claims that the court improperly rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 3 because as a matter of law: (1) the failure of his counsel to raise on appeal a claim of dilution of the burden of proof, under this court’s decision in State v. Rodgers, 198 Conn. 53 , 502 A.2d 360 (1985), and its progeny, established prejudice; and (2) that same failure also established his counsel’s deficient performance.

1992He claims that the court improperly rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 3 because as a matter of law: (1) the failure of his counsel to raise on appeal a claim of dilution of the burden of proof, under this court’s decision in State v. Rodgers, 198 Conn. 53 , 502 A.2d 360 (1985), and its progeny, established prejudice; and (2) that same failure also established his counsel’s deficient performance.

1992We hold that the petitioner did not suffer prejudice, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment. 4 The petitioner’s claims arise out of the direct appeal of his conviction of three counts of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) (1), and two counts of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (2). 5 State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629 , 522 A.2d 795 (1987).

1992We hold that the petitioner did not suffer prejudice, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment. 4 The petitioner’s claims arise out of the direct appeal of his conviction of three counts of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) (1), and two counts of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (2). 5 State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629 , 522 A.2d 795 (1987).