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34 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
R.C. v. Indiana Department of Child Servicesgreen2 sentences2020Second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013) (quotation omitted). 2020First, the juvenile court must “ascertain what conditions led to their placement and retention in foster care.” K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). | 6 | 6 |
In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.M. and El.M., E.M. v. Indiana Department of Child Servicesgreen2 sentences2020In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 . 2018In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). | 2 | 3 |
Collins v. Daygreen2 sentences2003First, “where the legislature singles out one person or class of persons to receive a privilege or immunity not equally provided to others, such classification must be based upon distinctive, inherent characteristics which rationally distinguish the unequally treated class, and the disparate treatment must be reasonably related to such distinguishing characteristics.” Id. at 78-79 . 1999When analyzing an equal privileges claim under Article 1, Section 23, this Court applies a two step analysis as established in Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind.1994). | 1 | 2 |
Maurice M. Larry v. Ray E. Lawler, Leland L. Walton, Jayne B. Spain, Lt. Andolsek, Robert E. Hamptongreen1 sentence2020Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 11. [12] “In addressing a claim of an unconstitutional denial of procedural due process, we undertake a two step analysis.” Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1978). | 1 | 1 |
In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.W. and G.S.: H.S. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Servicesgreen1 sentence2017“The court first identifies the conditions that led to removal and then determines whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re A.W., 62 N.E.3d 1267, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)). | 1 | 1 |
Engelica E. Castillo v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2015Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 468 (Ind. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Whittington v. Stategreen1 sentence2014“When reviewing whether the State has violated Article I, Section 9, we employ the following two- step analysis.” Id. (citing Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Booher v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Terrence J. Fuqua v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2013Instead, the court recognizes a two- step analysis to determine if the trash is searchable: First, the “trash must be retrieved in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it.” Second, the search must be based on an “articulable individualized suspicion that illegal activity is or has been taking place, essentially the same as is required for a ‘Terry stop’ of an automobile.” Fuqua, 984 N.E.2d at 714 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Browngreen1 sentence2012Humphries v. Ables, 789 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Smith v. Brown, 778 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2 In regards to landscaping, Callahan asserts that he would not have had a company “bulldoze and level out and smooth out” a piece of land had he known that a portion of it was actually on Riggs’s property. | 1 | 1 |
Humphries v. Ablesgreen1 sentence2012Humphries v. Ables, 789 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Smith v. Brown, 778 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2 In regards to landscaping, Callahan asserts that he would not have had a company “bulldoze and level out and smooth out” a piece of land had he known that a portion of it was actually on Riggs’s property. | 1 | 1 |
Missi v. CCC Custom Kitchens, Inc.green1 sentence2003Missi v. CCC Custom Kitchens, Inc., 731 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2000Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438, 445 (Ind.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. Stategreen1 sentence1996In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two step analysis: “(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.” Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983), reh. denied, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 , 104 S.Ct. 1449 , 79 L.Ed.2d 767 (1984) (citing United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Mayberry v. Stategreen1 sentence1996“First, we look to see if the sentence seems to be disproportionate.” Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Ind.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Fointno v. Stategreen2 sentences1996First, we look to see if the sentence seems to be disproportionate, i.e., “manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Fointno v. State, 487 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Ind.1986). 1996First, we look to see if the sentence seems to be disproportionate, i.e., "manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Fointno v. State, 487 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Ind.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Aschliman v. Stategreen1 sentence1992See Aschliman v. State (1992), Ind., 589 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 ; Holder v. State (1991), Ind., 571 N.E2d 1250, 1256, Rogers v. State (1979), Ind., 272 Ind. 65 , 396 N.E.2d 348, 354 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lawrence v. State
green
2 sentences1995The trial court refused the requested instructions, and we analyzed the claim of error as follows: In Lawrence v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 330 , 375 N.E.2d 208 , we discussed the two step analysis for determining the propriety of instructions on lesser included offenses. 1995The trial court refused the requested instructions, and we analyzed the claim of error as follows: In Lawrence v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 330 , 375 N.E.2d 208 , we discussed the two step analysis for determining the propriety of instructions on lesser included offenses. | 5 | 1981–1995 |
Quillen v. Quillen
green
2 sentences2019Id.; Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 102 . [21] In determining whether the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother was unlikely to remedy the reasons for removal, we engage in a two- step analysis. 2018Id.; Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 102 . [16] In determining whether the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Parents were unlikely to remedy the reasons for removal, we engage in a two- step analysis. | 4 | 2017–2019 |
Roddy v. State
green
2 sentences1984Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330, 337 , 375 N.E.2d 208, 212 ; Roddy v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 1098 , *510 1102-1118 (rehearing denied). 1982A leading case on instructions for lesser included offenses is Roddy v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 1098 , where this court discussed the two step analysis used for these questions. | 2 | 1982–1984 |
Blackman v. State
green
1 sentence2014“When reviewing whether the State has violated Article I, Section 9, we employ the following two- step analysis.” Id. (citing Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
English v. McKaskle
green
2 sentences1996In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two step analysis: “(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.” Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983), reh. denied, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 , 104 S.Ct. 1449 , 79 L.Ed.2d 767 (1984) (citing United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.1979)). 1996In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two step analysis: “(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.” Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983), reh. denied, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 , 104 S.Ct. 1449 , 79 L.Ed.2d 767 (1984) (citing United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.1979)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two step analysis: “(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.” Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983), reh. denied, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 , 104 S.Ct. 1449 , 79 L.Ed.2d 767 (1984) (citing United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.1979)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Patrice Mespoulede, A/K/A \Patrice Fabre\""
green
1 sentence1996In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two step analysis: “(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.” Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983), reh. denied, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 , 104 S.Ct. 1449 , 79 L.Ed.2d 767 (1984) (citing United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.1979)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Rogers v. State
green
2 sentences1992See Aschliman v. State (1992), Ind., 589 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 ; Holder v. State (1991), Ind., 571 N.E2d 1250, 1256, Rogers v. State (1979), Ind., 272 Ind. 65 , 396 N.E.2d 348, 354 . 1992See Aschliman v. State (1992), Ind., 589 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 ; Holder v. State (1991), Ind., 571 N.E2d 1250, 1256, Rogers v. State (1979), Ind., 272 Ind. 65 , 396 N.E.2d 348, 354 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Lawrence v. State
green
1 sentence1986This standard was enumerated by this Court in Lawrence v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 1291 , in which a two step analysis was set out,. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.