two step analysis in Connecticut

2008“The two steps are separate and distinct: (1) whether [impropriety] occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that [impropriety] deprived a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 572 , 849 A.2d 626 (2004).

2008“The two steps are separate and distinct: (1) whether [impropriety] occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that [impropriety] deprived a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 572 , 849 A.2d 626 (2004).

2017The ultimate determination of whether a defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation, therefore, presents a mixed question of law and fact, over which our review is de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mitchell , 296 Conn. 449 , 459, 996 A.2d 251 (2010). "[W]hether a defendant was subjected to interrogation ... involves a similar two step inquiry ....

2017The ultimate determination of whether a defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation, therefore, presents a mixed question of law and fact, over which our review is de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mitchell , 296 Conn. 449 , 459, 996 A.2d 251 (2010). "[W]hether a defendant was subjected to interrogation ... involves a similar two step inquiry ....

2017Because this framework is analogous to the determination of whether a defendant is in custody, the ultimate determination, therefore, of whether a defendant already in custody has been subjected to interrogation also presents a mixed question of law and fact over which our review is plenary, tempered by our scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence." (Citation omitted.) State v. Mullins , 288 Conn. 345 , 364, 952 A.2d 784 (2008).

2017Because this framework is analogous to the determination of whether a defendant is in custody, the ultimate determination, therefore, of whether a defendant already in custody has been subjected to interrogation also presents a mixed question of law and fact over which our review is plenary, tempered by our scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence." (Citation omitted.) State v. Mullins , 288 Conn. 345 , 364, 952 A.2d 784 (2008).

1986We then determine whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574, 576 , 500 A.2d 539 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984).” State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 352 , 503 A.2d 566 (1986).

1986We then determine whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574, 576 , 500 A.2d 539 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984).” State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 352 , 503 A.2d 566 (1986).

1986We then determine whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574, 576 , 500 A.2d 539 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984).” State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 352 , 503 A.2d 566 (1986).

1986We then determine whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574, 576 , 500 A.2d 539 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984).” State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 352 , 503 A.2d 566 (1986).

2024These factors include: the extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by defense conduct or argument . . . the severity of the [impropriety] . . . the frequency of the [impropriety] . . . the centrality of the [impropriety] to the critical issues in the case . . . the strength of the curative mea- sures adopted . . . and the strength of the state’s case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hinds, 344 Conn. 541 , 563–64, 280 A.3d 446 (2022). 273 A.3d 661 , cert. denied, U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 263 , 214 L.

2022Rather, the party seeking plain error review must demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Darryl W., 303 Conn. 353, 373 , 33 A.3d 239 (2012).

2022Rather, the party seeking plain error review must demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Darryl W., 303 Conn. 353, 373 , 33 A.3d 239 (2012).

2021A Federal Excessive Fines Clause In order to determine whether a financial penalty is unconstitutional under the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment to the federal constitution, courts rely on the two step inquiry established in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 , 118 S. Ct. 2028 , 141 L.

2021A Federal Excessive Fines Clause In order to determine whether a financial penalty is unconstitutional under the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment to the federal constitution, courts rely on the two step inquiry established in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 , 118 S. Ct. 2028 , 141 L.

2019State v. Warholic, 278 Conn. 354, 361 , 897 A.2d 569 (2006).

2019State v. Warholic, 278 Conn. 354, 361 , 897 A.2d 569 (2006).

2019In addition, the plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruocco, 322 Conn. 796, 803 , 144 A.3d 354 (2016). ‘‘Our Supreme Court . . . clarified the two step framework under which we review claims of plain error.

2019In addition, the plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruocco, 322 Conn. 796, 803 , 144 A.3d 354 (2016). ‘‘Our Supreme Court . . . clarified the two step framework under which we review claims of plain error.

2016Because this framework is analogous to the determina- tion of whether a defendant is in custody, the ultimate determination, therefore, of whether a defendant already in custody has been subjected to interrogation also presents a mixed question of law and fact over which our review is plenary, tempered by our scrupu- lous examination of the record to ascertain whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 364 , 952 A.2d 784 (2008), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242 , 248, 253, 61 A.3d 1084

2016Because this framework is analogous to the determina- tion of whether a defendant is in custody, the ultimate determination, therefore, of whether a defendant already in custody has been subjected to interrogation also presents a mixed question of law and fact over which our review is plenary, tempered by our scrupu- lous examination of the record to ascertain whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 364 , 952 A.2d 784 (2008), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242 , 248, 253, 61 A.3d 1084

2016In State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270 , 276 n.3, 623 A.2d 42 (1993), our Supreme Court noted: ‘‘We believe that Jackson v. Virginia, supra, [319] compels the conclusion that any defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence has been deprived of a constitutional right, and would there- fore necessarily meet the four prongs of Golding.

2016In State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270 , 276 n.3, 623 A.2d 42 (1993), our Supreme Court noted: ‘‘We believe that Jackson v. Virginia, supra, [319] compels the conclusion that any defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence has been deprived of a constitutional right, and would there- fore necessarily meet the four prongs of Golding.

2016The United States Supreme Court held in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Jackson v. Virginia, supra, at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , the court provided a two step analysis for constitutional challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal defendant's conviction.

2016The United States Supreme Court held in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Jackson v. Virginia, supra, at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , the court provided a two step analysis for constitutional challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal defendant's conviction.

2015This involves: ‘‘(1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would antici- pate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan Transportation, Inc. v. M & G Associates, 266 Conn. 520 , 525–26, 832 A.2d 1180 (2003).

2015This involves: ‘‘(1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would antici- pate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan Transportation, Inc. v. M & G Associates, 266 Conn. 520 , 525–26, 832 A.2d 1180 (2003).

2014This principle is echoed in Practice Book § 35a- 12A (d), which provides that ‘‘the moving party has the burden of proof that the proposed guardian is suitable and worthy and that transfer of guardianship is in the best interests of the child.’’ See also In re Averiella P., 146 Conn. App. 800, 804 , 81 A.3d 272 (2013) (applying best interests standard to motion to transfer guard- ianship).

2014This principle is echoed in Practice Book § 35a- 12A (d), which provides that ‘‘the moving party has the burden of proof that the proposed guardian is suitable and worthy and that transfer of guardianship is in the best interests of the child.’’ See also In re Averiella P., 146 Conn. App. 800, 804 , 81 A.3d 272 (2013) (applying best interests standard to motion to transfer guard- ianship).

2012See State v. Davis, supra, 29 and n.7 (challenging propriety of Appellate Court’s conclusion on basis of second Boscarino factor only); State v. Ellis, supra, 376 (limiting analysis to second, and only, Boscarino factor addressed by defendant); State v. Virgo, 115 Conn. App. 786, 796 , 974 A.2d 752 (2009) (defendant did not argue that second or third Boscarino factors were not satisfied, and, therefore, court addressed them only briefly), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 923 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009). 15 Prior cases involving joinder have neither expressly renounced nor invoked this two step inquiry.

2012See State v. Davis, supra, 29 and n.7 (challenging propriety of Appellate Court’s conclusion on basis of second Boscarino factor only); State v. Ellis, supra, 376 (limiting analysis to second, and only, Boscarino factor addressed by defendant); State v. Virgo, 115 Conn. App. 786, 796 , 974 A.2d 752 (2009) (defendant did not argue that second or third Boscarino factors were not satisfied, and, therefore, court addressed them only briefly), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 923 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009). 15 Prior cases involving joinder have neither expressly renounced nor invoked this two step inquiry.

2012See State v. Davis, supra, 29 and n.7 (challenging propriety of Appellate Court’s conclusion on basis of second Boscarino factor only); State v. Ellis, supra, 376 (limiting analysis to second, and only, Boscarino factor addressed by defendant); State v. Virgo, 115 Conn. App. 786, 796 , 974 A.2d 752 (2009) (defendant did not argue that second or third Boscarino factors were not satisfied, and, therefore, court addressed them only briefly), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 923 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009). 15 Prior cases involving joinder have neither expressly renounced nor invoked this two step inquiry.

2012See State v. Davis, supra, 29 and n.7 (challenging propriety of Appellate Court’s conclusion on basis of second Boscarino factor only); State v. Ellis, supra, 376 (limiting analysis to second, and only, Boscarino factor addressed by defendant); State v. Virgo, 115 Conn. App. 786, 796 , 974 A.2d 752 (2009) (defendant did not argue that second or third Boscarino factors were not satisfied, and, therefore, court addressed them only briefly), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 923 , 980 A.2d 914 (2009). 15 Prior cases involving joinder have neither expressly renounced nor invoked this two step inquiry.

2011Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Myers, 290 Conn. 278, 289 , 963 A.2d 11 (2009). “[W]e recently clarified the two step framework under which we review

2011Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Myers, 290 Conn. 278, 289 , 963 A.2d 11 (2009). “[W]e recently clarified the two step framework under which we review

2010See, e.g., State v. Savage, 34 Conn. App. 166, 172 , 640 A.2d 637 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 922 , 642 A.2d 1216 (1994); see also United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1st Cir.1976) (applying two step analysis under Fed.R.Evid. 804[b][3]); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir.1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 , 97 S.Ct. 816 , 50 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977).

2010See, e.g., State v. Savage, 34 Conn. App. 166, 172 , 640 A.2d 637 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 922 , 642 A.2d 1216 (1994); see also United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1st Cir.1976) (applying two step analysis under Fed.R.Evid. 804[b][3]); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir.1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 , 97 S.Ct. 816 , 50 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977).

2009Plain error is a doctrine that should be invoked sparingly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bowman, 289 Conn. 809, 817 , 960 A.2d 1027 (2008). “[W]e recently clarified the two step framework under which we review claims of plain error.

2009Plain error is a doctrine that should be invoked sparingly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bowman, 289 Conn. 809, 817 , 960 A.2d 1027 (2008). “[W]e recently clarified the two step framework under which we review claims of plain error.

2008Instructive in this regard is this court's decision in State v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 235 , 636 A.2d 760 (1994), wherein the issue was "the proper standard for appellate review of a trial court's denial of a motion for continuance to retain private counsel." The court noted: "The determination of whether to grant a request for a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and will not be *394 disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 239 , 636 A.2d 760 .

2008Instructive in this regard is this court's decision in State v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 235 , 636 A.2d 760 (1994), wherein the issue was "the proper standard for appellate review of a trial court's denial of a motion for continuance to retain private counsel." The court noted: "The determination of whether to grant a request for a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and will not be *394 disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 239 , 636 A.2d 760 .

2008I can find no rationale in our case law to justify a different analytical framework for improper joinder than that which we apply in every other type of nonconstitutional impropriety, wherein the court engages in a two part inquiry to determine first whether there was an impropriety, and second whether the impropriety was harmful error in light of the record as a whole. [9] Indeed, the only time the court does not apply a two step analysis is in the limited class of claims that constitutes structural error, wherein the claim "is not susceptible to a harmless error analysis. . . ." (Internal qu

2008I can find no rationale in our case law to justify a different analytical framework for improper joinder than that which we apply in every other type of nonconstitutional impropriety, wherein the court engages in a two part inquiry to determine first whether there was an impropriety, and second whether the impropriety was harmful error in light of the record as a whole. [9] Indeed, the only time the court does not apply a two step analysis is in the limited class of claims that constitutes structural error, wherein the claim "is not susceptible to a harmless error analysis. . . ." (Internal qu