Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zachary v. Stategreen2 sentences1986The appellant also argues that the concealed weapons statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to set out what behavior is prohibited where it excludes from the operation of the concealed weapons statute one carrying weapons “at his home.” In Alexander v. State, 477 So.2d 557 (Fla.1985) (quoting Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1972)), the supreme court stated: The test of a statute insofar as vagueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice_“The constitutiona 1981In Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1972), the Court stated: "The test of a statute insofar as vagueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." [Citation omitted]. | 2 | 6 |
Alexander v. Stategreen2 sentences2005The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.'" Alexander v. State, 477 So.2d 557, 560 (Fla.1985) (quoting Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669 (Fla.1972)). 1986The appellant also argues that the concealed weapons statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to set out what behavior is prohibited where it excludes from the operation of the concealed weapons statute one carrying weapons “at his home.” In Alexander v. State, 477 So.2d 557 (Fla.1985) (quoting Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1972)), the supreme court stated: The test of a statute insofar as vagueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice_“The constitutiona | 2 | 2 |
Newman v. Carsongreen2 sentences1998The statute must give reasonable notice that a person's conduct is restricted by the statute. *1151 Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426, 430 (Fla. 1973). 1990See Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426, 430 (Fla. 1973) finding section 811.165, F.S. (1970) (the predecessor statute to section 812.051) to be neither vague nor indefinite, using as its standard "whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." In Mid-Fla, the district court granted the plaintiffs' application for an order enjoining the enforcement of section 812.051, F.S. (1981), finding it to be likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on their claim that certain provisions of the statute violated the c | 2 | 2 |
Reynolds v. Stategreen2 sentences1985The statute must give reasonable notice that a person's conduct is restricted by the statute. 383 So.2d 228 at 229 (Fla. 1980). 1985The statute must give reasonable notice that a person's conduct is restricted by the statute." Reynolds v. State, 383 So.2d 228, 229 (Fla. 1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence1974(Emphasis supplied.) Also, in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970), this Court held, quoting from People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. Supp.2d 748, 92 P.2d 1039 , (1939), that: "To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited. ..." Id 237 So.2d at 141 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1974(Emphasis supplied.) Also, in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970), this Court held, quoting from People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. Supp.2d 748, 92 P.2d 1039 , (1939), that: "To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited. ..." Id 237 So.2d at 141 . 1974(Emphasis supplied.) Also, in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970), this Court held, quoting from People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. Supp.2d 748, 92 P.2d 1039 , (1939), that: "To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited. ..." Id 237 So.2d at 141 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Connally v. General Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1973Fla. 1970).” Vagueness “The test of a statute insofar as vagueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding.” Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). 1973Fla. 1970).” Vagueness “The test of a statute insofar as vagueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding.” Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
United States v. Harriss
green
2 sentences1972The test of a statute insofar as vagueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. [2] Appellant in his brief recognizes this basic test, citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 -617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 -996, to the following effect: "The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. 1972The test of a statute insofar as vagueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. [2] Appellant in his brief recognizes this basic test, citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 -617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 -996, to the following effect: "The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.