82 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 39 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Hairstongreen2 sentences2025The trial court addressed and rejected Appellant’s challenge to the admissibility of the body cam video because (a) the court’s cautionary instruction cured any potential prejudice; and (b) the evidence was relevant for the jury to determine whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury: It has been stated that “when examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 ([Pa.] 2014). 2025“When such evidence is admitted, however, the defendant is entitled upon request to a jury instruction explaining to the jury that the specific evidence is only admissible for one or more of the above-described limited purposes.” Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 37 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). “[W]hen examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). | 29 | 35 |
Commonwealth v. Dillongreen2 sentences2025Trial at 81, 175; Dillon, 925 A.2d at 141 (“[W]hen weighing the potential for prejudice, a trial court may consider how a cautionary jury instruction might ameliorate the prejudicial effect” of Rule 404(b) evidence). 2025Trial – Volume II, 1/25/24, at 160-61; Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007) (“[W]hen weighing the potential for prejudice, a trial court may consider how a cautionary jury instruction might ameliorate the prejudicial effect” of Rule 404(b) evidence). | 11 | 18 |
Commonwealth v. Sherwoodgreen2 sentences2024See also Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 603 Pa. 92, 115 , 982 A.2d 483, 497-98 (2009) (holding that cautionary instructions were sufficient to ameliorate undue prejudice caused by introduction of bad acts evidence). 2018Moreover, we emphasize that our supreme court has repeatedly recognized that “when examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 164 (2014); see also Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497-498 (Pa. 2009) (finding that cautionary instructions were sufficient to overcome the prejudicial effect of prior bad acts evidence), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1111 (2010). | 6 | 7 |
Commonwealth v. Tysongreen2 sentences2024The term “unfair prejudice” in Rule 404(b)(2) “means a tendency to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). “[W]hen examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence,” as “[j]urors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.” Tyson, 119 A.3d at 360 . 2024The term “unfair prejudice” in Rule 404(b)(2) “means a tendency to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). “[W]hen examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence,” as “[j]urors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.” Tyson, 119 A.3d at 360 (citation omitted). | 5 | 11 |
Com. v. Gilliam, K.green2 sentences2025As this Court has explained: To establish one of the exceptions set forth in Rule 404(b)(2), there must be “a close factual nexus sufficient to demonstrate the connective relevance of the prior bad acts to the crime in question[.]” Additionally, the term “unfair prejudice” in Rule 404(b)(2) “means a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” “[W]hen weighing the potential for prejudice, a trial court may consider how a cautionary jury instruction might ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the p 2025As this Court has explained: - 14 - J-S40044-24 To establish one of the exceptions set forth in Rule 404(b)(2), there must be “a close factual nexus sufficient to demonstrate the connective relevance of the prior bad acts to the crime in question[.]” Additionally, the term “unfair prejudice” in Rule 404(b)(2) “means a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” “[W]hen weighing the potential for prejudice, a trial court may consider how a cautionary jury instruction might ameliorate the prejudic | 4 | 10 |
Ruffin v. North Carolina Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2019A12033/ 19 S.Ct. 164 (2014); see also Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497-498 (Pa. 2009) (finding that cautionary instructions were sufficient to overcome the prejudicial effect of prior bad acts evidence), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1111 (2010). 2018Moreover, we emphasize that our supreme court has repeatedly recognized that “when examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 164 (2014); see also Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497-498 (Pa. 2009) (finding that cautionary instructions were sufficient to overcome the prejudicial effect of prior bad acts evidence), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1111 (2010). | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Speightgreen2 sentences2025“It is presumed the jury follows the court’s instructions.” Commonwealth v. Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 458 (Pa. 2004). 2024See N.T., 9/24/12, at 40; see also Dillon, 925 A.2d at 141 (“[W]hen weighing the potential for prejudice, a trial court may consider how a cautionary jury instruction might ameliorate the prejudicial effect” of Rule 404(b) evidence); Commonwealth v. Speight, - 17 - J-S44016-24 854 A.2d 450, 458 (Pa. 2004) (“It is presumed the jury follows [a trial] court’s instructions.”). | 3 | 3 |
Com. v. Sami, N.green2 sentences2024To establish one of the Rule 404(b) admissibility exceptions, there must be “a close factual nexus sufficient to demonstrate the connective relevance of the prior bad acts to the crime in question.” Commonwealth v. Sami, 243 A.3d 991, 999 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and emphasis omitted). 2024To establish one of the Rule 404(b) admissibility exceptions, there must be “a close factual nexus sufficient to demonstrate the connective relevance of the prior bad acts to the crime in question.” Commonwealth v. Sami, 243 A.3d 991, 999 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and emphasis omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Ivygreen2 sentences2020To determine whether the common plan or scheme exception of Rule 404(b) applies, the trial court must “examine the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator.” Cosby, 2019 PA Super 354, at *49 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 253 (Pa. Super. 2016) (explaining that the circumstances of the crimes need not be identical, but there must be a “logical connection between them.”). 2019In addition, Rule 404(b)(2) provides a res gestae exception to prior bad acts evidence that “permits the admission of evidence where it became part of the history of the case and formed part of the natural development of facts.” Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 251 (Pa. Super. 2016). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Knoxgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., id. at 867 (concluding the trial court properly admitted evidence of a prior drug transaction between defendant and victim as relevant and probative of defendant-shooter’s identity and motive of revenge); Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2013) (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that co-defendants and victim were members of rival drug distribution organizations in order to link them and suggest a motive for the killing, particularly where the trial court issued a cautionary jury instruction). 2019See, e.g., id. at 867 (concluding the trial court properly admitted evidence of a prior drug transaction between defendant and victim as relevant and probative of defendant-shooter’s identity and motive of revenge); Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2013) (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that co-defendants and victim were members of rival drug distribution organizations in order to link them and suggest a motive for the killing, particularly where the trial court issued a cautionary jury instruction). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., id. at 867 (concluding the trial court properly admitted evidence of a prior drug transaction between defendant and victim as relevant and probative of defendant-shooter’s identity and motive of revenge); Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2013) (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that co-defendants and victim were members of rival drug distribution organizations in order to link them and suggest a motive for the killing, particularly where the trial court issued a cautionary jury instruction). 2019See, e.g., id. at 867 (concluding the trial court properly admitted evidence of a prior drug transaction between defendant and victim as relevant and probative of defendant-shooter’s identity and motive of revenge); Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2013) (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that co-defendants and victim were members of rival drug distribution organizations in order to link them and suggest a motive for the killing, particularly where the trial court issued a cautionary jury instruction). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Flamergreen2 sentences2015See Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/15, at 11 (stating that “although the lyrical content of the video was mildly graphic, its prejudicial effect did not outweigh its relevance to. proving the identity of [Talbert].”); see also Flamer, 53 A.3d at 89-90 (holding that the prejudicial effect of the rap lyrics did not outweigh their relevance to show the defendant’s contemplation of a conspiratorial agreement). 2015See Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/15, at 11 (stating that “although the lyrical content of the video was mildly graphic, its prejudicial effect did not outweigh its relevance to proving the identity of [Talbert].”); see also Flamer, 53 A.3d at 89-90 (holding that the prejudicial effect of the rap lyrics did not outweigh their relevance to show the defendant’s contemplation of a conspiratorial agreement). | 2 | 2 |
Sanchez v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2019(See notes of testimony, 7/12/16 at 19-20.) Courts in this Commonwealth have long recognized that “when examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 164 (2014) (citations omitted). 2019See Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014) (stating, “[w]hen examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 164 (2014). - 14 - J. | 1 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Tedfordgreen1 sentence2025“When such evidence is admitted, however, the defendant is entitled upon request to a jury instruction explaining to the jury that the specific evidence is only admissible for one or more of the above-described limited purposes.” Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 37 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). “[W]hen examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIAgreen1 sentence2025“The law presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1184 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Roneygreen1 sentence2025We presume that jurors, when given a cautionary instruction, have followed the instruction.” Id.[;] Commonwealth v. Roney, … 79 A.3d 595, 640 ([Pa.] 2013)[;] … Harrington, … 262 A.3d [at] 645 …. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cash, O., Aplt.green2 sentences2023Moreover, “[i]t is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions[.]” Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262 , 1280 (Pa. 2016). 2023Moreover, “[i]t is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions[.]” Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1280 (Pa. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Crispell, D.green1 sentence2022See Commonwealth v. Crispell, 193 A.3d 919, 936-38 (Pa. 2018) (finding that counsel erred in not seeking to exclude evidence about prior bad acts, but holding that PCRA petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice from the admission of the evidence or the lack of a cautionary jury instruction); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 319-31 (Pa. 2011) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hutchinsongreen1 sentence2022See Commonwealth v. Crispell, 193 A.3d 919, 936-38 (Pa. 2018) (finding that counsel erred in not seeking to exclude evidence about prior bad acts, but holding that PCRA petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice from the admission of the evidence or the lack of a cautionary jury instruction); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 319-31 (Pa. 2011) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Baezgreen1 sentence2021See Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 735 (Pa. 1998) (stating that we presume that the jury follows a trial court’s instruction); see also Commonwealth v. Fortenbaugh, 69 A.3d 191, 193 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “[a] mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice”); see also Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2000) (stating that “[t]he trial court is in the best position to assess the effect of [alleged] prejudice[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Simpsongreen1 sentence2021See Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 735 (Pa. 1998) (stating that we presume that the jury follows a trial court’s instruction); see also Commonwealth v. Fortenbaugh, 69 A.3d 191, 193 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “[a] mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice”); see also Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2000) (stating that “[t]he trial court is in the best position to assess the effect of [alleged] prejudice[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fortenbaughgreen1 sentence2021See Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 735 (Pa. 1998) (stating that we presume that the jury follows a trial court’s instruction); see also Commonwealth v. Fortenbaugh, 69 A.3d 191, 193 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “[a] mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice”); see also Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2000) (stating that “[t]he trial court is in the best position to assess the effect of [alleged] prejudice[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Whitfieldgreen1 sentence2020See Rule 404, cmt; see also Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 419 A.2d 27, 29 (Pa. Super. 1980) (finding a jury can be instructed not to assume guilt simply because of gang affiliation). | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Cosby Jr., W.green1 sentence2020To determine whether the common plan or scheme exception of Rule 404(b) applies, the trial court must “examine the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator.” Cosby, 2019 PA Super 354, at *49 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 253 (Pa. Super. 2016) (explaining that the circumstances of the crimes need not be identical, but there must be a “logical connection between them.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. LaMassagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Solano, R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Beshoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Arringtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arrington v. Pennsylvaniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boles v. Rivagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Christinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. DiGiambattistagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Whitakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Geho
green
1 sentence2024Commonwealth v. Geho, 302 A.2d 463 , 465- 66 (Pa. Super. 1973) (en banc). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Gee v. Kerestes
green
1 sentence2023Appellant argues that, because he was claiming self-defense, the “proper classification of the killing [was] in dispute,” and the Commonwealth’s use of these terms prejudiced him, “as the jury [was] subtly dissuaded from considering more lenient verdicts.” Id. (citing Gee v. Kerestes, 722 F.Supp.2d 617 (E.D. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Wright v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2023Appellant argues that, because he was claiming self-defense, the “proper classification of the killing [was] in dispute,” and the Commonwealth’s use of these terms prejudiced him, “as the jury [was] subtly dissuaded from considering more lenient verdicts.” Id. (citing Gee v. Kerestes, 722 F.Supp.2d 617 (E.D. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
1 sentence2022See Kinard, supra; Brown, supra. Further, we note that “when examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143, 160 , 84 A.3d 657, 666 (2014). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. G.D.M.
green
1 sentence2019Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.” Id. at 360 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Schoff
green
1 sentence2017Appellant’s arguments herein have not demonstrated that the court’s decision was “manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record.” Schoff, supra at 154 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Robinson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Commonwealth v. Claypool green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Commonwealth v. Einhorn green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Commonwealth v. Gay green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Commonwealth v. Webster green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.