two step analysis in District of Columbia

2006Saunders v. United States, 508 A.2d 92, 95 (D.C.1986) (citing Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985)); see Smith v. United States, 474 A.2d 1271, 1274 (D.C.1983).

1991The decision to revoke probation is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and “typically involves a two step analysis: ‘(1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation.’ ” Saunders, 508 A.2d at 95 (quoting Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985)).

2006Saunders v. United States, 508 A.2d 92, 95 (D.C.1986) (citing Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985)); see Smith v. United States, 474 A.2d 1271, 1274 (D.C.1983).

1986II The decision whether to revoke probation is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and typically involves a two step analysis: “(1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation.” Black v. Romano, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2258 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985); see Smith v. United States, 474 A.2d 1271, 1274 (f).C. 1983). 6 Thus, the trial court may only revoke probation upon a finding that the express cond

1991The decision to revoke probation is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and “typically involves a two step analysis: ‘(1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation.’ ” Saunders, 508 A.2d at 95 (quoting Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985)).

1991The decision to revoke probation is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and “typically involves a two step analysis: ‘(1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation.’ ” Saunders, 508 A.2d at 95 (quoting Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985)).

2016Ordinarily, “[p]roper application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel requires a two- step inquiry.” In re Wilde, 68 A.3d 749, 759 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Modiri, supra, 904 A.2d at 395 ).

2012The government responds that appellant’s due process rights were not violated because the government had the same legal theory, albeit under slightly different factual scenarios, at both proceedings. “[T]he decision to revoke probation is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and typically involves a two step analysis: (1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation, and (2) a discretionary determination as to whether violation of a condition warrants revocation.” Brown v. United States, 900 A.2d 184, 188 (D.C.2006).

2000“The decision whether to revoke probation involves a two step inquiry: (1) determining whether a violation has occurred, and if so, (2) determining what action, if any, should be taken as a result.” Harris v. United States, supra, 612 A.2d at 203 (other citations omitted).

2000The determination of whether a violation has occurred “is essentially a factual one,” id. at 203 , and is therefore viewed deferentially under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.

1996See Perry v. State, 893 P.2d 521, 533 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) ("To support a finding that a defendant committed murder in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, the State must show the murder was preceded by torture or physical abuse, which may include the infliction of either great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty.”); Nuckols v. State, 805 P.2d 672, 674 (Okla.Crim.App.1991) (requiring a two step analysis, in which the jury must make a threshold finding of torture or physical abuse before it may proceed to consider whether the murder was EHAC); Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330,

1996See Perry v. State, 893 P.2d 521, 533 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) ("To support a finding that a defendant committed murder in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, the State must show the murder was preceded by torture or physical abuse, which may include the infliction of either great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty.”); Nuckols v. State, 805 P.2d 672, 674 (Okla.Crim.App.1991) (requiring a two step analysis, in which the jury must make a threshold finding of torture or physical abuse before it may proceed to consider whether the murder was EHAC); Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330,

1996See Perry v. State, 893 P.2d 521, 533 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) ("To support a finding that a defendant committed murder in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, the State must show the murder was preceded by torture or physical abuse, which may include the infliction of either great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty.”); Nuckols v. State, 805 P.2d 672, 674 (Okla.Crim.App.1991) (requiring a two step analysis, in which the jury must make a threshold finding of torture or physical abuse before it may proceed to consider whether the murder was EHAC); Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330,

1996See Perry v. State, 893 P.2d 521, 533 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) ("To support a finding that a defendant committed murder in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, the State must show the murder was preceded by torture or physical abuse, which may include the infliction of either great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty.”); Nuckols v. State, 805 P.2d 672, 674 (Okla.Crim.App.1991) (requiring a two step analysis, in which the jury must make a threshold finding of torture or physical abuse before it may proceed to consider whether the murder was EHAC); Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330,

1996See Perry v. State, 893 P.2d 521, 533 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) ("To support a finding that a defendant committed murder in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, the State must show the murder was preceded by torture or physical abuse, which may include the infliction of either great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty.”); Nuckols v. State, 805 P.2d 672, 674 (Okla.Crim.App.1991) (requiring a two step analysis, in which the jury must make a threshold finding of torture or physical abuse before it may proceed to consider whether the murder was EHAC); Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330,

1996See Perry v. State, 893 P.2d 521, 533 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) ("To support a finding that a defendant committed murder in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, the State must show the murder was preceded by torture or physical abuse, which may include the infliction of either great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty.”); Nuckols v. State, 805 P.2d 672, 674 (Okla.Crim.App.1991) (requiring a two step analysis, in which the jury must make a threshold finding of torture or physical abuse before it may proceed to consider whether the murder was EHAC); Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330,

1986Carradine v. United States, 420 A.2d 1385, 1389 (D.C.1980).

1978Judge Youngdahl announced one exception to his formulation (with which we need not deal here). “[T]he Court is in agreement with those jurisdictions which hold minor automobile drivers and motorcycle riders to the adult standard of care and the negligence per se rule . . .” Herrell v. Pimsler, supra at 1172.